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 This Article explores the spectacular prevalence, and failure, of the single 
most common technique for protecting personal autonomy in modern society:  
mandated disclosure.  The Article has four Parts:  (1) a comprehensive sum-
mary of the recurring use of mandated disclosures, in many forms and circums-
tances, in the areas of consumer and borrower protection, patient informed con-
sent, contract formation, and constitutional rights; (2) a survey of the 
empirical literature documenting the failure of the mandated disclosure regime 
in informing people and in improving their decisions; (3) an account of the 
multitude of reasons mandated disclosures fail, focusing on the political dy-
namics underlying the enactments of these mandates, the incentives of disclosers 
to carry them out, and, most importantly, on the ability of disclosees to use 
them; and (4) an argument that mandated disclosure not only fails to achieve 
its stated goal but also leads to unintended consequences that often harm the 
very people it intends to serve. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Argument 
“Mandated disclosure” is a regulatory technique that is much used 
but little remarked.  It aspires to improve decisions people make in 
their economic and social relationships and particularly to protect the 
naïve from the sophisticated.  The technique requires “the discloser” 
to give “the disclosee” information which the disclosee may use to 
make better decisions and to keep the discloser from abusing its supe-
rior position. 
For example:  You are shopping for a loan.  Or told you need 
prostate cancer surgery.  Or buying a computer online.  Or under ar-
rest and undergoing questioning.  You have never faced this choice be-
fore.  It turns on information you do not know.  Mortgagees, doctors, 
vendors, and police are experienced and have interests of their own. 
Mandated disclosure is supposed to give you information for ana-
lyzing your choices critically and to choose optimally.  Thus, truth-in-
lending laws require your lender to highlight credit terms.  The law of 
informed consent requires your doctor to describe prostatectomies, 
radiation, chemotherapy, and watchful waiting.  Contract doctrine re-
quires your vendor to reveal its contract’s terms, like warranties and 
mandatory arbitration.  Miranda requires police to tell you your rights.  
Thus informed, you understand your choices well enough to make an 
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intelligent decision about your credit, your cancer, your computer, or 
your confession. 
Mandated disclosure is ubiquitous.  Innumerable federal and state 
statutes, municipal ordinances, administrative regulations, and court 
rulings demand sometimes marvelously elaborate disclosures from  
businesses that issue car, student, or other consumer loans; mortgagees; 
home-equity lenders; credit card companies; banks accepting deposits; 
mutual funds; securities brokers; credit-reporting agencies; investment 
advisors; ATM operators; pawnshops; payday lenders; rent-to-own deal-
ers; installment-sales vendors; insurers of property, health, life, cars or 
rented vehicles, self-storage facilities, and much else; car-towing com-
panies; car repair shops; motor clubs; residential real estate agencies, 
developers, and landlords; time-share programs; sellers and lessors of 
mobile homes; membership camping facilities; providers of home im-
provements, services, and repairs; home-alarm installers; vocational 
schools; traffic schools; agents selling electricity; immigration consul-
tants; dog breeders and sellers; travel services and travel agencies; art 
dealers; police; doctors; hospitals; managed care organizations; colleges 
and universities; restaurants and other food establishments; halal-food 
dealers; and endlessly more.  To say nothing, for example, of the com-
mon law obligation to disclose information prior to a contract, or fed-
eral and state campaign finance regulation, which the Supreme Court 
recently trimmed to little more than mandated disclosure.1 
Mandated disclosure addresses a real problem:  modernity show-
ers us with consequential and complex decisions about which we know 
little.  Unsophisticated people must work with, depend on, and con-
tend with, specialized enterprises that expertly handle complex trans-
actions.  People must manage financial matters of many kinds.  They 
face medical choices.  They buy things whose mechanisms they do not 
understand and whose quality they cannot evaluate under terms they 
do not know. 
Not only does mandated disclosure address a real problem, it also 
rests on a plausible assumption:  that when it comes to decision-
making, more information is better than less.  More information helps 
people make better decisions, thus bolstering their autonomy.  Since 
people can no longer customize most transactions, disclosure helps 
restore some individual control.  It may also induce enterprises to be-
have more efficiently. 
 
1 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913-17 (2010) (striking campaign 
finance laws that ban corporate expenditures but upholding disclosure requirements). 
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Although mandated disclosure addresses a real problem and rests 
on a plausible assumption, it chronically fails to accomplish its pur-
pose.  Even where it seems to succeed, its costs in money, effort, and 
time generally swamp its benefits.  And mandated disclosure has unin-
tended and undesirable consequences, like driving out better regula-
tion and hurting the people it purports to help. 
Not only does the empirical evidence show that mandated disclo-
sure regularly fails in practice, but its failure is inevitable.  First, man-
dated disclosure rests on false assumptions about how people live, 
think, and make decisions.  Second, it rests on false assumptions about 
the decisions it intends to improve.  Third, its success requires an im-
possibly long series of unlikely achievements by lawmakers, disclosers, 
and disclosees.  That is, the prerequisites of successful mandated dis-
closure are so numerous and so onerous that they are rarely met. 
Because the disclosure mantra—more information is better than 
less—sounds plausible, we must be clear about our topic and our ar-
gument.  We are not asking what information people need to make 
good decisions.  We are asking whether a regulatory technique—
mandated disclosure—works.  We are not saying that information never 
helps people make decisions.  Our argument is directed at a regulato-
ry technique in which a lawmaker requires a discloser to give a disclo-
see a standard disclosure—prepackaged information that the lawmak-
er thinks the disclosee needs in order to choose wisely. 
Our tasks, then, are to identify mandated disclosure as a distinc-
tive regulatory method, to show the breadth of its use, to review the 
evidence of its failure, and to explain why it fails.  Our task is not to 
propose an alternative.  Mandated disclosure has been used so com-
monly—one might say so indiscriminately—that it is asked to solve 
many unrelated problems in many unrelated areas.  We doubt that 
any single regulatory method can be so widely effective.  We believe 
commentators and lawmakers must instead undertake the intellectual-
ly burdensome and politically painful work of tailoring solutions to 
problems.  We close by sketching some paths toward this harder but 
more rewarding work. 
B.  The Method 
Our argument has four steps.  The first is to identify mandated 
disclosure as a distinctive regulatory technique.  The second is to show 
how extensive and intensive mandated disclosure is.  For both pur-
poses we searched for statutes that mandate disclosures in three states 
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(California, Michigan, and Illinois) and located several hundred of 
them.  Less systematically, we looked for federal statutes, administra-
tive regulations, and case law that mandate disclosures.  In Part I, we 
provide examples of the many sectors in which disclosure is man-
dated, discuss the kinds of information that must be disclosed, and 
examine the format that disclosure takes. 
Our third step is to ask whether these mandates work.  They are 
used so prolifically in so many unrelated fields that we cannot assess 
them ourselves.  Instead, we survey the empirical literature.  Its gra-
vamen is that mandated disclosure generally fails to achieve its goals. 
The fourth step, perhaps the most substantial one, is to explain 
that failure.  We canvass the systematic factors that keep lawmakers, 
disclosers, and disclosees from accomplishing all the things they 
would have to do to make mandated disclosure work reliably, and we 
explore the dynamics that make it so unreliable. 
C.  The Style 
Writing about mandated disclosure raises the same problem that 
mandating disclosure does:  the amount of information exceeds the 
discloser’s ability to describe it intelligibly and the disclosee’s ability to 
understand it usefully.  To survey the spectacular profusion of man-
dates would require marching through acres of statutes, regulations, 
and cases and making the same mistake lawmakers make—pointlessly 
burdening our audience. 
In like manner, we urge readers to read only what they need.  In 
particular, Parts I and II, which catalog information, only doubters 
need scrutinize.  If you accept what is quickly obvious—that mandated 
disclosure is pervasive—you can skim Part I.  If you accept what is less 
obvious but richly documented—that mandates have been largely in-
effective—you can skim Part II.  You can then concentrate on Parts III 
and IV, which not only do much of the Article’s analytic work but also 
provide yet further evidence of the pervasiveness and ineffectiveness 
of mandated disclosure. 
I.  THE DISCLOSURE EMPIRE:  THE PERVASIVENESS OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE 
Mandated disclosure is now a standard—one might almost say fa-
vored—weapon in the arsenals of legislatures, courts, administrative 
agencies, and commentators.  In this Part, we describe several para-
digmatic examples of mandated disclosure to show just how standard 
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the weapon has become, and we survey the entire landscape of the 
mandatory disclosure device. 
A.  Three Paradigmatic Examples of Mandated Disclosure 
1.  Terms of Credit 
Selecting terms on which to borrow money exemplifies the kind 
of unfamiliar, complex, and consequential decision that mandated 
disclosure seeks to improve.  Lenders have information relevant to the 
decision but may have reasons not to educate borrowers.  Lawmakers 
have deployed truth-in-lending laws to compel lenders to inform bor-
rowers, generally in considerable detail. 
For example, the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA)2 and many 
state laws make lenders disclose interest rates and fees.  Sometimes 
these statutes specify metrics intended to summarize complex credit 
obligations; sometimes they specify disclosure phrases, like options to 
prepay, minimum payments, and much more.3  For example, try deci-
phering this Illinois “mini”-TILA (which is typical of statutes that re-
quire disclosing a specific statement): 
Unearned finance charges under the Rule of 78ths are computed by cal-
culating for all fully unexpired monthly installment periods, as originally 
scheduled or deferred, which follow the day of prepayment, the portion 
of the precomputed interest that bears the same ratio to the total pre-
computed interest as the balances scheduled to be outstanding during 
that monthly installment period bear to the sum of all scheduled 
monthly outstanding balances originally contracted for.
4
 
TILA was a prototype consumer-protection statute and became 
the “template” for most consumer-credit legislation5—legislation that 
now mandates detailed disclosures for credit generally, credit cards, 
automobile loans, student loans, mortgages, and other home-secured 
 
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2006); accord 12 C.F.R pt. 226 (2010); cf. Truth in Sav-
ings Act § 263, 12 U.S.C. § 4302 (requiring banks to disclose interest rates and terms of 
demand on interest bearing accounts).  The most important disclosure in TILA is the 
annual percentage rate (APR), a uniform measure of the cost of credit.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1606, 1631–1649. 
3 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1222 (West 1997) (mandating disclosure 
of payment terms, penalties, and options for educational loans). 
4 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 670/16(m) (West 2007). 
5 Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology:  Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending 
Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 234 (1991). 
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loans.6  Credit card issuers, for example, must disclose all of a con-
tract’s terms and highlight, in a uniform way, critical terms like annual 
percentage rates (APRs) and fees.7 
Attempts to protect low-income borrowers often prompt disclo-
sure requirements.  Pawnshops—a primary financial resource for the 
financially vulnerable—must detail interest payments, redemption op-
tions, fees, charges, and statutory caps.8  Payday lenders must tell bor-
rowers that their loans will not solve their long-term problems, that 
other debt-management services may be available, and that borrowers 
cannot be criminally prosecuted to collect the loan.9  Rent-to-own 
dealers must reveal the “true” cost of changing a rental to a purchase 
and of other fees.10  Retail installment sales must be accompanied by 
information about many financial aspects of the transaction.11 
Disclosure requirements dominate regulation of another kind of 
credit—mortgages, including high-risk mortgages.12  The Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) of 197413 and the Home Owner-
ship and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994,14 as implemented 
by Regulation Z,15 are primarily disclosure acts.  Mortgage disclosure 
 
6 Consumer Leasing Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213.3 (2010); see also Press Release, 
Federal Reserve (Sept. 27, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/press/boardacts/1996/19960927/default.htm (announcing revisions to 
Regulation M that would “simplify and clarify required disclosures for car leasing and 
other types of consumer lease transactions”). 
7 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1748.11(a), 1748.13(a) (West 2009) (requiring credi-
tors to disclose the terms of a credit card account during enrollment and to disclose in 
each billing statement the effects of making less than full payment). 
8 E.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/2 (West 2007). 
9 E.g., 815 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/2-20 (West 2008). 
10 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.623(a) (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 
§ 445.953 (West 2002). 
11 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.  § 445.853 (West 2002) (requiring disclosure 
of overall price, the feeds, insurance, remaining balance, time-price differentials, and 
more in retail installment sale); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 475.610 (2009) (detailing 
disclosure requirements for credit sales advertising of motor vehicles); 815 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 375/2.9 (West 2007) (defining “finance charges” for purposes of disclo-
sures for installment sales of cars). 
12 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/95 (West 2008) (requiring mortagees to 
inform borrowers “YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A LOAN AT A LOWER 
COST. . . . CLOSING COSTS AND FEES VARY BASED ON MANY FACTORS . . . YOU 
COULD LOSE YOUR HOME AND ANY MONEY YOU PUT INTO IT IF YOU DO 
NOT MEET YOUR PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN. . . .” (capitaliza-
tion in original)). 
13 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2006). 
14 Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
15 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (2010). 
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acts require written statements about obligations to obtain mortgage 
insurance,16 “all material facts” in mortgage-brokerage agreements,17 
borrowers’ rights to renounce obligations after entering mortgage-
rescue services,18 lenders’ obligations to disclose changes in loan 
terms,19 and more.  Lenders must even say that defaulting can lead to 
foreclosure and that it is prudent to shop for low rates.20 
2.  Informed Consent 
Patients often face unfamiliar but vital choices, which depend 
upon complex factors about which they understand little.  Doctors un-
derstand these choices better but may lack the time, interest, inclina-
tion, or ingenuity to educate the patient.  So that patients may make 
their own medical decisions, doctors must tell them the advantages 
and disadvantages of their choices.21  Few disclosure mandates have 
been as richly favored as the doctrine of informed consent.  Courts, leg-
islatures, and administrative agencies have mandated it in many forms 
and fora for decades.  The medical and research establishments have 
made it their conventional wisdom with barely a whisper of dissent. 
Informed consent can require extensive disclosures.  Ailments and 
treatments are innumerable, and doctors must give patients all the in-
formation a reasonable person would want in making the decision.  
This formulation has been understood increasingly broadly.  For ex-
ample, “[c]ourts are becoming more receptive to including physician-
specific and financial information within the scope of informed  
consent.”22 
 
16 E.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 930/15 (West 2001). 
17 E.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/5-7(a)(3) (West 2009). 
18 See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 940/10 (West 2009) (requiring “distressed 
property consultants” to disclose the client’s rights to cancel the consultation contract). 
19 See, e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/5-9 (West 2009) (ordering the licensee 
to disclose any material change in loan terms). 
20 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2971 (West 1993) (directing lenders to disclose that a 
home equity loan is secured by the home and “failure to repay the loan for any reason 
could cause you to lose your home”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1637 (West 2009) 
(requiring lenders to provide a premortgage educational notice that instructs potential 
borrowers to “shop around and compare loan rates and fees” and recommends credit 
counseling). 
21 For two classic cases involving informed consent, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).  For a legislative 
example, see GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2006). 
22 Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 
JAMA 1424, 1426 (1999).  For example, one “court ruled that payments received from 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer to prescribe a particular medication were within a phy-
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We will pay particular attention to disclosure of conflicts of inter-
est.  In one much-noticed case, the court held “that a physician who is 
seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must . . . disclose 
personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research 
or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”23  And one court 
extended the principle by observing that doctors may be obliged to 
tell patients about their competence to perform procedures and the 
superior competence of other doctors.24 
In addition, “states have enacted limited expansions of informed 
consent duties, generally in response to focused advocacy by patient 
groups.”25  Such mandates are often intended to persuade, rather than 
to inform.  For example, more than one-third of the states specify in-
formation doctors must give patients about treating breast cancer with 
lumpectomies rather than radical mastectomies.26  Or, to take another 
example, some states tell doctors what to tell women seeking abor-
tions.  Indeed, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.  
Casey, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of statutory 
provisions that required doctors to tell women 
the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of 
childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the unborn child.”  The 
physician . . . must inform the woman of the availability of printed mate-
rials published by the State describing the fetus and providing informa-
tion about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child 
support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption 
and other services as alternatives to abortion.
27
  
Informed consent reaches its acme—or nadir—in the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) system.  No researcher at an institution receiving 
federal funds who interacts with or collects “private” information 
about a human being may proceed without the approval of an “Insti-
 
sician’s informed consent obligation.”  Id. (citing D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997)). 
23 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990). 
24 Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 510 (Wis. 1996). 
25 William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:  Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1779 (1999).   
26 Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost 
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 379-81 (1999). 
27 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (2008 & Supp. 
2009)). 
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tutional Review Board” that (among other things) must ratify the lan-
guage by which the consent of research subjects is sought.28 
3.  Contract Boilerplate 
Truth-in-lending acts and the informed consent doctrine concern 
specific types of transactions.  The common law, however, has long re-
quired contracting parties to make disclosures.29  Recently, a particular 
area of contract disclosures has attracted much attention—the fine 
print.  The terms of many consumer transactions are tucked away in the 
package, or displayed online with an “I Agree” button, or printed on 
the back of order forms.  These terms usually concern contingent con-
tractual rights—such as warranties, dispute resolution, and remedies.  
Because this obscurely written and placed boilerplate may conceal un-
anticipated and tricky traps, legislators, courts, and commentators have 
devised disclosure requirements.  In response to several court decisions 
holding these standard forms binding even if not disclosed prior to the 
transaction,30 reform has been percolating.  For example, the American 
Law Institute’s (ALI’s) Principles of the Law of Software Contracts exclude 
such terms from the contract if there is no opportunity to read them 
before a purchase.31  The rationale is typical:  to protect the “autonomy” 
of consumers.32  Similarly, the European Draft Common Frame of Ref-
erence (a proposed commercial code for the European Community) 
recognizes that consumers are placed “at a significant informational 
disadvantage” and responds by mandating disclosure.33 
The “opportunity to read” principle also appears in specific con-
texts.  For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires a war-
ranty disclaimer to be “conspicuously” disclosed in “simple and readily 
 
28 See generally 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2009) (requiring such procedures to protect hu-
man research subjects). 
29 For an illuminating discussion of the general contract law disclosure doctrine, 
see Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:  Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in 
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565 (2006). 
30 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir 1997) (enforc-
ing an arbitration clause included in terms found in a computer’s shipping box); ProCD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that licenses included 
in product packaging are enforceable if consumers do not explicitly reject them). 
31 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, § 2.02(c)(2) (2010) (re-
quiring “reasonable notice of and access to the standard form before payment 
or . . . before completion of the transfer”). 
32 Id. ch. 2, topic 2, at 118.  
33 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW  
§§ II.-3:103, -3:105 (Study Grp. on a Eur. Civil Code & Research Grp. on EC Private 
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference, interim outline ed. 2008) . 
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understood language.”34  Likewise, U.C.C. § 2-316 requires warranty 
disclaimers to be conspicuous.35  Similar state laws apply to issues such 
as mandatory arbitration,36 risk warnings, return policy,37 and modifi-
cations of the contract.38  The ALLCAPS font in consumer contracts is 
one familiar artifact of such requirements. 
The doctrine of unconscionability and consumer antideception 
statutes also generate precontractual disclosure requirements.  Undis-
closed terms can be procedurally unconscionable, especially if they 
conflict with consumers’ reasonable expectations.39  For example, a 
clause waiving liability for negligence—if not illegal per se—“must be 
clearly and conspicuously printed or explicitly pointed out.”40 
B.  Other Provinces in the Disclosure Empire 
1.  Financial Transactions 
Numerous statutes apply TILA-like rules to other financial ac-
counts:  depository, savings, mutual funds, etc.41  These disclosures are 
sometimes comprehensive, as in TILA or the Good Faith Estimates in 
 
34 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006). 
35 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2009). 
36 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2008) (requiring that the 
disclosure of mandatory arbitration in health plan contracts be “prominently displayed 
on the enrollment form”). 
37 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1723 (West 2009) (instructing retail sellers with return 
policies to “conspicuously display that policy” in various locations); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 218-a (McKinney 2004) (detailing where retail mercantile establishments must “con-
spicuously post” their return policy). 
38 See, e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/5-9 (West Supp. 2009) (requiring dis-
closure of any material change in the terms of a residential mortgage loan). 
39 See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Re-
lated Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (1993). 
40 Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 523 
(1981). 
41 Banks must disclose information to depositors when they open accounts or re-
quest some transactions.  See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 23035(d) (West Supp. 2009) (out-
lining disclosure requirements accompanying deferred deposit transactions); 205 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/3 (West 2007) (requiring financial institutions to disclose con-
sumer-deposit-account terms).  The Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4413 
(2006)—as implemented by Regulation DD, 12 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2010)—tells depository 
institutions what costs and terms they must reveal and how they must do so.  SEC regu-
lations require the disclosure of mutual fund fees.  See Shareholder Reports and Quar-
terly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities 
Act Release No. 8393, Exchange Act Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244, 11,245 (Mar. 9, 2004) (codified in scattered 
parts of 17 C.F.R.). 
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mortgage disclosures, which include numerous items, including fees, 
payments, rights, obligations, and explanations.42  Other times, law-
makers “segregate” disclosures by mandating disclosure of a particular 
item in a separate form in an attempt to highlight its presence.  For 
example, the Federal Reserve recently promulgated a regulation to 
address the problem of high overdraft fees on ATM and debit with-
drawals.43  The regulation did not limit the actual fees banks charge; ra-
ther it required consumers to opt into the scheme by receiving a disclo-
sure notice on a separate form and signing a separate dotted line. 
Financial disclosures stretch to every domain of consumer protec-
tion.  Businesses planning to use clients’ financial information must 
tell them of their right to opt out and explain, in fine print, how to do 
so.44  Financial brokers must disclose their experience, obligations, 
and fees, and even warn clients that “THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
HAS NOT REVIEWED AND DOES NOT APPROVE, RECOMMEND, 
ENDORSE OR SPONSOR ANY LOAN BROKERAGE CONTRACT.”45  
Investment advisers must confess a catalog of past misdeeds, including 
rule violations and disciplinary actions.46  Credit-reporting agencies 
must tell consumers their federal and state rights.47  Creditors bun-
dling credit insurance with a loan must tell customers whether the in-
surance is required by law and that it may be duplicative.48  ATM oper-
ators must caution customers against using ATMs at night, alone, or in 
perilous circumstances.49 
A classic instance of mandated disclosure is the congeries of securi-
ties laws and regulations.  These mainly target experts, and thus fall out-
side our scope.  However, these disclosures also govern sales to the laity, 
and some of their provisions are specifically intended to help amateurs. 
2.  Insurance 
Insurance transactions require complex calculations about cloudy 
contingencies.  Insurance buyers cannot easily tell the value of their 
purchase because it depends on actuarial estimates that they do not 
know and cannot analyze.  Nor can the quality of the insurance be as-
 
42 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500 app. C. 
43 12 C.F.R. § 205.17. 
44 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.519, .529, .543 (West 2002). 
45 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/15-30 (West 2008) (capitalization in original). 
46 E.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 14, § 130.847 (2009). 
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b), 1681g(c)(2) (2006). 
48 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1758.97 (West 2005). 
49 E.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 695/15 (West 2007). 
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certained until a loss materializes, when it is too late to switch to a bet-
ter product.  Insurance that is bundled with a financial investment (as 
in life insurance or mortgage-related insurance products) compounds 
these burdens.  So, lawmakers try to protect the bewildered. 
Some protection involves regulatory oversight, such as precertifi-
cation of the standardized insurance policy, but much of it comes 
from a mosaic of disclosure statutes.  Often insurers must not only dis-
close policy terms, they must also highlight terms that are especially 
important or may cause unexpected agonies.  In Illinois, for example, 
insurers must disclose fees that are separate from the policy pre-
miums.50  Insurance financing acts require disclosure of the ways pur-
chasers can pay premiums.51  Insurance products with investment risks 
must reveal them.52  Residential property insurance acts require a re-
minder that rebuilding costs may differ from market value.53  Califor-
nia legislators have drafted a residential-property insureds’ “Bills of 
Rights,” which insurers must also disclose.54  And since disclosure re-
quirements are supposed to deter people from buying unneeded in-
surance, insurers must remind consumers that they need not buy in-
surance that is bundled with another service, like car-rental services 
and auto insurance55 or self-storage facilities and property insurance.56 
Life insurance, in particular, proliferates opportunities for cus-
tomers to make bad decisions.  For example, because people some-
times regret how they assigned their insurance benefits, their right to 
change their minds must be disclosed.57  Similarly, a statute might re-
quire a viatical-settlement provider to tell the viator about alternatives 
to selling her life insurance policy, such as accelerated benefits from 
the life insurer; to state all the adverse consequences of the settle-
 
50 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/500-80(e) (West 2008). 
51 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 778.4(a) (West 2005) (mandating disclosures by fire 
and casualty insurance broker-agents prior to arranging premium financing for a new 
or renewed policy); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513a9 (providing the required dis-
closures in premium financing agreements). 
52 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 762 ; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1409. 
53 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10101, 10102(a). 
54 Id. § 10103.5. 
55 E.g., id. § 1758.86; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/500-105(b)(3); 625 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 27/20.  
56 E.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  5/500-107(b)(2)(B). 
57 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2080(6)(d) (West 2008) (giving the in-
sured a right to revoke assignment of life insurance proceeds to cemetery or funeral 
services). 
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ment, like taxes, creditor rights, and loss of Medicaid; and to explain 
all the other benefits forfeited.58 
3.  Health Care 
Informed consent is only the beginning of disclosure require-
ments in health law.  For example, because Congress believed advance 
directives were insufficiently used, the Patient Self-Determination Act 
(PSDA) requires hospitals, nursing facilities, home health agencies, 
hospices, and managed care organizations to give patients  
written information . . . concerning—(i) an individual’s rights under 
State law . . . to make decisions concerning . . . medical care, including 
the right to . . . refuse . . . treatment and the right to formulate advance 
directives, and (ii) the written policies of the provider . . . respecting the 
implementation of such rights.”
59
   
Because the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) be-
lieved patients’ privacy was endangered, it promulgated elaborate 
regulations pursuant to the the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) that require institutions to tell patients the 
institution’s privacy rules.60  Because conflicts of interest are widely 
feared, health care service providers must disclose their use of “finan-
cial bonuses” in referrals or allocation of services.61 
Another bounteous fount of mandated disclosure is a program 
both employers and the government have recently promoted:  “con-
sumer-directed health care.”  It gives consumers an economic stake in 
shaping their health care plan by allowing them to choose their doc-
tors, hospitals, providers, tests, and treatments.62  As the former HHS 
Secretary said, “We have a better option, to provide beneficiaries with 
reliable information about the cost and quality of their care.  When 
given that kind of information, we know that consumers will make de-
cisions that drive costs down and the quality up.”63  This program, how-
 
58 E.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 158/35.  In a viatical settlement, terminally ill 
insureds sell their death benefits in exchange for annuities or other immediate sup-
port payments.  Id. 159/5. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
60 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2009).   
61 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.10 (West 2008). 
62 For an extended treatment, see Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient 
Life:  Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 62-65 (2009). 
63 Robert Pear, Bush Proposes Linking the Medicare Drug Premium to Beneficiaries’ In-
come, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at A15 (quoting Secretary Michael Leavitt). 
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ever, depends on patients’ access to “reliable information”; thus, dis-
closures have both been directly mandated and indirectly necessitated. 
4.  Miranda Warnings 
The Supreme Court famously enforced the Fifth Amendment by 
mandating disclosures: 
[A]n individual taken into custody . . . must be warned prior to any ques-
tioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can 
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the pres-
ence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.64 
Many jurisdictions try to make the disclosure “meaningful” by requir-
ing, for example, that interrogators use language the suspect under-
stands, ask the suspect whether he understood the warning, and tell 
the suspect of his right to end questioning.  A recent decision by the 
Supreme Court further affirms that disclosure is the main avenue of 
protection for suspects.65 
5.  Goods and Services 
Many consumers encounter market-wide disclosure rules like 
price-labeling requirements,66 nutrition facts,67 or truth-in-advertising 
laws.68  Less familiar are sector-specific rules.  Even a glimpse at the ex-
tensive and eclectic list shows how much lawmakers rely on mandated 
disclosure. 
Notorious exploitation and improvident purchases have inspired 
statutes dealing with “death products”—caskets, burial and funeral 
services, and cemetery plots.69  The Federal Trade Commission’s 
 
64 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). 
65 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259-60 (2010) (holding that a sus-
pect remaining silent is insufficient to imply that the suspect invoked his rights); see 
also Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Holds that Responding to Police Interrogation Waives 
the Right to Remain Silent, FINDLAW (June 7, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
colb/20100607.html (arguing that Berghuis “leaves [Miranda] to stand as an arbitrary 
disclosure requirement, rather than the protection against coercive interrogation”). 
66 E.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 214-i (McKinney 2004). 
67 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2010) 
68 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 15, 15 U.S.C § 55(a)(1) (2006) (defin-
ing when an advertisement is misleading); see also Howard Beales et al., The Efficient 
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 495-501 (1981) (considering 
how to define deceptive advertisements). 
69 The classic exposé is JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH (Vintage 
2000) (1963). 
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(FTC’s) Funeral Industry Practices Rule requires price disclosures.70  
States require service providers to disclose matters relating to their 
expertise, the payment scheme, customers’ options to withdraw from 
commitments, items not included in the “package,” and even a notifi-
cation that “THERE IS NO SCIENTIFIC OR OTHER EVIDENCE 
THAT ANY CASKET WITH A SEALING DEVICE WILL PRESERVE 
HUMAN REMAINS.”71 
Many mandated disclosures apply to car transactions. Dealers 
must reveal problems with resold vehicles.72  Used-car sellers must re-
port odometer readings (for the forgetful buyer?).73  Car-towing ser-
vices must state their charges, policies, and insurance before towing.74  
Repair shops and parts sellers must disclose their fee structure and the 
kind of parts they use in addition to giving itemized estimates.75  Many 
specific repairs, like installing ball joints, have their own information 
mandates.76  Car-rental agencies must describe customers’ liability for 
lost and damaged cars and how damages may be covered if customers 
decline rental-company insurance.77  Motor clubs that refer members 
to dealers must reveal any referral fees that they receive from dealers.78 
Real estate agents must tell homebuyers about the agents’ duties 
to them.79  Residential real estate developers in California are entitled, 
 
70 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2010); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMPLYING WITH THE 
FUNERAL RULE 6 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ 
adv/bus05.pdf (explaining the “General Price List,” which mandates six disclosures).   
71 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17530.7(c) (West 2008) (capitalization in original).  
For pre-need cemetery sales, see, for example, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 390/14(a) 
(West 2008); for pre-need burial, see 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1a-1(a)(3)(A) 
(West 2007).  See also Illinois Consumers’ Guide to Pre-Need Funeral and Burial Pur-
chases, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, § 610 exh. A (2009) (notifying consumers about 
terms, descriptions, payment method, and cancellation policy). 
72 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.23 (West 2009) (requiring “Lemon Law Buyback” 
disclosure if a car was repurchased due to defect); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-104.2 
(West 2008) (requiring disclosure if a car was repurchased due to failure of warranty). 
73 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.233a (West 2007). 
74 E.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18d-120, 5/18d-130 (requiring disclosure to 
vehicle owner before towing a damaged or disabled vehicle). 
75 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 306/15(a), 306/20, 306/50 (prohibiting 
work exceeding one hundred dollars until consumer authorization after disclosures); 
id. 308/15(b), 308/20, 308/50 (requiring disclosure of estimated and itemized repair 
costs); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9875.1 (West 2008) (mandating disclosure if 
repair parts are derived from secondary sources).  
76 E.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 4-228-120 (2010). 
77 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1936(g)(1) (West Supp. 2009). 
78 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 12150(1) (West 2005). 
79 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.2517 (West 2004).  
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under a variety of statutes, to over forty items of disclosure.80  Residen-
tial landlords must admit to code violations and provide case numbers 
of pending litigation.81  Timeshare programs must itemize customers’ 
prerogatives.82  Membership camping facilities must reveal the opera-
tor’s experience, the chief officers’ business backgrounds, and much 
more.83  Mobile-home and mobile-home-lot sellers or lessors must an-
nually disclose fees, obligations, and rent increases.84 
Home-improvement, home-service, and home-repair contracts 
must disclose clients’ rights, including a lay (but long) definition of a 
mechanic’s lien.85  Statutes even target specific activities:  alarm instal-
lers, for example, must disclose and define any mechanic’s lien.86 
Vocational schools enjoy lengthy (and costly) disclosure man-
dates, including more than twenty statistics about graduation rates, re-
enrollments, exam pass rates, graduates’ job prospects, and more.87  
Barber, nail, and cosmetology schools must disclose graduation rates 
and placement statistics.88  Traffic-violator schools must astonish appli-
cants with warnings that they might encounter repeat traffic offenders 
and that instructors are less robustly trained than those in licensed 
driving schools (who in turn disclose quite a bit themselves).89  Colleg-
es and universities must provide current and prospective students with 
crime statistics.90 
The list goes on:  sellers of electricity must disclose their remune-
ration,91 immigration consultants their past frauds,92 dog dealers and 
breeders the buyers’ rights to return sick or dead animals.93  Travel 
services and agents must specify, both orally and in writing, travelers’ 
 
80 See STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF REAL ESTATE, DISCLOSURES IN REAL PROPERTY TRANS-
ACTIONS (6th ed. 2005), available at http://www.dre.ca.gov/pub_disclosures.html. 
81 E.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-100 (2010). 
82 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 11211, 11216 (West 2008). 
83 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.302 (West 2009). 
84 E.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 745/6.5 (West Supp. 2009). 
85 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7159 (West Supp. 2009); see also id. § 7159.10 
(listing disclosures in service contracts between $500 and $750). 
86 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7599.54 (West 2008). 
87 E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/15.1 (West 2006). 
88 See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 410/3B-12(a) (West 2007). 
89 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 11200(b)(1) (West Supp. 2009) (traffic-violator 
schools); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:23-5.16 (Supp. 2010) (driving schools). 
90 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006). 
91 E.g., 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-115C(e)(1) (West Supp. 2009). 
92 E.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2AA(e) (West 2008).   
93 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 122100, 122190 (West 2006). 
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rights to certain claims.94  Art dealers must reveal subtleties such as 
medium, artist, and signature.95  Restaurants and food establishments 
must warn about undercooked food.96  They also must post their de-
partment-of-health certificate “in that part of the retail food estab-
lishment to which the public has access.”97 And food dealers must ex-
plain “the basis upon which . . . [halal] representations are made.”98 
We have not exhausted the catalog of mandated disclosures, but 
we have surely exhausted our readers (and ourselves).  This sampling 
amply suggests that mandated disclosure is a staple of the regulatory 
repertoire, and we will show how unreliable that staple is. 
II.  THE DOCUMENTED FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 
The great paradox of the Disclosure Empire is that even as it 
grows, so also grows the evidence that mandated disclosure repeatedly 
fails to accomplish its ends.  We proffer several kinds of evidence of 
that failure.  First, disclosers do not always provide, and disclosees do 
not always receive, information.  Second, disclosees often do not read 
disclosed information, do not understand it when they read it, and do 
not use it even if they understand it.  Third, mandated disclosure does 
not improve disclosees’ decisions.  Following the model of Part I, we 
first discuss the evidence about the three paradigmatic examples and 
then survey other areas. 
A.  The Three Paradigmatic Cases of Mandated Disclosure 
1.  Terms of Credit 
Truth-in-lending legislation is a crown jewel of the Disclosure Em-
pire, and if mandated disclosure works anywhere, it ought to work 
here.  Unlike with some disclosure regimes, rulemakers actually gave 
TILA some thought.  Congress spent eight years debating it.  The 
bill’s proponents largely got the law they wanted.99  They expected dis-
closure of APRs to produce sensible shopping for credit.  Administra-
 
94 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17550.13 (West 2008). 
95 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1742, 1744 (West 2009). 
96 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 289.6149 (West 2003). 
97 CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 7-38-012 (2010). 
98 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2LL(b) (West 2008). 
99 See Rubin, supra note 5, at 242-63 (describing the “epic battle” of the debate and 
drafting process). 
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tive agencies have repeatedly labored and issued regulations intended 
to simplify TILA and make it work. 
Consumers are more aware of APRs, but they remain confused 
about using them.100 
One leading study, for example, indicated that as knowledge of the 
[APR] increased, knowledge of the finance charge itself, expressed in 
dollars, declined.  Apparently, most consumers mistakenly believe that 
[the disclosed rate is] a percentage of the initial balance, rather than 
[the] average or declining balance.  As a result, they consistently miscal-
culate the finance charges to be twice the actual amount.  In other 
words, [truth-in-lending legislation] succeeded in making consumers in-
creasingly aware, but it has not managed to explain to them what it is 
they have been made aware of.
101
  
There is much evidence that consumers do not read TILA disclosures, 
are overloaded by the number of disclosures, and do not understand 
the basic disclosed features of the loan.102  Furthermore, consumer 
understanding of terms that TILA does not cover—such as the dollar 
amount of finance charges in open-end credit transactions, or the fi-
nancial burden of variable-rate mortgages—is poor.  For example, 
90% of consumers misunderstand the relationship between the inter-
est rate that lenders quote and the APR, and thus consumers mis-
perceive the cost of credit.103  Worse, only well-educated and well-off 
consumers seem to have enjoyed whatever increased awareness of 
credit terms that TILA brought.104 
More fundamentally, there is little reason to think disclosure sta-
tutes improved the terms on which borrowers pay.  For example, one 
study suggests that the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 
 
100 See, e.g., Yu-Chun Regina Chang & Sherman Hanna, Consumer Credit Search Be-
havior, 16 J. CONSUMER STUD. & HOME ECON. 207, 222 (1992) (“[M]ost consumers 
(80%) did not consider searching for information before purchasing credit.”); James 
H. McAlexander & Debra L. Scammon, Are Disclosures Sufficient?  A Micro Analysis of Im-
pact in the Financial Services Market, 7 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 185, 186 (1988) (find-
ing “important differences between high- and low-knowledge consumers in how they 
learned about and evaluate financial advisers”). 
101 Rubin, supra note 5, at 236 (citing William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Informa-
tion Disclosure and Consumer Behavior:  An Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending, 7 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 297, 302-03 (1974)). 
102 For a survey, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure:  The 
Problem of Predatory Lending:  Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 789-98 (2006). 
103 Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money:  Consumers’ Understanding 
of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 70 (1999). 
104 See Jean Kinsey & Ray McAlister, Consumer Knowledge of the Costs of Open-End Cre-
dit, 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 249, 257-59 (1981) (finding wealth and education effects in a 
1977 survey of Minnesota households). 
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1988105 did not increase competition in the credit card industry.  In-
terest rates and funding costs did not exhibit any measurable im-
provement following the Act.106 
Financial literacy education is an important component of the 
disclosure and informed consent paradigm, and much evidence now 
shows that this effort has largely failed.  Several studies testing partici-
pants in financial literacy education show almost no improvement in 
their performance;107 other studies demonstrate no change in beha-
vior, no increase in knowledge, no added ability to engage in financial 
planning, and no effect on bankruptcy outcomes.108  The establish-
ment of a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is further evi-
dence that existing disclosure statutes did not accomplish their goals.  
Ironically, though, the Bureau’s inaugural ceremonies suggest that 
disclosures will continue to be a major focus of the new Bureau.  As 
Secretary Timothy Geithner announced in launching the Bureau, dis-
closure “is one of the most powerful tools we have for getting people 
better information so they can make better choices about how they 
borrow, how they use credit, how they invest their savings.”109 
2.  Informed Consent 
Informed consent has been conventional wisdom for long enough 
that many studies explore it.  They show that informed consent does 
not achieve its purpose.110  First, doctors do not give patients the infor-
 
105 Pub. L. No. 100-483, 102 Stat. 2960 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
106  Sherrill Shaffer, The Competitive Impact of Disclosure Requirements in the Credit Card 
Industry, 15 J. REG. ECON. 183, 195-96 (1999).  
107 See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
197, 208-09 (2008) (surveying studies finding that financial education programs have 
no effect or small paradoxical results). 
108 See id. at 207-09; cf. Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis:  Hearing Be-
fore the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) (testimony of Annamaria Lusardi, Pro-
fessor, Dartmouth Coll.; Research Associate, Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Research), available at 
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0226-Lusardi.pdf (analyzing the “troubling” 
picture painted by surveys that examine the financial capabilities of Americans). 
109 Jessica Holzer, Geithner:  New Bureau To Focus On Improved Disclosures, FOXBUSI-
NESS, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/09/21/geithner- 
new-bureau-focus-improved-disclosures (quoting Secretary Timothy Geitner). 
110 For a brief exposition, see Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 411, 417-25 (2006).  For a detailed assessment, see CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE 
PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY:  PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS 92-99 (1998).  
For an extended comparison of the law and the reality of informed consent, see the 
first chapter of MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS:  IN-
DIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION (2d ed. 2009). 
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mation that they would need to make educated decisions.  For example, 
a study examined discussions between doctors and patients, particularly  
(1) the patient’s role in decision making, (2) the nature of the decision, 
(3) alternatives, (4) pros (benefits) and cons (risks) of the alternatives, 
(5) uncertainties associated with the decision, (6) an assessment of the 
patient’s understanding of the decision, and (7) an exploration of the 
patient’s preferences.”  The “completeness of informed decision making 
was low. . . . [F]ew decisions (9.0%) met criteria for completeness of in-
formed decision making.”
111
 
Second, good ways to communicate information have proved elu-
sive.  Forms used to provide information frequently exceed readability 
standards.112  “Many patients have limited health literacy and can have 
difficulty understanding information even when efforts are made to 
communicate it appropriately.”113 
Third, and critically, even when doctors lavish information on pa-
tients, most patients neither understand nor remember it.  Even when 
asked simple questions immediately after being given far more educa-
tion than clinicians could ever offer, patients commonly can answer 
only one-third to one-half of them.114  Countless numbers of studies 
reveal that despite extravagant efforts at educating patients, patients 
cannot remember, and presumably have not really understood, the 
risks of treatment explained to them.  In addition to the numerous 
studies of memory of risk disclosures, there is also highly plausible 
evidence that patients do not properly understand the possible bene-
fits of treatments.  In one study, for example, “patients’ expectations 
of improvements in their functional status after infrainguinal bypass 
operation were greater than those suggested by previous research.”115 
Fourth, despite decades of legal and medical efforts, patients reg-
ularly make life-and-death decisions without even the most basic in-
formation and with many misconceptions.  In one large study, for ex-
 
111 Clarence H. Braddock III et al., Informed Decision Making in Outpatient Practice:  
Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313, 2315 (1999). 
112 See Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., Readability Standards for Informed-Consent 
Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 721, 724 (2003) 
(“Among . . . 61 [medical] schools with specific grade-level standards [for informed 
consent text], only 8 percent . . . met their own standard; the mean readability ex-
ceeded the stated standard by 2.8 grade levels . . . .”). 
113 Margaret L. Schwarze et al., Exploring Patient Preferences for Infrainguinal Bypass 
Operation, 202 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 445, 450 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
114 David A. Herz et al., Informed Consent:  Is It a Myth?, 30 NEUROSURGERY 453, 455 
(1992). 
115 Schwarze, supra note 113, at 449. 
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ample, fewer than one-half of breast cancer patients understood sur-
vival rates and fewer than one-fifth understood recurrence rates, even 
though the patients thought that those factors were important and 
had consulted “a relatively large variety of information sources.”116  
Fifth, even if these educational problems could be solved, the infor-
mation proffered would frequently go unused.  Patients rarely change 
their minds when asked to give informed consent.117  Patients prefer 
not to make medical decisions, and the sicker and older they are, the 
less they wish to do so.  Furthermore, patients frequently make deci-
sions before having “consented” and often rely on a single factor in 
making such decisions.118 
Could informed consent work if doctors tried harder?  No.  Even 
the most dedicated efforts disappoint.  For example, one study truly 
tried to enlighten patients about conflicts of interest created by the 
ways that HMOs paid doctors.  It “went to unusual lengths to ensure 
that the essential information was conveyed.  Information . . . was dis-
closed by mail, followed by phone calls in which subjects’ understand-
ing was tested and reinforced through repetition and simple quiz 
questions.”119  While such efforts greatly increased patients’ knowledge 
of incentives, a majority still could not correctly answer more than half 
of the questions.  “[E]ven the extensive and [desperately] impractical 
methods used here to attempt to convey only limited knowledge of in-
centives fell well short of complete success.”120 
Even when legislatures have made special efforts to use informed 
consent in focused ways, the news has been discouraging.  Statutes 
have used expert boards to formulate special disclosures about mas-
tectomies and even threatened physician-discipline procedures.121  But 
 
116 Angela Fagerlin et al., An Informed Decision?  Breast Cancer Patients and Their 
Knowledge About Treatment, 64 PATIENT EDUC.  & COUNSELING 303, 309 (2006).   
117 See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT:  LEGAL THEORY AND CLINI-
CAL PRACTICE 202 (1987) (“[T]he empirical and anecdotal studies of patients who 
refuse treatment almost never portray the process of obtaining informed consent as 
playing a causative role.”); Ruth R. Faden et al., Disclosure of Information to Patients in 
Medical Care, 19 MED. CARE 718, 732 (1981) (“[R]efusals attributable to disclosures are 
rarely, if ever, seen.”). 
118 See SCHNEIDER et al., supra note 110, at 92-99 (discussing the reluctance of pa-
tients to make decisions and the ways in which they do so). 
119 Mark A. Hall et al., How Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives Affects Trust, HEALTH 
AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 197, 203. 
120 Id. at 205. 
121 See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost 
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 379-83 (1999) (discussing the unique requirements 
of disclosure to breast cancer patients). 
BEN-SHAHAR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  11:53 AM 
670 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 647 
while these statutes were “associated with slight increases (6 to 13 per-
cent)” in the use of lumpectomies, the “increases were tran-
sient, . . . lasting from 3 to 12 months.”122 
One might expect consent to operate better in the context of con-
sent to participate in research because a regulatory agency—the insti-
tutional review board (IRB)—must approve the disclosures’ exact 
words and procedures in advance.  But again the evidence is disap-
pointing.  For example, trials of cancer treatments are riskier than 
most research, so disclosures have been extensively examined.  Re-
search subjects have urgent reasons to understand their choices.  In 
an especially careful but otherwise typical study, medical providers in-
vested significant amounts of time educating patients about the 
treatments available to combat their cancer.123  While assessing their 
choices, patients were free to consult other sources of information as 
well as to tap into family support networks.  Despite the protracted ef-
fort to equip patients with the knowledge they needed to make in-
formed decisions, serious misunderstandings persisted:  “Many did 
not realize that the treatment being researched was not proven to be 
the best for their cancer, that the study used non-standard treatments 
or procedures, that participation might carry incremental risk, or that 
they might not receive direct medical benefit from participation.”124 
A final indication of the failure of informed consent is that its advo-
cates must continue to add new disclosures for it to work.  Given the 
failure of standard informed consent, one study recommends expand-
ing informed consent to include all of the following elements:  (1) in-
vestigation into “patients’ affective and cognitive processes”; (2) explo-
ration of “uncertainties and limitations both in the provider’s own 
knowledge and in the state of the science”; (3) inquiry into patients’ 
“motivations, beliefs, and values”; (4) exploration of how patients think 
decisions should be made; and (5) individualized process “in the con-
text of an ongoing relationship with a trusted health care provider.”125 
 
122 Ann Butler Nattinger et al, The Effect of Legislative Requirements on the Use of 
Breast-Conserving Surgery, 335 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1035, 1039 (1996). 
123 See Steven Joffe et al., Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials:  A Cross-
Sectional Survey, 358 LANCET 1772, 1775 (2001) (assessing the effectiveness of informed 
consent in clinical trials and proposing interventions that could enhance patients’ un-
derstandings of the risks involved in participating in such trials).   
124 Id. at 1774-75. 
125 Gail Geller et al., “Decoding” Informed Consent:  Insights from Women Regarding 
Breast Cancer Susceptibility Testing, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 28, 30-31. 
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3.  Contract Boilerplate 
Even when the standard form contract is available, very few people 
read it.  Empirical work is scant, perhaps because of the folk know-
ledge that no one reads boilerplate.  Still, some direct as well as indi-
rect evidence suggests that almost no consumers read boilerplate, 
even when it is fully and conspicuously disclosed. 
An experiment by PCpitstop provides anecdotal evidence.  The 
computer diagnostic software developer put a clause in an end-user 
license agreement that promised $1000 to a user who responded.  Af-
ter four months and 3000 downloads someone finally did.126  (All this 
in a forum for the technologically sophisticated and savvy.)  In a more 
systematic study, a group of researchers found that roughly 1 in 1000 
people actually scrolls through online boilerplate when it is disclosed 
prior to the agreement.127  Worse, that one-in-a-thousand “reader” 
spent a median time of twenty-nine seconds on the webpage.  Since 
these pages of legalese average over 2000 words, since people can read 
fewer than 150 words in that time, and since boilerplate is notoriously 
complex, readership is effectively zero.128  One of the authors of this 
study, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, found that in only 8 of 11,184 visits 
to sites offering a hyperlink to a list of terms next to a clickable “I 
AGREE” box, and in only 40 of 120,545 visits to sites offering a hyper-
link to the boilerplate terms without an “I AGREE” box, did the user 
choose to access the terms.129  Moreover, to “access” means at least one 
 
126 Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, P.C. PITSTOP, http:// 
pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
127 Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?  Testing a Law and Economics 
Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Working Pa-
per Grp., Paper No. 195, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/195/. 
128 See id. (reporting an average number of words of 2271 and an average reading 
rate of 250 to 300 words-per-minute).  Less rigorously, Robert Hillman surveyed con-
tracts students at Cornell on their readership of boilerplate and found that only a mi-
nority of somewhere between 4% to 13% read the online contracts.  Robert A. Hill-
man, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices:  A Survey and Discussion of Legal 
Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION  IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 
283, 289 tbls.11.3A-B ( Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).  We suspect this study significantly 
overstates readership ratios.  It is not clear that reports by the survey subjects—first-
year law students—regarding contract readership are credible or representative.  Stu-
dents did not have to actually read a contract, but merely state their readership habits.  
Id. at 286.  None of their answers had any payoff implication.  Indeed, some of the stu-
dents’ answers were puzzling, for example, by reporting a greater propensity to read 
free-subscription contracts than purchase contracts.  Id. at 288-89.  
129 Florencia Marrota-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?  Evaluating the Recom-
mendations of the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forth-
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second of view time; the average length of terms was 2,300 words.  
Marrota-Wurgler writes, “The general conclusion is clear:  No matter 
how prominently [end-user license agreements] are disclosed, they 
are almost always ignored.”130 
B.  The Failures of Other Mandated Disclosures 
The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires health care 
institutions to tell patients about advance directives so that they might 
decide how they should be treated if they become incompetent to 
make decisions.131  The living will is the primary means of doing so.  It 
does not appear that the PSDA encouraged people to use living wills, 
and living wills cannot easily reflect people’s considered preferences 
or state them in effective ways.132  In short, the law “has ‘done a disser-
vice to most real patients and their families and caregivers.’  It has 
promoted the execution of uninformed and under-informed advance 
directives . . . . The PSDA looks like a utter failure.”133  Many efforts 
have been made to help consumers in the various instantiations of 
consumer-directed health care.  Surveys of patients and clinicians sug-
gest that report cards have little effect.134  Patients are rarely aware of 
these disclosures, and even more rarely understand and use them.135  
A study of Medicare beneficiaries, for example, showed that roughly 
 
coming 2011) (manuscript at 13), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/ 
Wurgler paper.pdf. 
130 Id. (manuscript at 16). 
131 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2006). 
132 For an extended explanation, see Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough:  
The Failure of the Living Will, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 30.   
133 Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives:  A 
Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 
167 (1999) (footnote omitted) (quoting Rebecca Dresser, Confronting the ‘Near Irrelev-
ance’ of Advance Directives, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 55, 56 (1994)). 
134 See, e.g., Martin N. Marshall et al., The Public Release of Performance Data:  What Do 
We Expect to Gain?  A Review of Evidence, 283 JAMA 1866, 1873 (2000) (reviewing studies 
that explore the impact of publicly disclosed health care performance and determin-
ing that patients fail to “use the currently available information to any significant ex-
tent”); Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of Public Performance Reports:  A Sur-
vey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 279 JAMA 1638, 1641 (1998) (assessing patient 
awareness of publicly released report card on cardiac surgery mortality and finding 
that only a small percentage of patients knew about the data before undergoing car-
diac surgery). 
135 See Arnold M. Epstein, Rolling Down the Runway:  The Challenges Ahead for Quality 
Report Cards, 279 JAMA 1691, 1695 (1998) (exploring recent developments in health 
care report cards and identifying the greatest challenges to using these report cards 
more effectively). 
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90% either knew nothing or had limited knowledge about HMOs, and 
only 16% had adequate knowledge to choose between traditional 
Medicare and an HMO.136  Another study found that 67% of respon-
dents did not have a good grasp of the differences between traditional 
fee-for-service and HMO plans, and many reported not knowing the 
most basic facts about HMO plans.137  Notably, four out of every five 
large purchasers of HMO plans, such as employers, acknowledged 
that they did not systematically compare plans’ affordability or effec-
tiveness.138  Most purchasers just checked whether a plan was accre-
dited and did not investigate other aspects.139 
Evaluations of medical care and disclosure of “report cards” might 
produce better care even if consumers rarely read the evaluations, 
since providers presumably will work to win good reviews.  Also, if 
some of the readers of these report cards are health plan administra-
tors and insurance companies, we should expect the information dis-
closed to have an impact.  That is, if health plan administrators play a 
substantial role in directing patients to higher-quality care—in the 
same way that investment analysts direct retail investors to higher-
value securities—then these professionals would surely know how to 
access and analyze the report cards.  Indeed, some studies based on 
clinical data speak of significant improvements in care, but these find-
ings notoriously struggle with selection biases.140  One study showed 
 
136 Judith H. Hibbard et al., Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed Choices?, 
HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 181, 186. 
137 James S. Lubalin & Lauren D. Harris-Kojetin, What Do Consumers Want and Need 
to Know in Making Health Care Choices?, 56 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 67, 70 (Supp. 1 
1999). 
138 Id. at 91 fig.1 (citing Judith H. Hibbard et al., Choosing a Health Plan:  Do Large 
Employers Use the Data?, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1997, at 172). 
139 Id. at 91-92. 
140 See, e.g., Edward L. Hannan et al., Improving the Outcomes of Coronary Artery Bypass 
Surgery in New York State, 271 JAMA 761, 765-66 (1994) (contending that the decline in 
mortality rate from coronary-bypass graft surgery in New York was largely due to “quali-
ty improvement” measures undertaken in hospitals after the State began collecting and 
analyzing health outcome data on the operation); Dana B. Mukamel & Alvin I. Mush-
lin, Quality of Care Information Makes a Difference:  An Analysis of Market Share and Price 
Changes After Publication of the New York State Cardiac Surgery Mortality Reports, 36 MED. 
CARE 945, 950-53 (1998) (finding that “quality report cards” assessing health outcomes 
of cardiac surgery in New York State hospitals resulted in, among other things, greater 
market share for those hospitals with more favorable outcomes); Eric D. Peterson et 
al., The Effects of New York’s Bypass Surgery Provider Profiling on Access to Care and Patient 
Outcomes in the Elderly, 32 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 993, 999 (1998) (concluding that by-
pass-surgery-provider profiling is a “potential means of improving patient outcomes 
while maintaining access to care”).  For a statistical critique of these studies, see Jesse 
Green & Neil Wintfeld, Report Cards on Cardiac Surgeons:  Assessing New York State’s Ap-
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that providers seek to protect their ratings by shifting their efforts 
from unreported dimensions of care toward the reported dimensions 
and found no evidence that overall quality of care had increased.141  A 
recent and refined study concluded that report cards had undesirable 
consequences.142  First, providers became reluctant to treat severely ill 
patients.  Second, report cards led providers to sort patients by pro-
viders based on the severity of illness, treating the healthier patients in 
higher-rated hospitals and sicker patients in lower-rated ones.  These 
trends, along with the tendency to substitute riskier therapies with 
more cautious but less effective medical therapies, led to higher costs 
and worse outcomes, especially for sicker patients.143  Still, the overall 
effect of hospital report cards continues to be a subject of empirical 
exploration, with some reliable evidence demonstrating improvement 
in care.144  But as we will argue below, to the extent that such success is 
due to consumers’ readership, rather than intermediaries’ readership, 
). 
sure, which conveys feedback ratings rather than core information. 
HIPAA regulations prescribe numerous rules for doctors and hos-
pitals that are intended to protect patients’ privacy.  Studies show, 
however, that the disclosure forms are written at a readership level 
 
proach, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1229, 1230 (1995), which describes controversy sur-
rounding the publicly available data on cardiac surgery mortality rates and cautions 
that the data might not properly account for the degree of patients’ illnesses.  See also 
Timothy P. Hofer et al., The Unreliability of Individual Physician “Report Cards” for Assess-
ing the Costs and Quality of Care of a Chronic Disease, 281 JAMA 2098, 2098 (1999) (ex-
amining the effects of “physician performance measures for diabetes care” and con-
cluding that these measures could incentivize doctors to avoid “patients with high 
prior cost, poor adherence, or response to treatments”). 
141 See Susan Feng Lu, Multitasking, Information Disclosure and Product Quality:  Evi-
dence from Nursing Homes 1-3 (Simon Sch. Working Paper No. FR 09-03, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340578 (determining that nursing homes have not im-
proved in overall quality of care despite publicly available “report cards” because exist-
ing resources were simply reallocated to achieve better scores on those aspects of care 
being measured). 
142 See David Dranove et al., Is More Information Better?  The Effects of “Report Cards” on 
Health Care Providers, 111 J. POL. ECON. 555, 555-56 (2003) (finding that cardiac surgery 
“report cards” in New York and Pennsylvania resulted in medical providers being less 
willing to take on sicker patients, and therefore caused “worse health outcomes” and 
“decreased patient and social welfare”). 
143 Id. at 581-84. 
144 See Leemore Dafny & David Dranove, Do Report Cards Tell Consumers Anything 
They Don’t Already Know?  The Case of Medicare HMOs, 39 RAND J. ECON. 790, 817 (2008) 
(finding patient response to the Medicare report cards even after controlling for inde-
pendent market factors).  
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hopelessly beyond most people’s level.145  Other findings indicate that 
nobody tries to read the HIPAA forms.  The University of Michigan 
Hospital’s form runs to seven large pages of print so small that one of 
us cannot read it with his glasses on.146  Mandated disclosure of privacy 
policies outside health care do no better.  For example, a survey of In-
ternet users found that less than 1% of them even noticed the dis-
closed policies.147 
Many of our colleagues informally report personal satisfaction 
with mandated nutrition labeling, and there are indications that some 
forms of nutrition labeling do some good.  Americans report being 
more aware of nutrition facts and changing their purchasing based on 
nutrition labels.  For example, Alan Mathios suggests that even before 
mandatory nutrition labeling, low-fat salad dressing had voluntary dis-
closures, but mandated labeling explicitly exposed the contents of 
high-fat salad dressings, and thus buyers could distinguish between 
the worse and the worst, precipitating a decline in sales for the highest 
fat products.148  There is also evidence that the level of attention to nu-
trition data boxes is increasing. 
But even for food labeling—the simplest and most understanda-
ble case of daily disclosures—evidence is mixed.  Another study dis-
covered that people infrequently consult nutrition labels, and that 
those who do often find it difficult to comprehend and use the infor-
mation provided.149  Subjects in the study particularly struggled when 
trying to gauge whether nutrient contents comprised a “low, medium 
or high amount.”150  Likewise, a review of 103 studies “found that al-
though some consumers could understand some of the information 
on nutrition labelling, in general they reported finding nutrition la-
belling confusing, especially the use of some technical and numerical 
 
145 See, e.g., Steven Walfish & Keely M. Watkins, Readability Level of Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act Notices of Privacy Practices Utilized by Academic Medical Cen-
ters, 28 EVALUATION & HEALTH PROFS. 479 (2005); Mark Hochhauser, Readability of  
HIPAA Privacy Notices, BENEFITSLINK.COM (Mar. 12, 2003), http://benefitslink.com/ 
articles/hipaareadability.pdf. 
146 Carl E. Schneider, HIPAA-cracy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 10, 11. 
147 B.J. Fogg et al., How Do People Evaluate a Web Site’s Credibility?  Results from a Large 
Study, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, 86 (Nov. 11, 2002), http:// 
www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/stanfordPTL.pdf. 
148 Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices:  An 
Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 673-75 (2000). 
149 Gary Jones & Miles Richardson, An Objective Examination of Consumer Perception of 
Nutrition Information Based on Healthiness Ratings and Eye Movements, 10 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 238 (2007). 
150 Id.  
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information.”151  The review identified numerous studies that con-
tested the validity of consumer self-reported levels of nutrition-label 
consultation.  Employing an analytical tool known as “verbal protocol 
analysis,” the researchers in these studies recorded participants’ 
thoughts as the participants consulted nutrition labels.  The research-
ers analyzed the data collected to more fully understand how nutrition 
labels affected consumers’ choice of food products.  While consumers 
may look at nutritional information, these studies concluded that they 
seldom process its meaning.152 
Even if consumers try to process the information, their ability to 
do so depends upon “literacy and numeracy skills”153 (which may help 
explain why our colleagues report greater benefit from nutrition labe-
ling than the evidence seems to indicate for many people).  One study 
found that patients experienced “many difficulties interpreting cur-
rent food labels” and that patients’ difficulties were “highly correlated 
with their underlying literacy and numeracy skills.”154  This correlation 
remained even for more educated patients.  Despite a “generally well-
educated” sample, nearly 80% of which had adequate literacy skills, 
more than two-thirds of subjects had numeracy skills below a ninth-
grade level.155  So, for example, when 200 patients were asked twenty-
four questions about actual labels, only 22% of them 
could determine the amount of net carbohydrates in two slices of low-
carb bread, and only 23% could determine the amount of net carbohy-
drates in a serving of low-carb spaghetti.  There were 970 errors identi-
fied on the subjects’ responses to the first 12 items of the [National La-
bel Survey].  Common errors included (1) did not attempt to apply 
serving size/servings per container information or used it inappropriately 
(n=325), (2) confused by extraneous or complex information (n=369), 
and (3) calculation and other errors (n=276). Many patients were con-
fused by the complexity of the nutrition label and could not find the 
proper information on the label, or incorrectly used the information in 
 
151 Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley, Consumer Understanding and Use of Nutrition La-
belling:  A Systematic Review, 8 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 21, 23 (2005). 
152 Id. at 24; see also Russell L. Rothman et al., Patient Understanding of Food Labels:  
The Role of Literacy and Numeracy, 31 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 391, 391 (2006) (conclud-
ing that many patients struggle to understand nutrition labels and that there is a 
strong correlation between poor label comprehension and low-level literacy and nu-
meracy skills). 
153 Mary Margaret Huizinga et al., Literacy, Numeracy, and Portion-Size Estimation 
Skills, 36 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 324, 326 (2009). 
154 Rothman et al., supra note 152, at 394. 
155 Id. at 396. 
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the percent daily value column or the 2000-calorie recommended daily 
allowance (RDA) footnote when this information was not relevant.
156
  
But assume that nutrition labeling is more successful than this 
study suggests.  The question would then be how to distinguish be-
tween correlation and causation.  Changes in consumption, especially 
the rise of demand for low-fat foods and the decline in demand for 
high-fat foods, are associated with mandated disclosure, but various 
factors may have set the trend before the disclosure regulation, as a re-
sult of various factors—change in consumer tastes, the obesity epidem-
ic, aggressive advertising by low-fat food manufacturers, and more. 
Furthermore, consumers have other ways to acquire nutrition in-
formation.  Manufacturers highlight nutrition advantages and make 
comparative claims.  Perversely, because of disclosure mandates in the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act,157 the amount of nutrition in-
formation in manufacturers’ advertising and voluntary campaigns has 
narrowed substantially.  Fewer comparative claims are made, claims 
focus on narrower issues (e.g., total fat), and advertising of “good 
foods” like fruits and vegetables has fallen significantly.158  To be sure, 
voluntarily disclosed information can be biased and misleading, and 
the FTC has been monitoring such information.  But if mandatory 
merely replaces voluntary disclosure, then its value is questionable. 
It is also sobering that, while food labeling may be have an in-
creasing effect on people’s decisions, few succeed in changing their 
overall diets.  Findings suggest, for example, that reduced consump-
tion of one high-fat food, such as red meat, is offset by increased con-
sumption of another high-fat food, such as dairy products.159 
 
156 Id. at 393. 
157 Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 1(a), 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 21 U.S.C.). 
158 PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, BUREAU OF ECON. STAFF, FTC, 
ADVERTISING NUTRITION AND HEALTH:  EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977–1997 
E-30 (2002); see also Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information, Advertising, and 
Health Choices:  A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. ECON. 459 (1990) (examining 
the effects of information on consumer and producer behavior in the ready-to-eat ce-
real market); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising:  The 
Case of Fat Consumption in the United States, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 91 (1995) (examining 
how the introduction of producer advertising affected fat consumption). 
159 See Brenda M. Derby & Alan S. Levy, Do Food Labels Work? (noting studies that 
show reduced-fat options do not necessarily lead to less fat intake), in HANDBOOK OF 
MARKETING AND SOCIETY 372, 389 (Paul N. Bloom & Gregory T. Gundlach eds., 2001); 
Daniel S. Putler & Elizabeth Frazao, Assessing the Effects of Diet/Health Awareness on the 
Consumption and Composition of Fat Intake (finding “widespread ‘balloon’ effects, where 
women trade one source of dietary fat for another”), in ECONOMICS OF FOOD SAFETY 
247, 267 ( Julie A. Caswell ed., 1991). 
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Evidence suggests that Miranda warnings fail for two reasons.  
First, people do not understand those warnings.  Asked to paraphrase 
Miranda provisions directly after hearing each provision, 
[o]nly 38.5% of detainees achieved good comprehension for the easy 
(< sixth grade) level, and substantially fewer (20.5%) achieved good 
comprehension for the moderate (8th to 10th grade) level. . . . [V]ery 
few detainees (6.8%) accurately recalled even at the easy (< sixth grade) 
level that there is no cost for a court-appointed attorney.160  
Thus, for example, when Rogers “examined whether college students 
espousing knowledge of their Miranda rights were accurate in their 
self-appraisals,” he found that “[n]early all (95.6%) believed that any 
confession would nullify their right to counsel.”161 
Second, evidence shows that 
the overwhelming majority of suspects (some 78% to 96%) waive their 
rights.  As Patrick Malone pointed out . . . “Miranda warnings have little 
or no effect on a suspect’s propensity to talk. . . . Next to the warning la-
bel on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of offi-
cial advice in our society.”
162
  
Miranda does not even help people with every advantage.  The FBI in-
terrogated Yale faculty, staff, graduate students, and undergraduates 
after a 1960s draft protest.  The warnings were “almost wholly ineffec-
tive.”163  Each man waived his rights, and after being better informed 
about the legal meaning of doing so, regretted it.164 
We could go on.  We could say, for example, that disclosure by 
used-car dealers of items such as prior use, odometer readings, war-
ranties, and safety checks did nothing to improve the excess price 
paid by poor buyers relative to more wealthy ones.165  We could also 
point to some moderate successes of disclosure regimes, particularly 
 
160 Richard Rogers, A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing . . . Emerging Miranda 
Research and Professional Roles For Psychologists, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 779 (2008). 
161 Id. at 781. 
162 Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 
99 MICH. L REV 1000, 1012-13 (second alteration in original) (quoting Patrick Malone, 
“You Have the Right to Remain Silent”:  Miranda After Twenty Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 
368 (1986)). 
163 John Griffiths & Richard E. Ayres, Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda 
Project:  Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 318 (1967).  
164 Id. at 310. 
165 See Kenneth McNeil et al., Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the Impact of 
Consumer Disclosure Laws:  The Used Car Industry, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 695, 717 (1979) 
(“Wisconsin’s disclosure law . . . did not increase or decrease the relative disadvantage 
of the poor.”). 
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those that rely on ratings systems.166  But enough.  Let us move on to a 
more fundamental step of our argument—an exploration of why 
mandated disclosure is so unreliable. 
III.  WHY MANDATED DISCLOSURE FAILS 
We have shown that mandated disclosure regularly—though not 
inevitably—fails to achieve its purpose of improving disclosees’ deci-
sions.  Mandated disclosure is not doomed to fail, but it rarely suc-
ceeds.  On analysis, one can see why failure is virtually inherent in the 
regulatory technique.  Success requires three actors—lawmakers, dis-
closers, and disclosees—to play demanding parts properly.  Rarely can 
each actor accomplish all that is needed, and therefore mandated dis-
closures rarely work as planned. 
A.  Lawmakers 
For mandated disclosure to work, lawmakers must succeed at sev-
eral tasks.  First, they must correctly identify a problem that needs a 
regulatory solution.  Second, they must correctly decide that man-
dated disclosure is the appropriate regulatory method.  Third, they 
must correctly decide what disclosure to mandate.  Fourth, they must 
correctly and comprehensibly articulate the standard of disclosure.  
Each step is problematic; tacking all four successfully is uncommon. 
These steps are so problematic because each one pushes the law-
maker toward excessive mandates.  Lawmakers have incentives to re-
gulate when regulation is unnecessary, to use mandated disclosure 
when it is ineffective, to set mandates too broadly, and to articulate 
standards too loosely.  As a result, disclosure mandates grow but never 
diminish; disclosures are added, never removed. 
1.  Is Regulation Necessary? 
Demands for action deluge lawmakers.  “Trouble stories”—tales of 
misfortune that might represent a systematic problem—inspire many 
of these demands.  The family that lost a home to foreclosure, the pa-
tient who died, and the consumer who has been swindled spark sym-
 
166 See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE:  THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANS-
PARENCY (2007) (analyzing the success of simple disclosures).  But see Clifford Winston, 
The Efficacy of Information Policy:  A Review of Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil’s 
Full Disclosure:  The Perils and Promise of Transparency, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 704 (2008) 
(arguing that evidence of the alleged success of transparency regimes is inconclusive).  
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pathy and anger.  Indignation, political pressure, and a sense of duty 
drive lawmakers to regulate. 
More specifically, as Bardach and Kagan observe, “[c]atastrophes 
are probably the most important catalysts of new regulation.”167  Legis-
lators in our media-oriented world “transform individual acts of mal-
feasance into social problems requiring society-wide solutions.”168  Leg-
islators write prohibitory legislation, which places them “on the side of 
the angels without having to vote for higher taxes.”169  Once regulatory 
bureaucracies are established, their growth is determined in part by 
failure of current policy, and in part by new risks and new situations 
that develop.170  Noteworthy events spark that growth, including 
“scandals that expose presumptive laxity, corruption, or incompetency 
in the regulatory agency.”171 
Trouble stories, however, are dubious bases for regulation.  They 
are anecdotes and may not represent a problem at all, much less one 
extensive and serious enough to necessitate regulation.  For example, 
the atrocities of Nazi doctors and the Public Health Service research 
at Tuskegee have been the primary rationale for the university and 
hospital committees that regulate “human-subject” research.  But 
these stories tell us little about how often and how unethical medical 
researchers, much less unethical social scientists, significantly injure 
people in this country and in this era. 
Another example involves a research subject who died under trag-
ic circumstances a decade ago,.  It turned out that the researcher had 
a financial interest in a company that might have benefited had the 
research succeeded.172  This trouble story has become “proof” that re-
searchers with financial interests in their work are dangerous.  Exem-
plifying the overreaction that scandals provoke, “one [conflict of in-
terest committee] chair remarked, ‘The future of academic health 
centers depends on . . . [conflict of interest oversight] being done 
 
167 EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:  THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 23 (Transaction Publishers 2d prtg. 2003) (1982). 
168 Id. at 67. 
169 Id. at 14. 
170 Id. at xiv. 
171 Id. at 22. 
172 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Estate of Gelsinger v. Trustees of University of Pennsyl-
vania:  Money, Prestige, and Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research, in HEALTH LAW 
AND BIOETHICS 229, 230 (Sandra H. Johnson et al. eds., 2009).   
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right.’”173  Researchers may sometimes be tempted to take some advan-
tage of research subjects for financial gain, but are they tempted and 
do they succumb often enough and harmfully enough to justify regu-
lating conflicts of interest?  Who knows?  Who asks? 
Not only are trouble stories dubiously representative, they are 
asymmetrical.  They push in only one direction—toward regulation.  
What might induce lawmakers to forego or revoke regulation?  What 
would be evidence that the problem was infrequent and minor?  The 
pressure for more is salient, politically charged, and urgent; the pressure 
for less is not.  The injured research subject or the defrauded consumer 
is conspicuous; the people who can be saved by suppressed research or 
the consumers who pay for regulation are anonymous and forgotten. 
2.  Is Mandated Disclosure the Best Form of Regulation? 
Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei, luring lawmakers onto the rocks 
of regulatory failure.  It is alluring because it resonates with two fun-
damental American ideologies.  The first is free-market principles.  
Mandated disclosure may constrain unfettered rapacity and counter-
acts caveat emptor, but the intervention is soft and leaves everything 
substantive alone:  prices, quality, entry.  Instead of specifying out-
comes of transactions or dictating choices, it proffers information for 
making better decisions.174  Second, mandated disclosure serves the 
autonomy principle.  It supposes that people make better decisions 
for themselves than anyone can make for them and that people are 
entitled to freedom in making decisions. 
The more-information-is-better mantra seems to serve both the 
free-market and autonomy principles.  Thus, in defending mandated 
disclosure, the FTC stated, “It is a basic tenet of our economic system 
that information in the hands of consumers facilitates rational pur-
chase decisions; and, moreover, is an absolute necessity for efficient 
functioning of the economy.”175  The ease with which lawmakers 
mandate disclosure further evidences the ideological appeal of the 
 
173 Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Disclosing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research:  Views of 
Institutional Review Boards, Conflict of Interest Committees, and Investigators, 34 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 581, 583 (2006). 
174 For excellent discussions, see Beales et al., supra note 68, at 513-14, Colin Ca-
merer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003), and Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
175 Proprietary Vocational and Home Study Schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,796, 60,805 
(Dec. 28, 1978). 
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mantra.  For example, a flagship disclosure statute—the Truth-in-
Lending Act of 1968—passed by ninety-two to zero votes in the Se-
nate.176  The PSDA passed unopposed in the Senate.177  Courts adopted 
informed consent with impressive confidence and many pieties (and 
little evidence). 
Mandated disclosure appeals to lawmakers for other reasons.  
First, it looks cheap.  It requires almost no government expenditures, 
and its costs seem to be imposed on the story’s villain, the stronger 
party who withholds information. 
Second, mandated disclosure looks easy.  It just requires more 
communication between parties who are already communicating; in 
hindsight, the information that could have led a trouble-story victim 
to a better decision seems obvious.  For example, Rena Truman’s doc-
tor repeatedly urged her to have a Pap smear but did not specify the 
consequences of not having one.  She died of cervical cancer.  Typical-
ly, one judge asked, 
Can it be doubted that, had the decedent in this case known that for $6 
and mild discomfort she could discover the existence of cervical cancer 
and thus survive, she would have taken the test?  Central to her failure to 
take the test was a clear lack of understanding of the significance of the 
doctor’s recommendation.
178
 
Third, mandated disclosure looks effective.  Mandated informa-
tion often seems relevant to a difficult decision.  When asked, con-
sumers say they want information.  Even unenthusiastic commentators 
imagine that while mandates may not help, they cannot hurt.  And the 
dogma of disclosure seems unfalsifiable:  even when disclosure fails, 
this failure only means that the mandate should be enhanced.  For 
example, despite a long and long-standing list of mandated mortgage 
disclosures, an epidemic of irrational and devastating borrowing pro-
duced a subprime mortgage disaster, a foreclosure surge, and a finan-
cial crisis.  Despite proposals to regulate mortgages substantively and 
 
176 Rubin, supra note 5, at 254-55. 
177 See Elizabeth Leibold McCloskey,  The Patient Self-Determination Act,  1 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 163, 168 (1991).  McCloskey, the sponsor’s aide, thinks “Reinhold Nie-
buhr would have enjoyed watching the legislative process,” for translating “a good idea 
into a good law is . . . a Niebuhrian dream.”  Id. at 164. 
178 Truman v. Thomas, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (Karlton, J. 
concurring and dissenting), vacated, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).  For a detailed examina-
tion of that case and the assumption that Ms. Truman would have behaved differently 
had Dr. Thomas told her the risks of not having a Pap smear, see Mark A. Hall & Carl 
E. Schneider, When Patients Say No (to Save Money):  An Essay on the Tectonics of Health 
Law, 41 CONN. L. REV. 743, 764-67 (2009). 
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oversee lenders more closely,179 commentators and reformers still con-
sider disclosures central to the solution.180  For example, the Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires a lender to disclose a 
new, all-inclusive version of the APR three days before the deal.181  
Even catastrophes like the BP oil spill, which led to a serious debate 
on how to prevent such episodes, have invoked proposals for man-
dated disclosure.  Why not disclose the oil company’s safety record to 
its consumers at the gas station?182 
For all these reasons, lawmakers rarely inquire into the effective-
ness or burden of disclosure.  For example, “only limited discussions 
of the potential costs and benefits of the PSDA occurred during the 
legislative process.”183  Similarly, the courts primarily responsible for 
creating the duty of informed consent barely asked whether patients 
want to make medical decisions, whether doctors could provide and 
patients could use the mandated information, whether patients would 
make better decisions with more information, or what informed con-
sent would cost—despite empirical grounds indicating that courts 
should expect troubling answers to these questions.184 
 
179 See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:  The 
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1317-66 (2002) (propos-
ing that the government stop predatory lending by establishing a suitability standard); 
John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 
407 (suggesting “creditor-focused reform”); see also HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON 
PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 17-18 (2000), 
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (explaining the 
relationship between predatory lending and subprime markets). 
180 See HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 179, at 67 
(proposing that originators be required to provide an accurate “Good Faith Estimate” 
of, among other things, the APR); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM:  A NEW FOUNDATION 63-65 (2009), available at http:// 
www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (proposing new formats for 
financial disclosures that would be less technical and tested for their readability); Oren 
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1073, 1140-49 (2009) (providing one of the more nuanced and careful views of 
disclosure reform); Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole 
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth:  Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON 
REG. 181, 230-31 (2008) (proposing a comprehensive APR measure). 
181 15 U.S.C. §1638(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
182 Jody Freeman, The Good Driller Award, Op-Ed., N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2010, at A31. 
183 Jeremy Sugarman et al., The Cost of Ethics Legislation:  A Look at the Patient Self-
Determination Act, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 387, 389 (1993). 
184 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he pa-
tient’s right of self-decision . . . can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses 
enough information to enable an intelligent choice.”). 
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In short, when lawmakers are besieged, mandated disclosure looks 
like rescue.  Its critics are few.185  Lawmakers can be seen to have acted.  
The fisc is unmolested.  The people most visibly burdened—the dis-
closers—rarely dare resist vigorously and prefer disclosure to yet harsh-
er regulation.  Easy alternatives are few.  Disclosure’s political utility 
does much to explain its incessant use and its irrepressible expansion.186 
3.  What Is the Proper Scope of the Disclosure Mandate? 
Mandated disclosure’s appeal to lawmakers and the allure of the 
more-is-better mantra lead lawmakers to mandate disclosure too often 
and too broadly.  Furthermore, disclosure’s logic is inherently expan-
sive.  Only broad disclosure accommodates the variety of disclosees 
and circumstances.  One can always imagine that disclosing one more 
datum might help.  Because it is hard to anticipate what data will help, 
safety seems to lie in broad mandates. 
For example, what should researchers disclose about conflicts of in-
terest?  Conflicts may include “the award of stock contingent on certain 
occurrences, licensing rights, ‘put’ options, seed money for commercial 
start-ups, limited partnership and other joint venture opportunities, 
royalty-based payments, and specialized grant funding to individual in-
vestigators and to institutions.”187  Worse, incentives’ effects 
 
185 For some early skepticism, see Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Disclosure 
of Finance Charges:  A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (1966), Homer Kripke, Gesture 
and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1969), and Note, Consumer 
Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).  Some economists who expect busi-
nesses to volunteer information if consumers want it have criticized mandated disclo-
sure, if faintly.  See, e.g., Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Disclo-
sure (exploring various consequences of disclosure through economic analysis), in 2 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 605 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998); Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure 
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 479-80 (1981) (arguing that it is in a com-
pany’s economic interest to disclose information, even in the absence of positive dis-
closure law); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure 
of Product Risks 2-4 (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 327, Harvard Law 
and Economics Discussion Paper No. 564, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=939546 (noting that disclosure regimes present potential unintended risks, 
such as chilling information gathering from firms). 
186 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude:  The Need for 
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and 
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1096-102 (1984) (describing the shift from usury 
laws to disclosure regulation). 
187 Richard S. Saver, Medical Research Oversight from the Corporate Governance Perspec-
tive:  Comparing Institutional Review Boards and Corporate Boards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
619, 716 (2004). 
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vary in intensity and impact depending on the overall context, such as 
the number of other investigators sharing the same incentive, how the 
incentive is actually calculated, the amount of money to be earned com-
pared to an investigator’s other compensation sources, the time period 
over which the incentive is applied, and whether the institution as a 
whole shares in the incentive.188  
All this might be relevant; what can be excluded?  Similarly, mortgage 
disclosures are hard to specify because “predatory lending can take 
many forms,” including overpricing loans, lending more than buyers 
can repay, charging fees that offset the advantages of refinancing, “a 
myriad of other potentially exploitive terms,” and misrepresenting the 
loan documents.189 
Mandates also multiply when it is hard to pinpoint what informa-
tion disclosees need.  For example, hospitals, physicians, and schools 
must disclose “report cards” about their performance, when perfor-
mance depends on both the skill and the effort of the producer and 
the characteristics of their patients and students.  However, despite 
decades of inquiry, scholars have not found reliable indicia of medical 
quality, principally because they cannot factor out all the influences 
on medical success.  And since exceptional doctors attract risky cases, 
success may not reflect skill. 
In addition, trouble stories never stop.  No regulation eliminates 
problems, and mandated disclosure barely reduces them.  Thus, there 
is constant pressure to cover newly noticed contingencies.  The scope 
of mandates ratchets ever up, never down. 
Lawmakers might set a mandate’s scope by asking consumers what 
they want to know.  Alas, they say virtually everything.  When choosing 
health care plans, they want to know about 
(1) access . . . ; (2) amount of paperwork; (3) benefits; (4) choice of pro-
vider . . . ; (5) communication/interpersonal skills/caring of provider; 
(6) convenience . . . ; (7) coordination of care; (8) costs; (9) courtesy . . . ; 
(10) hospital ratings; (11) good value for the money; (12) plan adminis-
trative hassles; and (13) quality . . . .
190
  
In one large study, 76% of the patients questioned “would want to 
hear of any adverse effects [of a treatment], no matter how rare” and 
 
188 Id. at 717. 
189 Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological 
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 90-91 (2010). 
190 Lubalin & Harris-Kojetin, supra note 137, at 72. 
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83% wanted to know about any “serious adverse effect, no matter how 
rare.”191 
If people knew how much they were asking for, they would not say 
such things.  Given much less information, they still use much less 
than they are given.  For example, “the Minnesota Health Data Insti-
tute distributed a 16-page, statewide report card that featured com-
parison tables and color-coded graphs of consumer satisfaction within 
categories of health plans and compared 38 plans based on 20 per-
formance measures.”192  However, “[c]onsumers found the report 
cards cumbersome, complex, and detailed.”193 
Furthermore, in at least some areas (like medicine) people regu-
larly profess themselves pleased with whatever quantum of information 
they receive, however inadequate.  For example, one review of the li-
terature reports that “[p]atient satisfaction with the quality of infor-
mation provided, was usually high, despite frequent poor recall.”194 
Another reason mandates expand is that disclosees interpret in-
formation “wrongly.”  Thus, while patients and research subjects are 
supposed to be warned of the evils of doctors’ and researchers’ con-
flicts of interest, one study found that some people “perceived finan-
cial interests as a positive sign that the investigator would be invested 
in ensuring a study was done well.”195  Such perversity drives lawmakers 
to insist on broader disclosures so that disclosees understand the 
problem the right way.196 
4.  Can the Quantity Problem Be Answered? 
Because lawmakers tend to overuse mandated disclosure and to 
inflate its scope, a recurring and crucial “quantity problem” arises.  
This problem has two principal aspects—the “overload” effect and the 
“accumulation” problem.  The overload effect arises when a disclosure 
 
191 Dewey K. Ziegler et al., How Much Information About Adverse Effects of Medication 
Do Patients Want from Physicians?, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 706, 708 (2001) (em-
phasis added). 
192 Judith H. Hibbard et al., Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care:  Implications 
from Decision-Making Research, 75 MILBANK Q. 395, 395 (1997). 
193 Id. at 398. 
194 R. Lemaire, Informed Consent—A Contemporary Myth?, 88-B J. BONE & JOINT SUR-
GERY 2, 4 (2006). 
195 Christine Grady et al., The Limits of Disclosure:  What Research Subjects Want to 
Know About Investigator Financial Interests, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 598 (2006).  
196 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 186, at 1165 (arguing that the correct approach to 
reform is to increase accuracy rather than to simply increase or decrease the number 
of disclosures). 
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is too copious and complex for the disclosee to handle effectively.  
The accumulation problem arises because so many disclosures assail 
disclosees that they cannot possibly attend to more than a fraction of 
them.  Both the overload effect and the accumulation problem are in 
the first instance the responsibility of the lawmaker, who must eva-
luate them in deciding whether and how to mandate a disclosure. 
a.  The Overload Effect 
The overload problem is ubiquitous.  When mandates are too de-
tailed, both disclosers and disclosees have trouble.  Forms become so 
long and elaborate that disclosers have problems assembling and or-
ganizing the information, and disclosees do not read them and cannot 
understand, assimilate, and analyze the avalanche of information.197 
The classic overload statement is Miller’s “magical number sev-
en”198—seven being roughly the number of items people can keep in 
short-term memory.  This number is often thought too high, but many 
typical disclosures easily exceed it.  For example, Miranda warnings 
average 96 words and range up to 408 words.  Rogers invokes Miller’s 
number and concludes that even with “verbal chunking” (combining 
data into a single item for easier storage) “the upper limit of informa-
tion processing for Miranda warnings is likely less than 75 
words . . . . Even when cued, participants with less than a 12th grade 
education recalled only 55.8% of the verbal material.”199  And this still 
overstates understanding, since “many suspects have cognitive deficits 
and are further impaired by highly stressful circumstances,” and since 
“the mere recitation of concepts cannot be equated with genuine un-
derstanding.”200  The same problem proliferates in medicine.  In one 
study, for example, “[a]nesthesiologists and nurse practitioners vastly 
exceeded patients’ short-term memory capacity” when trying to edu-
cate them, the “investigators concluded that there is an extreme ten-
dency toward information overload by health care providers.”201 
 
197 See Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1211-15 (1994) (examining the social science literature on infor-
mation overload). 
198 George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two:  Some Limits on 
Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 90 (1956).   
199 Rogers, supra note 160, at 778. 
200 Id. at 778-79. 
201 Elisabeth H. Sandberg et al., Clinicians Consistently Exceed a Typical Person’s Short-
Term Memory During Preoperative Teaching, 53 SURV. ANESTHESIOLOGY 131, 131 (2009). 
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The overload problem is omnipresent and usually inevitable be-
cause of the dynamics of mandating disclosure.  Even if a mandate 
begins modestly—label the calories on the can of tuna—it irrepressi-
bly expands.  In part, this trend is because lawmakers discover that 
people need more information to interpret the first mandate correctly 
(e.g., information about average caloric needs or the calories from 
fats) and that more information is relevant to the choice (e.g., infor-
mation about trans fats, carbohydrates, vitamins, salt, and so on).  As 
information proliferates, it becomes hard to argue that yet other data 
are not equally relevant, and various data will have their advocates, 
such as the groups that want disclosures about whether food contains 
anything genetically modified or about a food’s country of origin. 
Lawmakers have no good solution to this problem.  There is rarely 
a good solution in principle:  incomplete disclosure leaves people ig-
norant, but complete disclosure creates crushing overload problems.  
Thus, a sophisticated lawmaker could recognize that “less is more” but 
still fear that “less is not enough.”  Furthermore, and crucially, the 
lawmaker’s incentives generally push it toward ever more disclosure. 
A particularly revealing illustration of the way lawmakers create 
overload problems—virtually against their will and certainly against 
their avowed intentions—comes from the IRB system. There, the reg-
ulator (the IRB) approves the exact words of every disclosure the re-
searcher makes and has unreviewable discretion to impose whatever 
requirements it wishes.  The literature, government agencies, and elite 
commissions agree that consent forms are too long, and there is every 
reason to believe that individual IRB members concur.202  Neverthe-
less, in the decades during which the IRB system has regulated how 
researchers may solicit consent from prospective research subjects, 
consent forms have steadily swollen.  In one study, for example, 
[t]he length of the consent form increased roughly linearly by an aver-
age of 1.5 pages per decade.  In the 1970s, the average consent form was 
less than one page long and often only a paragraph or two, but by the 
mid-1990s the average form had increased in length to over 4.5  
pages . . . .”
203
  
 
202 See Carl E. Schneider, The Hydra, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2010, at 9. 
203 Ilene Albala et al., The Evolution of Consent Forms for Research:  A Quarter Century of 
Changes, IRB:  ETHICS & HUMAN RES., May–June 2010, at 7, 9 (citation omitted).  “More 
recently, Beardsley and colleagues in Australia found that the median length of con-
sent forms increased from seven to 11 pages between 2000 and 2005.”  Id. at 7 (citing 
Emma Beardsley et al., Longer Consent Forms for Clinical Trials Compromise Patient Under-
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In a span of seven years, for example, between 1975 and 1982, the 
“mean length of consent forms nearly doubled.”204 
How can a lawmaker committed to brevity become the instigator 
of prolixity?  A study by William Burman and others helps explain why 
lawmakers generally, and IRBs particularly, steadily expand both the 
scope, length, and complexity of disclosure mandates.205  That study 
looked at the way twenty-five IRBs at “large institutions oriented to-
ward clinical research” reviewed two protocols.206  Review generally 
took over three months.  The IRBs found no problem with the proto-
cols, but they required a median of 46.5 changes in each consent 
form.207  Most (85%) of the changes “did not change the meaning of 
the consent form,” but they did change its quality.208  The forms got 
longer, the sentences wordier, the active voice scarcer, and the read-
ing-difficulty level higher (by a mean of .9  levels), so that 41% of the 
forms “had an inappropriately high reading grade level.”209 
b.  The Accumulation Problem 
The overload effect pervades the Disclosure Republic, but it is at 
least well known in the literature and by lawmakers.210  However, they 
hardly notice the “accumulation” problem.  Lawmakers evaluate dis-
closure mandates issue-by-issue, but in disclosees’ lives, each disclosure 
competes for their time and attention with other disclosures, with 
their investigations into unmandated knowledge, and with everything 
they do besides collecting information and making decisions (like 
working, playing, and living with their families).  One disclosure by it-
 
standing:  So Why Are They Lengthening?, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, e13, e13-e14 (2007), 
http://jco.ascopubs.org/content/25/9/e13.full.pdf). 
204 Id. at 7. 
205 William Burman et al., The Effects of Local Review on Informed Consent Documents 
From a Multicenter Clinical Trials Consortium, 24 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 245 (2003). 
206 Id. at 252. 
207 The range of changes was between 3 and 160.   
208 Id. at 249. 
209 Id.  Furthermore, 11.2% of the changes actually introduced errors into the 
forms.  Two-thirds of the forms “had an error of protocol presentation or a required 
consent form element.”  Id.  Many errors were minor, but over a quarter  
were more substantive:  deletions of significant side effects (e.g., the possibility 
of hepatotoxicity from rifampin and/or pyrazinamide), major errors in the 
description of study procedures (e.g., incorrect information on study dura-
tion), or the complete removal of a required section of the consent form (e.g., 
the right to withdraw from the study).  
Id. at 249-51. 
210 See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1060 (1984). 
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self may seem trivial, but en masse disclosures are overwhelming.  
Even if disclosees wanted to read all the disclosures relevant to their 
decisions, they could not do so proficiently, and practically they could 
not do so at all.  They soon learn their lesson and give up any inclina-
tion they may have had to devote their lives to disclosures. 
Lawmakers are shielded from the accumulation problem. They 
deal with trouble stories and the social problems they symbolize one at 
a time, in specialized agencies or committees, or in courts confronted 
with a particular case or controversy.  In those contexts, nothing draws 
their attention to the accumulation problem; nor would raising it be a 
politically attractive maneuver.  And even if the literature eventually 
recognized the accumulation problem, even if the literature informed 
lawmakers, and even if lawmakers wanted to thin the disclosure land-
scape by selecting only a few critical disclosures, the lawmakers would 
not have the competence, incentives, or opportunity for doing so. 
Furthermore, the American system of overlapping jurisdictions 
permits one lawmaker to act even if other lawmakers with concurrent 
jurisdiction believe action is unnecessary, undesirable, or even unsafe.  
For example, the FDA must approve the content of labels.  Neverthe-
less, a state jury may hold a pharmaceutical company liable for injuries 
purportedly resulting from drugs containing labels that the FDA ap-
proved but that the jury thought insufficiently informative.211  In 
another example, the FCC already limits the frequency energy that a 
cell phone can emit, research has identified no “conclusive evidence” 
that cellphone emissions are harmful, and information about emis-
sions is available online.212  Nevertheless, the San Francisco board of 
supervisors has passed an ordinance requiring “handset makers to 
post in stores how much wireless radiation their phones give off.”213 
5.  Can the Standard of Disclosure Be Articulated Effectively? 
Suppose the lawmaker has identified a genuine problem, the 
problem is appropriate for mandated disclosure, and the mandate’s 
scope has been shrewdly gauged.  The lawmaker must now articulate 
the mandate.  Standards can range from vague general statements to 
 
211 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (discussing a case arising under 
state law in which the jury found that a drugmaker did not provide adequate warning 
on its labels of risks related to using the drug intravenously). 
212 John D. Sutter, San Francisco to Warn Consumers About Cell Radiation Levels, CNN 
(June 16, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/06/16/san.francisco.cell. 
radiation/index.html?hpt=T2. 
213 Id. 
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precise lists of specific data.  Informed consent exemplifies the former 
end of the continuum:  what information would a reasonable patient 
want in making her decision?  Miranda exemplifies the latter:  a set of 
words so specific that television addicts can recite them from memory.  
Alas, both ends of the continuum are problematic.  The specific end 
requires extraordinary prescience and precision.  Perversely, this pre-
cision is likeliest when information is already well known; it became 
easier to write intelligible cigarette warnings after the dangers of 
smoking were common knowledge.  The vague end of the spectrum 
may ease these problems, but it gives disclosers scant guidance. 
Lawmakers may be concerned not only with what must be dis-
closed, but also with how.  The problem of disclosing conflicts of in-
terest to research subjects provides a hint of the difficulties the me-
thod of disclosure poses.  In one survey of researchers and regulators, 
some thought 
that the financial disclosure should occur early in the consent process, 
and some respondents suggested that a disclosure statement should ap-
pear near the top of the consent document.  There was also support for 
highlighting the disclosure in some way, but this suggestion raises the 
concern that such highlighting might communicate to potential re-
search participants that the financial disclosure is more important than 
other components of the consent document.
214
  
To put the point differently, the lawmaker has an inherently diffi-
cult task.  Both the market-failure and the autonomy rationales for 
mandated disclosure assume that disclosees and their circumstances, 
preferences, and choices are various.  Given all this variety, how is a 
lawmaker to find language to guide each discloser to the disclosure 
most helpful to disclosees? 
In sum, the lawmaker’s incentives are to mandate disclosure even 
when it is inappropriate and to mandate disclosure too broadly.  Fur-
thermore, those incentives persist even after the lawmaker has acted; 
trouble stories will continue to reveal that the new disclosure regime 
has not solved every problem.  And experience continually suggests 
more data that might improve disclosees’ decisions.  Thus, disclosure 
mandates often grow and rarely shrink. 
B.  Disclosers 
The second prerequisite to mandated disclosure is that the dis-
closers provide the mandated information.  Even under the optimistic 
 
214 Weinfurt et al., supra note 173, at 590. 
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assumption that disclosers will truly try to comply with disclosure re-
quirements, much will keep them from doing so effectively. 
1.  Interpreting the Mandate 
First, the discloser must determine what to disclose.  But, as we 
have just explained, mandates can be frustratingly vague. We could 
invoke illustrations of mythic proportions, like the original  
TILA and Regulation Z that implemented it, which were contradictory 
at places and over time were accompanied by countless Federal Re-
serve Board comments.  But it does not take a long technical statute to 
create complexity and vagueness—such downfalls can also result from 
a seemingly simple standard of disclosure. Consider contract law’s dis-
closure norms.  Sellers cannot imagine and describe everything any 
imaginable buyer might ever want to know about a contract.  But if 
not everything, how much?  The common law has struggled to find a 
formula.  Some nondisclosures amount to fraudulent concealment 
and are subject to standard antifraud sanctions, but mandated disclo-
sure is intended to go beyond antifraud rules.  The Restatement of 
Contracts requires disclosing facts that would “correct a mistake of the 
other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the 
contract.”215  But the ambiguity of this rule suggests why legislators lat-
er supplemented it with bright-line rules on, say, which advertising 
practices are deceptive.216 
Or consider doctors’ duty to provide information “‘a reasonable 
person . . . would be likely to attach significance to . . . in deciding 
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.’”217  You are the doc-
tor.  A drug’s side effects include 
excess stomach acid secretion, irritation of the stomach or intestines, 
vomiting, heartburn, stomach cramps, bronchospasm, stomach ulcers, 
intestinal ulcers, hepatitis, stomach or intestinal bleeding, inflammation 
of skin, redness of skin, itching, hives, rash, wheezing, trouble breathing, 
life-threatening allergic reaction, giant hives, rupture in the wall of the 
stomach or intestines, hemolytic anemia, large skin blotches, decreased 
 
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981). 
216 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52 (2006). 
217 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Jon R. Waltz 
& Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent for Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 
(1970)). 
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blood platelets, decreased white blood cells, and loss of appetite.
218
   
Which side effects do you describe?  The likeliest?  The gravest?  Does 
your answer change if you know the drug is aspirin?  If you know that 
NSAIDs like aspirin kill thousands of people yearly?219 
The informed consent standard is yet more problematic, since it 
requires the disclosure of information patients need in order to make 
a decision about their treatment, not just side effects of specific treat-
ments.  A common problem, for example, is that “patients may regard 
a particular outcome of treatment as highly undesirable but 
then . . . learn to tolerate it well.”220  Many people initially refuse colos-
tomies, but they commonly are able to adjust to them.  So what should 
doctors tell patients?  Even a “relatively complete” description of co-
lostomies “lack[] relevant details”:  “What does it mean, for example, 
to have ‘no voluntary control’ of the colostomy?  What is involved in 
maintaining a colostomy?  What percentage of men will develop impo-
tence?  Moreover, the description never really shows people what a co-
lostomy looks like or how one operates.”221 
In sum, descriptions of illnesses and treatments “are necessarily 
incomplete, and patients and the public are likely to fill in the blanks 
idiosyncratically, with . . . personal experiences or stereotypes.”222 
When a mandate is stated broadly, disclosers might think that duty 
requires—or prudence demands—disclosing everything.  For example, 
HIPAA obligates providers to tell patients what providers may legiti-
mately do with patients’ health information.223  This produces disclo-
sures so detailed and deadly that we relegate our gruesome example 
to this footnote.224 
 
218 Comman and Rare Side Effects for Aspirin Oral, WEBMD, http:// 
www.webmd.com/drugs/drug-1082-aspirin.aspx?drugid=1082&drugname=aspirin& 
source=1&pagenumber=6 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
219 See Byron Cryer, NSAID-Associated Deaths:  The Rise and Fall of NSAID-Associated GI 
Mortality, 100 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1694, 1694 (2005) (citing estimates of between 
3200 and more than 16,500 NSAID-associated deaths per year in the United States). 
220 Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 58, 66 (1990). 
221 Peter A. Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?  A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies 
Between Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 QUALITY OF LIFE 
RES., 599, 601 (2003). 
222 Id. 
223 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2009). 
224 The University of Michigan Health Services Privacy notices includes the follow-
ing disclosure: 
University Providers, Employee Plans and Affiliated Health Plans all use and 
disclose [private health information] in connection with their standard busi-
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The problems with the disclosure of aspirin’s side effects came 
from a vague mandate, whereas the problems with HIPAA’s came 
from a broad one.  Equally baffling problems can result from complex 
mandates.  For example, the Federal Reserve issued Regulation Z to 
tell creditors how to comply with TILA: 
Regulation Z, while it did not salvage Truth-In-Lending’s basic goals, did 
succeed in making the statute too complex to be complied with.  Well-
meaning creditors could not comply with it.  Well-counseled creditors 
could not comply with it.  The pamphlets published by the Federal Re-
serve Board to help creditors comply with it did not comply with it. . . . 
[M]any [creditors] found Regulation Z a conundrum too deep for ei-
ther good will or high-priced intellect to solve.
225
  
Similarly, politicians, patients, and physicians have wanted to re-
quire disclosure of conflicts of interest created by capitation methods 
of paying doctors.  But nobody knows which interests matter, especial-
ly when conflicts are mediated by factors such as “size of the patient 
panel, amount of the capitation sum, refinement of risk adjustments, 
dollar value of stop-loss provisions, and scope of risk . . . not to men-
tion such relative intangibles as the force of professional ethics and 
fear of malpractice suits.”226  HMOs “‘can tell people whether [the 
HMOs] have a withhold, bonus payments or capitation’ . . . but ‘there 
 
ness operations, including quality assessment and improvement activities.  Ex-
amples of these activities include obtaining accreditation from independent 
organizations like the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, the National Committee for Quality Assurance and others, 
outcomes evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, operation of 
preventive health, early detection and disease management programs, case 
management and care coordination, contacting of health care providers and 
patients with information about treatment alternatives, and related functions; 
evaluations of health care providers (credentialing and peer review activities) 
and health plans; operation of educational programs; underwriting, premium 
rating and other activities relating to the creation, renewal or replacement of 
health benefits contracts; obtaining reinsurance, stop-loss and excess loss in-
surance; conducting or arranging for medical review, legal services, and audit-
ing functions, including fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs; 
business planning and development; and business management and general 
administrative activities, including data and information systems management, 
customer service, resolution of internal grievances, and sales, mergers, trans-
fers, or consolidations with other providers or health plans or prospective 
providers or health plans.  
University of Michigan Quality and Safety, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HEALTH SYSTEMS, 
http://www.med.umich.edu/quality/toolkit/npp.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
225 Rubin, supra note 5, at 236-37. 
226 Lawrence D. Brown, Management by Objection?  Public Policies to Protect Choice in 
Health Plans, 56 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 145, 161 (Supp. 1 1999). 
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are literally over 100,000 ways to pay, and these systems are very pro-
prietary [and] the plans change them all the time.’”227 
The IRB system provides a illustration of how hard it is to deter-
mine what disclosures are required.  The IRB as the regulator—not 
the discloser—decides what information to give prospective research 
subjects.  Yet faced with a single protocol, IRBs disagree wildly about 
what to tell subjects and how.228  This illustration is damning because 
the discloser—which has reasons to flout mandates—is out of the pic-
ture, and yet the presumably expert agency still reaches no consensus 
on disclosure requirements. 
2.  Assembling the Data 
If the discloser can ascertain what data to reveal, it must next lo-
cate and assemble them.  But such information is often inaccessible or 
laborious to collect.  For example, an Illinois statute requires private 
business and vocational schools to state their enrollments and their 
students’ graduation, licensing, placement, and employment rates and 
salaries.229  How many educational institutions keep all that informa-
tion—or can get it, even with arduous effort (not least because much 
of it must come from former students)? 
Some information is too complex to assemble.  For example, con-
sumer-directed health care information is endlessly intricate.  Innu-
merable kinds of care might be offered.  Infinite permutations of 
reimbursement systems are possible.  Plan organization is endlessly va-
riable.  Quality is virtually impossible to measure.  Costs are too com-
plex and dynamic to describe. 
Assembling data is also difficult where information is speculative.  
How does a biobank anticipate all the ways donations might be used 
decades later?  How does a big firm lawyer anticipate the conflicts of 
interest that might develop over a lengthy representation? 
Not only must disclosers collect information, they must also moni-
tor and update the disclosures.  Disclosers must hunt down changes 
 
227 Id. (quoting Paul Lengerin, President, N.J. HMO Ass’n). 
228 See, e.g., Lee A. Green et al., Impact of Institutional Review Board Practice Variation 
on Observational Health Services Research, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 214, 221 (2006) 
(finding wide variations in consent requirements and the “standards [IRBs] applied to 
determine the level of review required”); Keith Humphreys et al., Letter, The Cost of 
Institutional Review Board Procedures in Multicenter Observational Research, 139 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 77, 77 (2003) (determining that disagreement among home IRBs and 
local sites contributes to the high cost of IRBs). 
229 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 410/3B-12(a) (West 2007). 
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and then repeat the travails of interpreting the law and assembling the 
data.  In at least some areas, the conventional wisdom is that disclosees 
need detailed updates often.  For example, Wendler and Rackoff ar-
gue that consent to participate in research expires when significant 
changes have occurred in “(a) the nature of the research itself, as de-
termined by its purpose, risks, potential benefits, requirements, and 
alternatives; (b) the individual’s personal and medical situations; and 
(c) the individual’s preferences and interests.”230  Such changes trigger 
a need for elaborate reconsent. 
3.  Implementing the Mandate 
Suppose the discloser can identify the information to be disclosed, 
can assemble it, and now must present it.  How should a discloser 
present it?  (Here we are discussing only disclosers’ problems commu-
nicating information; we later discuss disclosees’ problems reading it.)  
This question has looked easy to lawmakers and commentators, but 
consider a relatively simple mandate:  Miranda.  Two recent surveys 
“yielded 945 distinct Miranda warnings from 638 jurisdictions that 
were augmented by research on 122 juvenile English warnings and 
121 general Spanish warnings.”231  These warnings “range from 21 to 
408 words with an average of 95.60 words.”232  Further, “[r]emarkable 
differences in reading levels are observed across Miranda warn-
ings/waivers”:  a fifth are written below a sixth-grade reading level, 
most require a sixth- to eighth-grade level, and 2% “require at least 
some college education.”233 
One problem in crafting disclosure mandates is that ambiguity 
and even confusion are startlingly hard to avoid.  For example, even 
“[a]bsolute terms when placed in a medical setting appear to be open 
to interpretation.  Only 80.3% agreed that certain meant 100 of 100 
people, and only 67.8% agreed that never meant zero of 100 
people.”234  One study “found that physicians’ interpretations of the 
 
230 Dave Wendler & Jonathan Rackoff, Consent for Continuing Research Participation:  
What Is It and When Should It be Obtained?, IRB:  ETHICS & HUMAN RES., May–June 2002, 
at 1, 1. 
231 Rogers, supra note 160, at 778 (citations omitted). 
232 Id.   
233 Id. at 779. 
234 Kimberley Koons Woloshin et al., Patients’ Interpretation of Qualitative Probability 
Statements, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 961, 965 (1994). 
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term ‘likely’ . . . ranged from 25 to 75%,”235 and another study “re-
ported that interpretations of the term ‘very likely’ ranged from 30 to 
90%, even when presented in a restricted medical context.”236  Much 
mandated disclosure attempts to help people cope with risk.  But 
[d]ifferent people interpret given chance terms very differently. . . . Even 
the same individual may interpret a chance term differently depending 
on the context in which it occurs. . . . Terms that linguistically denote 
approximately equal probabilities show a remarkable variation . . . whereas 
the interpretation of terms that linguistically denote different probabili-
ties tends to overlap . . . .
237
  
And how is a discloser supposed to decide how to describe a risk when 
people think a term denotes a low risk applied to themselves and a 
higher risk applied to others? 
Numbers present similar puzzles for disclosers.  For example, risks 
can be stated as either rates or proportions.  Genetic counselors (spe-
cialists in describing risks to the uninformed) conventionally believe 
“that women understand proportions better than rates” even though 
there is “no scientific evidence to support that convention.”238  On the 
contrary, in one study “more than three times as many women (151) 
judged risks correctly with rates alone, compared with only proportions 
(41)” and “[m]any women (129) did not understand either format.”239 
Presumably responding to such problems, two lawmakers—the 
European Union and the U.K. Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency—proposed substituting words for numbers.  How-
ever, the EU’s terms 
have been shown to lead to considerable overestimations of risk by pa-
tients, doctors and the general public.  For example, according to EU 
guidelines the term ‘common’ is assigned to side effects that occur in 
1-10% of people taking the medicine . . . . [O]n average, patients inter-
 
235 Dianne C. Berry et al., Patients’ Understanding of Risk Associated with Medication 
Use:  Impact of European Commission Guidelines and Other Risk Scales, 26 DRUG SAFETY 1, 2 
(2003) (citing Geoffrey D. Bryant & Geoffrey R. Norman, Correspondence, Expressions 
of Probability:  Words and Numbers, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 411 (1980)). 
236 Id. (citing Daniëlle Timmermans, The Roles of Experience and Domain of Expertise 
in Using Numerical and Verbal probability Terms in Medical Decisions, 14 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 146 (1994)). 
237 Tim Smits & Vera Hoorens, How Probable is Probably?  It Depends on Whom You’re 
Talking About, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 83, 84 (2005) (citations omitted). 
238  David A. Grimes & Gillian R. Snively, Patients’ Understanding of Medical Risks:  
Implications for Genetic Counseling, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 910, 912-13 (1999). 
239 Id.  
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preted the word to mean around 45%, while doctors estimated the risk 
to be around 25%.
240
  
But “even the patients receiving information as percentages assessed 
the risk as higher than the actual risk.”241  And these disasters came 
not from recalcitrant disclosers, but from lawmakers themselves. 
Other problems abound, many too well known to require reitera-
tion here.  For instance, the way a fact is framed notoriously affects 
perceptions of it:  people react differently if a treatment is said to have 
an 80% chance of success instead of a 20% chance of failure.  Yet all 
information necessarily comes in some frame.242 
4.  Resisting the Mandate 
We have argued that even disclosers striving to obey a mandate 
will encounter crippling problems.  But disclosers may have reasons to 
disobey, since lawmakers usually impose mandates when they think 
disclosers are withholding information for illegitimate reasons, such as 
conflicts of interest.  And an enterprise that unscrupulously withholds 
information before a mandate might well continue to do so afterward. 
Nevertheless, stereotypes about evil nondisclosers ought not drive 
policy decisions.  Many disclosers are not evil; many disclosers have 
good reasons to behave well; and many disclosers dutifully obey man-
dates.243  Furthermore, even scrupulous disclosers may resist mandates 
for understandable, sensible, and even admirable reasons.  A disclo-
sure mandate is often one of many commands, incentives, and pres-
sures.  Usually, disclosers primarily want to get their work done, and 
mandates can be irrelevant to and even inconsistent with doing so.  
For example, disclosure requirements deluge doctors and hospitals, if 
only because they have so much significant information.244  But they 
 
240 Peter Knapp et al., Communicating the Risk of Side Effects to Patients:  An Evaluation of 
UK Regulatory Recommendations, 32 DRUG SAFETY 837, 838-39 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
241 Id. at 839. 
242 For entry to a large literature, see Annette Moxey et al., Describing Treatment Ef-
fects to Patients:  How They Are Expressed Makes a Difference, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 948 
(2003).   
243 Cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buy-
ers?  Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312 (2009) (showing 
that undisclosed terms in software licenses are no worse than disclosed ones). 
244 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 951 (1963) (“Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the infor-
mation possessed by the physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment 
is necessarily very much greater than that of the patient . . . . Further, both parties are 
aware of this information inequality, and their relation is colored by this knowledge.”). 
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properly think their principal task is to cure illness and soothe suffer-
ing, and that alone wholly outstrips their available time.  A typical doc-
tor lacks time to provide just the preventive care the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task prescribes.245  And “comprehensive high-quality man-
agement of 10 chronic illnesses require more time than primary care 
physicians have available for patient care overall.”246  Obviously, disclo-
sures are not the only desirable activity doctors must perform. 
Disclosers may consider a mandate not only burdensome, but in-
effective and even harmful.  They may learn that a costly disclosure is 
unread and unheeded.  Disclosers may also find that no matter how 
precise they are, disclosees tend to give more weight to data than the 
data merit.  For example, however side effects are revealed, patients 
tend to exaggerate their importance.247  Doctors may think such over-
estimates discourage patients from complying with treatment instruc-
tions, and doctors know that baseline noncompliance is dismayingly 
high (50% is a common estimate).248  Doctors may conclude that the 
risk of bad outcomes from noncompliance exceeds the risk from un-
disclosed side effects.  For example, in a French study, “[o]nly 44% of 
the rheumatologists regularly told their patients about possible serious 
side effects and only 7% about life-threatening side effects.”249  How-
ever, as many as 88% of the rheumatologists gave patients information 
“all the time” or “fairly often” about the adverse effects of not taking 
prescribed drugs.  The researchers thought that a “central concern 
among rheumatologists may be that concern about side effects may 
cause poor compliance.”250 
 
245 See Kimberly S.H. Yarnall et al., Primary Care:  Is There Enough Time for Preven-
tion?, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 635, 637 (2003) (concluding that doctors do not have 
enough time to provide patients with all of the screening and counseling that the U.S. 
Prevention Services Task Force recommends). 
246 Truls Østbye et al., Is There Time for Management of Patients With Chronic Diseases 
in Primary Care?, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 209, 212 (2005). 
247 See Berry et al., supra note 235, at 5-6 (showing through four experiments that 
disclosure requirements affect treatment decisions by causing patients to overestimate 
“adverse effects”). 
248 On noncompliance, see L. Stockwell Morris & R. M. Schulz, Patient Com-
pliance—An Overview, 17 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 283 (1992).  The ex-
tent of noncompliance is commonly thought to be vast, so that “[n]oncompliance may 
be the most significant problem facing medical practice today.”  Stephen A. Eraker et 
al., Understanding and Improving Patient Compliance, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 258, 
258 (1984).  Morris and Schulz estimate that half the patients in long-term therapy are 
noncompliant.  Morris & Schulz, supra at 285. 
249 Jean-Marie Berthelot et al., Informing Patients About Serious Side Effects of Drugs.  A 
2001 Survey of 341 French Rheumatologists, 70 JOINT BONE SPINE 52, 55 (2003). 
250 Id. at 54-55. 
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Disclosers also discover that human situations are more complex 
than the lawmakers anticipated.  For example, disclosers who must de-
liver bad news may want to soften it, and doctors and patients alike of-
ten think that desirable.251  Thus cancer patients are even more opti-
mistic about their prognoses than their optimistic doctors, partly be-
because of “physician communication behaviors such as avoidance of 
discussing prognosis, withholding prognostic information, or present-
ing overly optimistic information.”252 
Disclosers have many ways to resist mandates.  Mandates can be 
ignored, even in conspicuous circumstances.  For example, “EU legis-
lation passed during the 1990s made it mandatory for drug packaging 
to contain a leaflet providing all the information that is provided to 
health professionals in the summary of product characteristics, includ-
ing all adverse effects, but in a form understandable to the patient.”253  
However, in a recent study, 40% of the leaflets “gave no indication of 
the likelihood of any adverse effect.”254 
Disclosers can often beautify disclosure language.  When health 
plans had to reveal how their doctors were paid, “almost none” men-
tioned “the potential negative impact that incentive arrangements 
might have on physician behavior.”255  They more often bathed “in-
centives in a positive light” by saying, for example, that they rewarded 
better care.256 
Disclosers can also overdisclose in order to exacerbate the over-
load of disclosees.  These padded disclosures are intended to over-
whelm and distract consumers.  Some of the chunkiness of the disclo-
sures is indeed mandated, but some is added to bulk up the file and 
ensure that disclosees feel rushed, fatigued, and overwhelmed, reduc-
ing their level of attention.257 
 
251 “Mildly but unrealistically positive beliefs can improve outcomes in patients 
with chronic or terminal diseases. . . . Moreover, unrealistically optimistic views have 
been shown to improve quality of life.”  Peter A. Ubel, Editorial, Truth in the Most Opti-
mistic Way, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1142, 1143 (2001) (citations omitted). 
252 Tracy M. Robinson et al., Patient-Oncologist Communication in Advanced Cancer:  Pre-
dictors of Patient Perception of Prognosis, 16 SUPPORTIVE CARE CANCER 1049, 1050 (2008). 
253 Neil Carrigan et al., Adequacy of Patient Information on Adverse Effects:  An Assess-
ment of Patient Information Leaflets in the UK, 31 DRUG SAFETY 305, 306 (2008). 
254 Id. at 307. 
255 Mark A. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Disclosing HMO Physician Incentives, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 207, 227. 
256 Id. 
257 Willis, supra note 102, at 790. 
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Disclosers can also obey the letter of a mandate but flout its spi-
rit.258  Doctors may use an informed consent form rather than labor to 
educate patients.  One unit of the University of Michigan Health Sys-
tem thrusts a single statement for all its varied procedures at the pa-
tient just before the procedure commences.  Many companies and 
government agencies have customers sign disclosure forms even when 
customers plainly do not read and cannot understand them.  Mechan-
ical compliance is chronic when disclosers rely on agents.  Bored 
agents notoriously deliver information like automata, radiating weari-
ness and impatience, urging disclosees to sign without reading, inti-
mating that disclosures are empty technicalities.  The poster example 
is the title company’s closing agent, the funnel for many mortgage, 
real estate, and safety disclosures.  In addition, disclosers may work 
outside the mandate’s technical reach.  For example, police may try to 
induce waiver or question suspects “outside Miranda.”259  Similarly, 
consumer-credit disclosure requirements may “create incentives for 
lenders to draft contract terms that evade current disclosure regula-
tion and continue to obscure the actual contract terms.”260 
Do evaders risk trouble?  If, like Holmes’s bad man, they ask what 
“courts are likely to do in fact,” they generally answer “not much.”  
Few nondisclosures injure anybody enough to provoke litigation.  
While it is hard to prove this empirically, we believe that most in-
formed consent suits are brought as pendants to malpractice suits, few 
are won, and damages are usually modest. 
Disclosers may react to mandates in subtler ways.  Consider the 
advisor’s conflict-of-interest example: 
Disclosure might deter advisors from giving biased advice by increasing 
their concern that estimators (now thought to be alerted by disclosure) 
will completely discount extreme advice or attribute corrupt motives to 
advice that seems even remotely questionable.  On the other hand, advi-
sors might be tempted to provide even more biased advice, exaggerating 
their advice in order to counteract the diminished weight that they ex-
pect estimators to place on it . . . .
261
   
 
258 See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998) (describing the short-
comings of well-intentioned social projects over time). 
259 Leo, supra note 162 at 1009 & n.53, 1010 & n.56. 
260 Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:  Rational-
ity, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 
1560 (2006). 
261 Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean:  Perverse Effects of Disclosing Con-
flicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2005). 
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Disclosure requirements may give disclosers not only “strategic rea-
son” but also “moral license” to “exaggerate their advice”—to shout 
louder!262 
When lawmakers distrust disclosers, they may try to dictate the way 
information is provided by, for example, specifying details of disclo-
sure forms (like font size)263 and the precise data to be disclosed (like 
serving sizes in nutrition-fact boxes).264  Such specifications can reach 
ambitious proportions.  For instance, some rent-to-own regulations 
require conspicuous disclosure of as many as seventeen items (aspects 
of the goods, payments, charges, risk allocations, options, etc.).265  Si-
milarly, some jurisdictions require describing more than thirty aspects 
of a used car’s condition.266 
In sum, even a willing discloser encounters many impediments to 
making useful disclosures.  For good reasons and bad, not all disclos-
ers are willing, and reluctant disclosers have many ways to resist the 
ideal disclosure the lawmaker envisioned. 
5.  An Illustrative Vignette:  The Clery Act 
The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Cam-
pus Crime Statistics Act267 grew out of trouble stories like the tragedy 
of a Lehigh student who was raped and murdered in her dorm.  The 
Clery Act requires roughly 6600 institutions of higher education268 to 
publish an annual campus security report for prospective and current 
students and employees that includes crime statistics for the past three 
years, policy statements, descriptions of crime-prevention programs, 
and procedures for handling sex offenses.  The Act makes schools 
keep a public log of reported crimes and give warnings of crimes that 
threaten public safety.  The Department of Education assures us that 
the Act “is intended to provide students and their families, as higher 
 
262 Id. at 22. 
263 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2008, 2008-5 I.R.B. 368.  
264 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2010) (defining “serving size” as “an amount of food cus-
tomarily consumed per eating occasion by persons 4 years of age or older which is ex-
pressed in a common household measure that is appropriate for food”). 
265 See James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
751, 841-43 (1991) (identifying seventeen items of disclosure in Ohio’s rent-to-own sta-
tute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1351.02 (LexisNexis 2006)). 
266 See McNeil, supra note 165, at 701 n.5 (describing Wisconsin’s used-car disclo-
sure regulations). 
267 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006). 
268 Sara Lipka, Do Crime Statistics Keep Students Safe?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 
30, 2009, at A1. 
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education consumers, with accurate, complete, and timely informa-
tion about safety on campus so that they can make informed deci-
sions.”269  The Department warns that complying with the Act requires 
significant institutional resources and support.270  As a result, 
[c]olleges spend a good deal of money putting out crime reports of 
questionable value.  How much the process costs, including percentages 
of staff salaries, is so hard to calculate that even those who work on the 
reports could not guess how much.  The Clery Act’s complexity requires 
perpetual training, especially as amendments continue to change colleg-
es’ reporting requirements.271  
Are Clery Act disclosees (you are probably one) better informed?  
Crime statistics are notoriously unreliable because defining a crime and 
determining its incidence are so difficult.  “Campus  police officers rou-
tinely struggle with the crime classifications . . . . Nuances of a crime’s 
location are especially confounding . . . .”  How could these officers not 
struggle with regulations in which “[a]ggravated assaults, for example, 
get counted by victim, but robberies—even of five people by one perpe-
trator—should be counted by incident”?272  One expert reports 
“field[ing] five or six calls a week from colleges that need help figuring 
out what to report.  When she travels to institutions for audits, she al-
ways turns up errors in the way they are counting crimes.  ‘Not once,’ 
she says, ‘have I found a campus that’s completely in compliance.’”273 
If the Department of Education cannot write standards that col-
leges can understand (try working through the almost 200 pages of 
instructions issued in the handbook!274), if colleges are confused about 
the rules and interpret them differently, if even an expert could not 
understand the colleges’ resultant reports, is it plausible to expect the 
audience to find the reports helpful?  Even if they read the reports, 
which are often longer than insurance policies and full of tables and 
 
269 OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE HANDBOOK FOR 
CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING 3 (2005). 
270 See id. at 1 (“Compliance with the Clery Act is not simply a matter of entering 
statistics into a Web site or publishing a brochure once a year.  Compliance is a whole 
system of developing policy statements, gathering information from all the required 
sources and translating it into the appropriate categories, disseminating information, 
and, finally, keeping records.  Many people at your institution—from the president on 
down—should be involved.”). 
271 Lipka, supra note 268.   
272 Id. 
273 Id. (quoting Dolores A. Stafford, Chief of Police, George Washington Univ.). 
274 OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., supra note 269. 
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charts,275 the intended audience of prospective and current students 
and college employees will have no idea how crimes are reported and 
tallied or of the interpretive problems colleges face.  Furthermore, 
since reports include total crimes, not rates, the mandated disclosures 
have little meaning unless readers somehow convert them to rates. 
All this assumes a college that is trying to comply with the law.  But 
experts “suspect that many institutions simply import numbers from 
the ‘Clery complaint’ software program sold to police departments 
and send off their reports,” and “some colleges may manipulate their 
numbers.”276 
Overall, then, the money colleges spend complying with the Clery 
Act—and pass on to their students in the form of higher tuition—is 
simply wasted.277  Worse, the Act creates perverse incentives.  The 
more policing colleges do, and the more they encourage students to 
report crimes, the likelier they are to uncover crimes to report.  By 
thus shining the light, the well-policed colleges look dangerous.  Fur-
thermore, the resources the Clery Act commandeers would be better 
spent actually making schools safer.  Thus, one criminologist called 
the Act’s reporting regulations “symbolic politics” and said that great-
er safety is likelier to come from practices like installing blue-light tel-
ephones and security cameras:  “[t]hat’s just one fix, he says, for a sys-
tem that revolves around complex annual reports, a huge investment 
with little return.  ‘The focus,’ Mr. Sloan says, ‘ought to shift from 
producing a bunch of statistics that are basically useless.’”278 
C.  Disclosees 
We now must make some heroic assumptions.  The lawmaker has 
accurately identified the information the consumer needs and has 
stated the mandate correctly and comprehensibly.  The discloser has 
read, understood, and obeyed the mandate, has assembled the required 
information, and has disclosed it effectively.  Now, the success of man-
dated disclosures depends on how much better disclosees consequently 
 
275 See, e.g., UNIV. OF MICH., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT & ANNUAL FIRE SAFETY RE-
PORT (2010), available at http://www.umich.edu/~safety/pdf/annual_report_2010.pdf 
(providing thirty-six pages of information for the relatively safe town of Ann Arbor). 
276 Lipka, supra note 268. 
277 Nor do disclosees even read Clery Act data.  “[W]hen the law required colleges 
to print and distribute their annual crime statistics, [George Washington University’s 
police chief] would make a point to visit freshman dormitories on the day of delivery.  
‘There were trash cans full of them,’ she says.  ‘It was a colossal waste of money.’”  Id. 
278 Id. 
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make important, complex, and unfamiliar decisions.  In this section, we 
argue that many factors conspire to keep disclosees from profitably us-
ing the disclosures.  More fundamentally, mandated disclosure rests on 
false assumptions:  that people want to make all the consequential deci-
sions about their lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all the 
relevant information, reviewing all the possible outcomes, reviewing all 
their relevant values, and deciding which choice best promotes their 
preferences.  These assumptions so poorly describe how human beings 
live that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s deci-
sions and thus cannot be a dependable regulatory mechanism. 
1.  Disclosures and the World of Chris Consumer 
Before we identify the individual factors that keep disclosees from 
using disclosures, we present the trump card:  the accumulation prob-
lem.  People encounter too many disclosures to digest most of them.  
Meet Chris Consumer—the poster child of the disclosure paradigm—
the person who stands at the receiving end of many mandated disclo-
sures.  Chris is Mr. Main Street, the ordinary American who makes 
choices that mandated disclosures aim to improve.  We will chronicle 
a day in his life through the lens of a simulation.  We will assume—
recognizing that this is an outrageously ridiculous assumption—that 
Chris actually reads all the mandated disclosures that he encounters.  
But despite these fabricated elements, in an important way, Chris’s 
tale will be realistic:  it will capture the variety of real disclosures that a 
person like Chris, living the median American life, encounters on a 
daily basis. 
Chris starts his morning by taking his daily medication and a new vita-
min product, reading the mandated warnings on the drug insert and on the 
vitamin bottle.  He is about to shave, but when he notices a bit of rust on the 
can of shaving cream, he promptly reads the warning on the spray can advis-
ing him to discard it once rusted.  He plugs in the toaster gingerly, after read-
ing the sticker on the cord, warning of electric shock.  Chris likes toast with but-
ter and jam, but after reading the nutrition data on the label, he scrapes on a 
micro-layer.  He now has time only for a quick glance at the newspaper—a sto-
ry about the passage of legislation revamping consumer financial protection—
and contents himself with the invoice for it, which arrived yesterday by mail, 
with its full statement of itemized charges. 
This morning Chris’s car will not start, so he calls a towing company, lis-
tens to their prerecorded statements, and asks for help.  The tow truck driver 
presents a form that discloses the company’s charges, policies, and insurance.  
Chris reads it carefully, signs, and directs the driver to the repair shop.  At the 
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shop, Chris receives a detailed disclosure of the shop’s repair and pricing poli-
cies.  The repair, he hopes, is covered by the car manufacturer’s seven-year war-
ranty.  So he pulls the warranty statement out of the glove compartment, reads 
it, and recognizes, to his disappointment, that this particular repair does not 
apply to the “power train” and is not covered. 
Later that morning, at the office, Chris logs in to his computer and the 
software update program immediately greets him, informing him that new ver-
sions of Microsoft Office and Firefox are ready to be installed.  Wasn’t it just 
last week that I installed a previous update?, he puzzles.  Once launched, 
the installation is automatic, until Chris needs to click “I Accept” at the bottom 
of the End User License Agreement.  Chris reads these agreements—4000 words 
for the Microsoft program and only 1100 words for Firefox (an open-source 
software, after all).  As an average American, Chris can read 250 words per 
minute.  Granted, these contracts are no easy read, but maybe because he read 
the previous versions of the terms and conditions—not identical but also not 
much different—reading these texts takes only twenty-five minutes.  With this 
accomplished, and to catch a moment of leisure, Chris switches the screen to  
nytimes.com, but remembers to click on terms of service (2500 words) and the 
privacy policy (only 650 words).  True, he has read these disclosed terms before, 
but they are modified occasionally, and blessed are the prudent. 
The car shop calls to tell Chris the charges for parts and labor.  The 
charges seem inflated, Chris thinks, wishing he had known this before choos-
ing this shop.  But Chris can hardly tow the car to another shop.  He grudging-
ly consents.  He then calls his bank to make a balance transfer for this forth-
coming repair payment, since he recently—after reading a bank communiqué 
about new regulations—decided to opt out of overdraft coverage.  However, the 
balance transfer requires a signature, which he signs by completing an electron-
ic form on the website and clicking to accept another set of terms, a moderately 
short passage of legalese he nobly reads.  While on the bank’s website, he checks 
his account activity and opens an automated message from the bank, which in-
forms him about . . . Ding-dong! 
FedEx arrives.  Chris signs the shipping form, after reading the terms on 
the back.  The package contains an invoice from a supplier that the office uses 
occasionally, which memorializes the terms from yesterday’s phone call regard-
ing a certain upcoming shipment of widgets.  Chris notices that the terms on the 
front of the invoice are exactly as agreed, then turns to the preprinted terms at 
the back of the invoice, and sedulously reads them. 
Chris lunches with colleagues at a diner where a sign warns him against 
food that is not overcooked.  Thanks to a recent municipal ordinance, the menu 
lists the calories in each dish.  Thus chastened, Chris orders cautiously.  At the 
men’s room, a sign reminds employees—or him too?—to wash their hands.  
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Still hungry after his virtuous breakfast and lunch, Chris stops off at the ice 
cream parlor, and with no signs posted or disclosures in sight, he orders a 
1000-calorie sundae. 
Returning to the office, Chris passes a construction site where a notice tells 
him about the building project and that he can learn more about it at City 
Hall.  He checks the address of City Hall on his iPhone, using the AroundMe 
application, but he is first invited to download an update to this application.  
Not so simple, though:  as he logs in with his iTunes password to access the 
download, he is told that he must first accept the updated iTunes Terms and 
Conditions.  He starts reading the new terms on his iPhone screen, scrolling 
down, until a note at the bottom says “Page 1 of 45.”  He chooses instead the 
option of emailing himself the full set of terms, which he plans to read later. 
It is early November, so later in the afternoon Chris goes for a flu shot.  A 
two-page form recites the risks, including Guillain-Barré syndrome and death.  
He glooms through the form and signs.  Unfortunately, his one concern—a 
rumor that a version of the shot is unsafe—is not discussed (as far as he can 
tell).  Before leaving, Chris refills a prescription, after getting a form stating 
that HIPAA requires the pharmacy to provide a notice “that describes how we 
may use your information for treatment, payment and other purposes that de-
tails your rights regarding the privacy of your health and medical informa-
tion.”  Chris pauses to parse this sentence, fails, and turns to the notice (2023 
words). 
Back at home, Chris sorts through today’s mail.  A notice from his credit 
card provider, which initially looked like junk mail but turned out to contain 
relevant information, introduces recent changes to the privacy policy.  It is not 
clear whether these are favorable changes, so Chris opens the folder where he 
filed all prior notices—a thick dossier, to be sure—and compares the old and 
new terms.  He learns that they are not comparable because the language is 
quite vague regarding the identity of the parties with whom his financial in-
formation is shared.  The new privacy language assures him that his informa-
tion will be shared only when “it enhances the service” to him, but it then says 
that his information will also be shared with “other companies to provide ser-
vices to us or make services and products available to clients.”  Could they be 
saying one thing and then the opposite?  Is it just a cloud of smoke? he 
wonders, as he promptly files this latest pamphlet in the binder. 
Today’s mail also contains the monthly bill from his auto insurance com-
pany, with a brochure about a change in the law that affects his coverage.  
Chris reads through the brochure.  His daughter brought home a day-trip per-
mission slip from school, which he has to read and sign, and a separate autho-
rization for the school to take her pictures during the day trip.  Finally, the mail 
packet contains a printed “Explanation of Benefits” form that details the bill-
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ing of a recent visit to the dentist, showing which portions of the cost were cov-
ered and the amount of his co-pay.  This dental visit took place three months 
earlier and Chris strains his memory to recall the assurances he received that day 
at the clinic—that his co-pay would be much lower.  He finds no documentation 
to support this recollection and resigns to pay the disappointing charge in full. 
At dinner, his son tells the family about a new movie that was just released 
and that he already downloaded from the Internet, free of charge.  Chris recalls 
the FBI warnings about copying, which appear anytime he plays a DVD movie, 
often in two languages.  But he is not sure whether this warning applies to con-
tent copied from an online source.  Before dessert, the phone rings and Chris 
answers.  After a short pause, an unfamiliar voice asks him to donate to some 
cause.  The voice seems to be reading a prescripted text at an abnormal speed 
and flat intonation, so Chris asks the voice to explain the gist of the solicita-
tion.  The voice cannot, and so Chris musters his utmost resilience and asks to 
end the conversation.  The voice manages to convince him, though, to receive 
more information by mail. 
After dinner, Chris looks forward to Monday Night Football, but first he 
must buy a wedding gift through an online gift registry and order a new toner 
cartridge for the printer.  Chris opens an account in the registry website—a 
quick choice of user ID and password and a slow read through terms and con-
ditions and another privacy policy.  He then Googles the cartridge model and 
finds an eBay seller who offers it at a discount.  He knows nothing about this 
seller, and the seller’s name is a bit unnerving—tonerdude101—not to men-
tion that there is no other information on the eBay page.  No terms or condi-
tions, no privacy statement, nothing to read!  But to Chris’s delight, there is one 
data point—a whopping 99.8% feedback score from over 50,000 sales.  He 
clicks “Buy It Now.”  Lastly, while on his computer, he checks his e-mail and 
finds the iTunes terms he e-mailed to himself earlier that day.  Oops, they are a 
little over 10,000 words.  Too long to read, he concludes, but he spends fifteen 
minutes skimming the topics covered and reads only the text that is ALLCAPS. 
Finally Chris turns on the football game—midway through the third quar-
ter—only to hear, “This telecast is intended solely for the private, non-
commercial use of our audience.  Any publication, reproduction, retransmis-
sion, or any other use of the pictures, descriptions, or accounts of this game 
without the express written consent of . . . .”  A game break signals the return of 
a Cialis commercial that he has watched many times before.  The commercial 
ends with a ten-second segment in which the narrator’s warm, confident voice 
changes its tone and pitch and becomes a rapid, condensed utterance listing the 
many side effects of the drug.  Puzzled by the mixed message, Chris watches the 
end of the game and goes to bed.  Michael Crichton’s Disclosure is lying at his 
bedside, but Chris has read enough for one day. 
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Thank heavens this is only a normal day in the life prescribed for 
Chris.  Many important decisions did not arise:  choosing a credit 
card, choosing a cell-phone carrier, buying a car (and getting a car 
loan), purchasing insurance, reviewing health plans, making retire-
ment investment decisions, signing up for pre-need burial services, 
making a living will, adopting a pet, installing an alarm, and so en-
dlessly on.  Such decisions arise irregularly but routinely, and they give 
Chris an even denser thicket of reading. 
Truly, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, Chris was a 
saint.  Was he free?  Was he happy?  The question is absurd.  The mor-
al of Chris’s story hardly needs to be drawn.  Chris lost hours of his 
day reading disclosures he did not want, could not understand, and 
did not use.  He did make decisions, but he did not make them better 
because of the disclosures.  And he stole the time he spent attending 
to disclosures from things he needed to do, things he enjoyed doing, 
and decisions about which he was actually interested in learning.  The 
disclosure paradigm, then, mistakenly asks whether people making a 
decision would be better off with more information.  If they had noth-
ing else in life but that decision, perhaps so.  But since information that 
could be useful in a single-decision world becomes useless in the con-
stant-decision world, the answer is generally no. 
With Chris’s sobering story in mind, let us return to our project of 
identifying all the necessary conditions for mandated disclosure to 
work.  We now ask what disclosees must do if disclosures are to serve 
their purpose. 
2.  Acquiring Disclosed Information 
Disclosees cannot use information until they get it.  But they often 
do not get it because they do not know that it exists, where it is, or 
how to find it, and they often doubt that they need it or that it would 
justify its acquisition costs.  And so the long path from lawmaker to 
discloser to disclosee ends because disclosees do not know about or 
take up the proffered information.  Literally or metaphorically, all 
those Clery Act reports are tossed in the wastebasket. 
For example, the updated credit-card agreement arrives.  Why?  Is 
its information new?  Relevant?  Necessary?  Or the tow truck comes.  
Does the driver have information about the towing service?  Would it 
lead you to dismiss that service and look for one with better terms? 
People have many reasons not to seek out information.  Many 
people do not know how much the quality of goods and services varies.  
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For example, “[m]ost consumers do not believe clinical quality varies 
significantly across doctors, hence the low consumer demand for clini-
cal quality report cards.”279  Patients see LASIK eye surgery as a com-
modity and shop for it only considering price, even though quality dif-
fers considerably across providers.280  Confidence can also lead people 
to overestimate their knowledge.  As a result, “investors often do not 
recognize how difficult these choices are and instead rely on a belief 
that their innate abilities will lead to a good investment result.”281  And 
one “of the most disconcerting findings” of a study of doctors’ attempts 
to teach patients about end-of-life care “was that patients expressed 
strong preferences about treatments that they did not understand.”282 
Even when people know they need information, they may not 
want it enough to labor to acquire it.  First, they must find the right 
document and then the right place in it.  (Try finding the water-
damage exclusion in your homeowners insurance policy or the privacy 
policy in a credit-card contract.)  Disclosure documents are notorious-
ly long:  HIPAA disclosures easily run to six large pages of small type.  
IRBs casually require consent forms of twenty pages.  To pile Pelion 
on Ossa, these documents are infamously a farrago of tortured lan-
guage, serpentine sentences, tiny print, and irrelevancies.283 
 
279 HA T. TU & JOHANNA R. LAUER, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RE-
SEARCH BRIEF NO. 9, WORD OF MOUTH AND PHYSICIAN REFERRALS STILL DRIVE HEALTH 
CARE PROVIDER CHOICE 5 (2008), available at http://www.hschange.org/ 
CONTENT/1028/1028.pdf. 
280 Ha T. Tu & Jessica H. May, Self-Pay Markets in Health Care:  Consumer Nirvana or 
Caveat Emptor?, 26 HEALTH AFF. w217, w222 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
cgi/content/reprint/26/2/w217.  LASIK may be “relatively simple surgery with low 
complication rates, but for patients whose eyes have certain ‘problem’ characteristics 
(for example, abnormal topography, large pupils, thin corneas), quality differences 
can be critical.”  Id. 
281 Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2003). 
282 Gary S. Fischer et al., Patient Knowledge and Physician Predictions of Treatment Pre-
ferences After Discussion of Advance Directives, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 447, 452 (1998). 
283 When our hypothetical Chris Consumer was prescribed Prozac, Googling 
turned up a website that told him how to read a package insert (2443 words).  How to 
Read a Package Insert, EPILEPSY.COM, http://www.epilepsy.com/epilepsy/medicine_ 
inserts (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).  It said inserts have eleven sections:  “Description,” 
“Clinical Pharmacology,” “Indications and Usage,” “Contraindications,” “Warnings,” 
“Precautions,” “Adverse Reactions,” “Overdosage,” “Dosage and Administration,” “How 
Supplied,” and for some drugs, “Drug Abuse and Dependence.”  Id.  Chris balked but 
read on:  “It’s a good idea to review the package insert for any new medicine and to 
look at it again if anything about your health changes.”  Id.  Chris sighed and reached 
for his Stedman’s medical dictionary.  And then for the insert, which bade him “read 
the Medication Guide before starting therapy with PROZAC” and “reread it each time 
the prescription is renewed.”  ELI LILLY AND CO., PROZAC MEDICATION INSERT 24 
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With all these barriers to acquiring information, no wonder, for 
example, that while people widely think the quality of care is the most 
important factor in choosing a health plan, hardly any patients review 
the data disclosed under mandates from quality-report-cards statutes.  
Indeed, less than 1% of patients surveyed knew the rating of their 
hospital or surgeon.284 
3.  Understanding the Information 
Now suppose disclosees locate information, recognize its relev-
ance and importance, and try to understand it.  Many will fail. 
a.  Illiteracy and Innumeracy 
Illiteracy prevents many people from understanding much dis-
closed information.  Illiteracy can mean (1) not knowing what word a 
combination of letters represents, (2) not knowing what a word 
means, (3) not knowing what words combined in a sentence mean, or 
(4) not knowing how to extract information from a combination of 
sentences.285  Well over 40 million adults are functionally illiterate, 
“and another 50 million have marginal literacy skills.”286  In one study, 
97% of adults had reading capacities below the level necessary to un-
derstand a definition of “peremptory challenge” used to educate 
prospective jurors.287  Sector-specific illiteracy—like health or financial 
illiteracy—is common.  Four out of ten patients could not “compre-
hend directions for taking medication on an empty stomach.”288  Many 
patients misunderstand common clinical terms like “acute,” “stable,” 
and “progressive.”289 
 
(2009), available at http://pi.lilly.com/us/prozac.pdf.  Chris embarked dutifully on 
1993 words.   
284 Epstein, supra note 135, at 1694. 
285 See NAT’L READING PANEL, TEACHING CHILDREN TO READ 7-15 (2000) (describ-
ing the stages of literacy development). 
286 Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. 
Med. Ass’n, Health Literacy:  Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 JAMA 552, 552 
(1999). 
287 IRWIN S. KIRSCH, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY IN 
AMERICA:  A FIRST LOOK AT THE RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY 
82-83 (1993). 
288 Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs, supra 
note 286, at 552 (citing Mark v. Williams et al., Inadequate Functional Health Literacy 
Among Patients at Two Public Hospitals, 274 JAMA 1677 (1995)). 
289 Michele Heisler, Helping Your Patients With Chronic Disease:  Effective Physician Ap-
proaches to Support Self-Management, 8 SEMINARS MED. PRAC. 43, 49 (2005). 
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Rates of innumeracy are worse than rates of illiteracy.  A standard 
test asks people how often a flipped coin comes up heads in 1000 
tries, what 1% of 1000 is, and to turn a proportion (1 in 1000) into a 
percentage.  30% of women of above-average literacy “had 0 correct 
answers, 28% had 1 correct answer, 26% had 2 correct answers, and 
16% had 3 correct answers.”290  Although most people in another 
study had at least some college education, 40% “could not solve a ba-
sic probability problem or convert a percentage to a proportion.”291  
No wonder that “[a]fter receiving quantitative risk reduction data 
about the benefit of mammography, most women did not apply this 
information correctly when asked to estimate their risk for death from 
breast cancer with and without mammography.”292 
Furthermore, disclosures are chronically hard to read.  Financial-
privacy notices are written, on average, at a third- or fourth-year college 
reading level.293  Two-thirds of the privacy forms academic medical cen-
ters use require a college reading level, and almost all (90%) are “diffi-
cult.”294  Practically all the quality report cards given to patients use in-
dicators the patients do not understand.295  HIPAA authorization forms 
add two pages to consent materials and use language “similar in com-
plexity to that in corporate annual reports, legal contracts, and the 
professional medical literature.”296  And only 3% to 4% of the popula-
tion can understand the language in which contracts are drafted.297 
 
290 Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of Screen-
ing Mammography, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 966, 969 (1997).   
291 Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General Performance on a Numeracy Scale Among Highly Edu-
cated Samples, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 37, 39 (2001). 
292 Schwartz et al., supra note 290, at 969.  Accuracy ranged from 7% to 33%. 
293 See Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print:  Readability of Financial Privacy Notic-
es, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE ( July 1, 2001), http://www.privacyrights.org/ 
ar/GLB-Reading.htm (examining a sample of sixty privacy policies). 
294 Walfish & Watkins, supra note 145, at 484. 
295 See Judith Hibbard & Jacquelyn Jewett, Will Quality Report Cards Help Consumers?, 
HEALTH AFF., May–June 1997, at 218, 225 (finding that consumers did not understand 
many of the report’s indicators and, in turn, gave those indicators low salience). 
296 Peter Breese et al., Letter, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
and the Informed Consent Process, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 897, 897 (2004).  Similarly, 
HIPAA forms in “major health-care institutions” were (on average) six pages long in 
ten-point font.  Peter Breese, Readability of Notice of Privacy Forms Used by Major Health 
Care Institutions, 293 JAMA 1593, 1593 (2005).  A “median of 80.0% of persons in the 
surrounding area would have difficulty understanding the privacy notices.”  Id. 
297 Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 233, 234, 237-38 (2002) (citing KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 287, at 17 fig. 1.1, 
19); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Commentary, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 
(1986) (explaining why it is reasonable for consumers to ignore the dense textual con-
tent of contracts). 
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Even sophisticated lawyers retire defeated. 
During oral argument of Gerhardt v. Continental Insurance Co. before the 
New Jersey Supreme Court,
298
 Chief Justice Weintraub looked at the in-
surance policy at issue and said, “I don’t know what it means.  I am 
stumped.  They say one thing in big type and in small type they take it 
away.”  Justice Haneman added, “I can’t understand half of my insurance 
policies.”  Justice Francis stated, “I get the impression that insurance 
companies keep the language of their policies deliberately obscure.”
299
   
Credit-card contracts, subject to mandated disclosures, are no better.  
As Elizabeth Warren said of one, “I teach contract law at Harvard, and 
I can’t understand half of what it says.”300  And Judge Posner was re-
ported to have said that “[f]or my home equity loan, I got 100s of 
pages of documentation; I didn’t read, I just signed.”301 
The standard response to illiteracy and innumeracy is to demand 
simpler forms.  But for decades experts have labored intelligently and 
earnestly to present complex information accessibly, and it is now 
clear that only modest progress is possible.  For example, one sophis-
ticated attempt at a simple guide for prostate-cancer patients aimed 
for a seventh-grade reading level,302 which would exclude roughly half 
the population.  A recent study of mutual-fund disclosures is to like 
effect.303  Unfortunately, complexity cannot be explained simply.  So-
phisticated vocabularies and professional languages encapsulate com-
plex thoughts.  If only simple words may be used, everything must be 
spelled out.  This returns us to the overload problem.  Many words 
make forms repellently long and cognitively overwhelming.304  Thus one 
 
298 225 A.2d 328 (N.J. 1966). 
299 Eisenberg, supra note 297, at 309. 
300 Elizabeth Warren Defends The Consumer Financial Protection Agency, BUSINESS INSID-
ER, http://www.businessinsider.com/elizabeth-warren-defends-the-consumer-financial-
protection-agency-2009-7/#ixzz137xyXGQL (view video).   
301 David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate Contracts?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 
22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read-
boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/. 
302 Margaret Holmes-Rovner et al., Evidence-Based Patient Choice:  A Prostate Cancer 
Decision Aid in Plain Language, BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING, June 20, 
2005, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/5/16.   
303 See John Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual 
Fund Choices? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,859, 2009), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14859 (finding that providing a white-collar 
test subject with a “Summary Prospectus” did not alter the subject’s investment choice, 
although the subject made the decision more quickly). 
304 Even a father of the IRB system thinks it “necessary to use polysyllabic words in 
consent forms; it is in the nature of the language.  If the prospective subject has sys-
temic mastocytosis and we want to invite him or her to participate in a controlled clini-
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effort “to come up with a ‘simplified’ Miranda warning backfired when 
several Miranda components were included in a 32-word sentence.”305 
Consider one of the plainer contracts drafted in lay language—
eBay’s User Agreement,306 which affects millions of people.  The com-
prehensible terms are those people already know, like the “fees and 
services” provision. But in crucial areas—those that might provoke 
problems—even the lay language is confusing:  “When you give us 
content, you grant us a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, irrevoca-
ble, royalty-free, sublicensable (through multiple tiers) right to exer-
cise any and all copyright, trademark, publicity, and database rights 
(but no other rights) you have in the content, in any media known 
now or in the future.”307  In this syntactical tangle, ten adjectival terms 
come between the article (“a”) and the noun (“right”), which itself 
requires much more clarification.  The terms mean little until you 
reach “right” and find out what the terms are modifying.  Almost all 
the sentence’s vocabulary requires special knowledge.  “Content,” 
“non-exclusive,” “perpetual,” “irrevocable,” “royalty-free,” “sublicensa-
ble,” “tiers,” “copyright,” “publicity,” “database,” “rights,” and “media” 
are words people typically do not use in the contract’s sense, if at all. 
What if disclosures were oral?  Of course, this would place a great-
er burden on people’s memories, and thus would be a poor strategy 
when disclosures inform repeat or long-term decisions.  Still, at best, 
this would only partly solve the literacy problem (and probably ex-
acerbate the numeracy problem).  Extracting complex information 
from speech is like listening to a foreign language you almost know.  
At first you think you understand; you hear a word you do not instant-
ly recognize; you pause to identify it; you return to find the speaker 
several stops along in the sentence and you struggle to catch up.  Soon 
you are lost.  (Warnings about side effects in drug advertising—
especially since they are read so fast—often present this problem.)  
Reading at least lets you choose your pace and reread puzzling pas-
sages.  And many disclosures are far too long to state orally. 
Oral disclosures can reduce comprehension in other ways.  Disclo-
sees are often worried, afraid, anxious, and rushed.  They cannot take 
 
cal trial of cimetidine versus disodium cromoglycate, we must say so.”  Robert J. Levine, 
Letter, IRB:  ETHICS & HUMAN RES., Jan. 1982, at 8. 
305 Rogers, supra note 160, at 779 (citing A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Doug-
las, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 34 (1970)). 
306 Your User Agreement, EBAY,  http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement. 
html?_trksid=m40 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
307 Id. 
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in what they are told and use it effectively.  For example, one para-
medic who was told she had cancer reflected, “I was in a bubble.  I saw 
his mouth moving and I was aware of a flow of words, but I was unable 
to process most of the information.  He might as well have been 
speaking a different language.”308  Even Yale faculty and students who 
burned draft cards and whom polite law-enforcement officials inter-
viewed at home were nervous and discomfited.309  Alternatively, disclo-
sees may be bored.  Disclosures, after all, are not thrillers.  Think 
about the safety announcement on airplanes, delivered orally but of-
ten unintelligibly.  Does the medium improve comprehension? 
Oral disclosures are also difficult for the law to police and to verify.  
Thus, creditors who provide their customers oral disclosures of 
charges and options mandated under TILA can be held in violation of 
the statute.  In a landmark decision, the FTC found that a bank vi-
olated the disclosure mandate by giving oral, instead of written, dis-
closure.  “Oral disclosures are inherently unreliable,” the FTC held.  It 
is “inherently inconsistent with the statutory scheme, which contem-
plates written disclosure.” 310 
Empirical evidence about oral disclosures confirms its limited use-
fulness.  For example, patients may need to know about end-of-life 
care, particularly CPR, since it is less effective and more unpleasant 
than popularly supposed.  Unfortunately, doctors’ conversations with 
patients about end-of-life care are rare and unsuccessful.  In one 
study, discussions “did not usually concern specifics of treatment, such 
as artificial ventilation or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, but rather 
tended to deal with generalities and avoided details.”311  A study of 
how experienced clinicians discussed advance directives with patients 
they knew well found that median conversations lasted 5.6 minutes 
and were hardly enlightening:  “Physicians used vague language to de-
scribe scenarios, asking what patients would want if they became ‘very, 
very sick’ or ‘had something that was very serious.’  They rarely at-
tempted to define vague situations or to ascertain the meaning of 
such terms . . . .”312  Further, “qualitative terms were used loosely to de-
scribe outcome probabilities.”  These brief conversations scanted “the 
 
308 ROSALIND MACPHEE, PICASSO’S WOMAN 41 (Kodashu Int’l 1996) (1994). 
309 Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 163, at 314-15. 
310 USLIFE Credit Corp., 91 F.T.C. 984, 1027 (1978), modified, 92 F.T.C. 353 (1978). 
311 Jaya Virmani et al., Relationship of Advance Directives to Physician-Patient Communi-
cation, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 909, 913 (1994). 
312 James A. Tulsky et al., Opening the Black Box:  How Do Physicians Communicate 
About Advance Directives?, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 441, 444 (1998).   
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more common, less clear-cut predicaments surrounding end-of-life 
care.”313  In another study, even patients told about “mechanical venti-
lation had a poor understanding of what this procedure entails, and a 
significant number harbored important misconceptions.”314  If such 
discussions of such issues by such doctors with such people leave them 
so ignorant, what hope is there for the average run of disclosures? 
Furthermore, the best-informed speakers are busy and costly.  
Therefore, doctors tell nurses to “consent” the patient or use substi-
tutes like videotapes instead of having the careful discussion advocates 
of informed consent envision.  Corporations shift communication to 
automation and spoken formulas.  This can mean an operator reading 
(slowly, wearily, mechanically) terms drafted by lawyers.  As Judge Eas-
terbrook said sardonically, “If the staff at the other end of the phone 
for direct-sales operations . . . had to read the four-page statement of 
terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice 
would anesthetize rather than enlighten . . . .”315  Many airline passen-
gers would second this observation, based on their exposure to the 
oral flight-safety announcements preceding takeoff. 
Finally, disclosure mandates are often aimed at people who may 
be particularly disadvantaged in trying to understand them.  For ex-
ample, sicker patients are considerably more vulnerable to the com-
plexities of informed consent than healthier patients.316 
b.  Making Sense of Information 
Illiteracy is not the only impediment to understanding disclosures.  
Simply comprehending disclosures of the kind that are commonly 
mandated takes intelligence—sometimes a good deal of it—especially 
when misunderstanding even a single datum can badly mislead the 
disclosee.  “High intelligence is a useful tool in any life domain, but 
especially when tasks are novel, untutored, or complex, and situations 
are ambiguous, changing, or unpredictable.”317  Yet in areas where 
 
313 Id.  
314 Gary S. Fischer et al., Patient Knowledge and Physician Predictions of Treatment Pre-
ferences After Discussion of Advance Directives, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 447, 451 (1998). 
315 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). 
316 See, e.g., L. Jaime Fitten & Martha S. Waite, Impact of Medical Hospitalization on 
Treatment Decision-Making Capacity in the Elderly, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1717, 
1720 (1990) (“[S]ignificant numbers of medically ill patients failed to substantially un-
derstand key issues in treatment despite language and form simplification of consent 
documents.”).  
317 Linda S. Gottfredson & Ian J. Deary, Intelligence Predicts Health and Longevity, but 
Why?, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 2 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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mandated disclosure is likeliest to be used, full and accurate under-
standing is vanishingly rare.318 
When people receive information, they rarely hear exactly what 
they are told.  Rather, they interpret the data as they receive it by 
putting data in the framework of their understanding.  When people 
make decisions in their ordinary lives, their 
understanding of the rapid flow of continuing social events . . . [de-
pends] on a rich store of general knowledge of objects, people, events, 
and their characteristic relationships.  Some of this knowledge may be 
represented as beliefs or theories, that is, reasonably explicit ‘proposi-
tions’ about the characteristics of objects or object classes. 319  
People use these theories to organize and explain the information 
they receive.  In short, people misunderstand mandated disclosures 
because they lack or misunderstand background information and be-
cause they have no theories, or the wrong theories, for interpreting 
what they are told. 
For example, patients misunderstand medical information be-
cause they do not know what their organs do, where they are, or even 
what they are called.320  Patients interpret information about CPR in 
light of TV fantasy.321  Few people applying for mortgages know what 
amortization is and how it works, which makes even lucid descriptions 
of balloon payments and fluctuating interest rates mysterious.  In fact, 
many borrowers think that the “‘amount financed’ disclosed on the 
TILA statement was their total loan amount, not the loan minus pre-
 
318 We cite numerous examples of this failure in our material on the effectiveness 
of mandated disclosure in Part II, especially the material on the failure of informed 
consent. See supra subsection II.A.2. 
319 RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 28 (1980). 
320 Ben Watt was literate enough to have written a memoir of his illness, but had 
“always thought ‘bowel’ was just a colloquial term like ‘guts’ and meant somewhere 
near your arse.”  BEN WATT, PATIENT 32 (Grove Press 1997) (1996). 
321 See Susan J. Diem et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on Television:  Miracles and 
Misinformation, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1578, 1581 (1996) (observing that on television 
“only 28 percent of the patients had primary cardiac arrests,” while in real life “75 to 95 
percent of arrests result from underlying cardiac disease”); cf. Rebecca Dresser, The 
Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, 271, 271 
(2002) (arguing that research subjects “confuse research with therapy” not just be-
cause of inadequate consent forms, but also because “[p]atients are inundated with 
messages equating study participation with medical treatment”).   
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paid finance charges, or that the ‘discount fee’ in the [Good Faith Es-
timate]” is a discount they receive, not a fee they are charged.322 
Likewise, few people understand even the basics of the health care 
market.323  This means, at best, that they lack “baseline information 
that could provide context for required disclosure.  Therefore, health 
care consumers can easily misinterpret even accurate data.”324  In one 
study, for example, prospective plan enrollees thought high hospitali-
zation rates for pneumonia showed leniency in approving inpatient 
treatment, not a failure to vaccinate.325  Similarly, the Yale faculty and 
students who waived their Miranda rights knew they could refuse to 
answer but did not know the consequences of answering.  “Their 
waiver of the right to a lawyer’s advice was even less informed, since 
their ignorance of the significance of the right to silence was com-
pounded by their ignorance of the functions a lawyer might have per-
formed for them.”326 
Conflicts of interest is another area in which consumers often fail 
to understand the complexity of the underlying service they are re-
ceiving or the conflict of the service provider.  When intermediaries 
receive kickbacks and incentives from businesses to provide advice to 
consumers, there are various types and degrees of concern, but they 
often are misperceived and misjudged by consumers.  For example, 
Even assuming that consumers would read and understand a contingent commis-
sion disclosure . . . they will be ill-equipped to police the underlying con-
flict of interest or to assess its significance.  Insurance consumers gener-
ally do not know how to assess the quality of different insurance options:  
the risks associated with an insurer’s “fair” financial rating, for instance, 
are beyond the ken of most insurance consumers, including many small 
businesses and otherwise savvy individuals.
327
 
 
322 James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure and Promise of Mandated Con-
sumer Mortgage Disclosures:  Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment 
with Mortgage Borrowers, 100 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 516, 518-19 (2010). 
323 For example, 30% of those surveyed in one study knew almost nothing about 
HMOs.  Of the remaining patients, “only 16 percent had adequate knowledge (scores 
of 76 percent or higher) to choose between traditional Medicare and an HMO.”  Hib-
bard et al., supra note 136, at 185-86. 
324 William M. Sage, Accountability Through Information:  What the Health Care Industry 
Can Learn from Securities Regulation, MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND (Nov. 2000), 
http://www.milbank.org/reports/0012sage.html (citations omitted). 
325 Sage, supra note 25, at 1729 (citing Barbara S. Cooper, From Bill-Payer to Pur-
chaser:  Medicare in Transition, HEALTH SYS. REV., July–Aug. 1997, at 16, 17). 
326 Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 163, at 311. 
327 Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure:  The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 314-15 (2007). 
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4.  Remembering the Information 
Receiving and analyzing information about complex and unfami-
liar subjects takes time, so disclosees must remember what they have 
been told.  But memory is a sieve.  Studies of informed consent, for 
example, repeatedly find that people correctly remember about one-
third of the basic information they are given if asked open-ended 
questions and about half if asked multiple-choice questions.328 
This lack of retention is inevitable.  Even in the best of circum-
stances it is hard to remember what you have learned without effort.  
But information is especially hard to remember if you are unfamiliar 
with a subject.  That is, things are most easily remembered if you can 
place them in some kind of context, a template, or a story.329  Thus ju-
rors do reasonably well at remembering the facts of a case (and at 
helping each other remember the facts) but do quite badly at remem-
bering the judge’s instructions about the law.330  As the jurors hear the 
facts, they put them into the framework of a story.  Legal rules do not 
fit into jurors’ narrative templates. 
Furthermore, people are better at remembering pleasant thoughts 
than unpleasant ones.  Mandated disclosures are often bleak and mi-
natory.  For example, “[r]etention of information is selective and the 
expected benefits of surgery are recalled much better than the poten-
tial risks.”331  We need not review all the reasons for selective memory.  
It may be related to cognitive biases or defense mechanisms such as 
suppression or denial.  One implication, however, is that such factors 
may contribute to physicians’ tendency to avoid discussing prognoses, 
withhold prognostic information, or present overly optimistic infor-
mation.332 
 
328 See, e.g., Herz et al., supra note 114, at 454 tbl.1. 
329 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 206 (discussing evidence that jurors assimilate incoming 
information into a story framework they construct and often forget information that 
does not fit well into that framework). 
330 See id. at 218 (reporting that, when tested on the elements of the judge’s in-
structions, jurors on average performed about as well as they would have if they had 
randomly guessed). 
331 Lemaire, supra note 194, at 4. 
332 See Robinson et al., supra note 252, at 1050 (discussing various cases of patient 
over-optimism, including those connected to patient communication behaviors). 
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5.  Analyzing the Information 
Mandated disclosure attempts to solve social problems by requiring 
the revelation of information.  We have now looked at the likelihood 
that the disclosee will receive, understand, and remember information.  
We have seen that each step in the process is so problematic that often 
the disclosee will not encounter the information, assimilate it, read or 
hear it correctly, or understand it.  The whole point of mandated dis-
closure is to give people good information.  If they do not take up the 
information and learn it accurately, mandated disclosure fails. 
We might well end our discussion of mandated disclosure here.  
But it has another fault:  it addresses a large problem with a partial re-
medy.  People make bad decisions not just because they lack informa-
tion, but also because they do not effectively use the information they 
have.  Mandated disclosure does not solve this problem.  Particularly, in 
cases where disclosures are most frequently mandated, people can have 
considerable—even disabling—difficulties making good decisions. 
A great and growing literature in social psychology and behavioral 
economics documents the ways people distort information and ignore 
and misuse it in making decisions.  That literature teaches that you do 
not solve the problem of bad decisions by giving people information.  
It may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. 
Requiring that people be given information is otiose if the infor-
mation does not produce better decisions.  We have concentrated on 
disclosees’ cognitive problems with disclosed information and argued 
that people often lack an adequate command of information to make 
good decisions.  But even if disclosees were offered, accepted, under-
stood, and remembered all the relevant information, they would still 
encounter difficulties in using the information that it would do them 
little good.  To put the point differently, mandated disclosure is fun-
damentally misconceived because its solution to the problem of 
choice is information alone.  But people’s problems choosing go well 
beyond ignorance.  In what follows, we discuss several problems 
people have in analyzing information and using it to make decisions. 
a.  Coping with Complexity 
We have already said that providing complex information in large 
quantities makes it hard for disclosees to acquire and understand dis-
closures.333  The problem worsens when they try to use such informa-
 
333 See supra subsection III.A.4. 
BEN-SHAHAR_FINALDOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  11:53 AM 
2011] The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 721 
tion.  People can keep only a few factors in mind when analyzing a 
problem.  A “large body of empirical work suggest[s] that the integra-
tion of different types of information and values into a decision is a 
very difficult cognitive process.  Evidence shows that people can 
process and use only a limited number of variables.”334  In fact, infor-
mation may decrease the reliability of decisions:  “When individuals had 
more information, their ability to use it ‘consistently’ declined.”335  
One study, for instance, asked expert handicappers to predict horse 
races.  The more information the handicappers had, the more confi-
dent they were, but their “predictive ability was as good with 5 va-
riables as with 10, 20, or 40.”  Worse, “reliability of the choices de-
creased as more information was made available.”336 
It will come as no surprise, then, that consumers borrow more 
than is rational.  The calculations required to borrow shrewdly are 
numerous and knotty:  Consumers must compare relative costs of cre-
dit and cash, compare different financial products (such as short- ver-
sus long-term or secured versus unsecured), set the proper level of 
saving versus consumption, factor in the time value of money and how 
it might evolve, and assign each factor a weight.  Faced with all this, it 
is hard not to overweight a few simple, easily understood factors like 
low present interest rates.337 
People often simplify decisions by pruning away factors, and at the 
extreme they consult a single factor. 
Making trade-offs to integrate conflicting dimensions into an overall 
choice is such a complex cognitive task that people tend to use heuristic 
shortcuts that may not produce optimal decisions.  These simplified 
strategies include selecting only one dimension and ignoring others or 
focusing on concrete, easy to understand concepts such as cost rather 
than more complicated and less precise factors such as quality indica-
tors.
338
   
The more overwhelming a decision, the more appealing radical short-
cuts become.339  Indeed, confronted with disclosures containing many 
 
334 Hibbard et al., supra note 192, at 397.   
335 Id. at 398. 
336 Id. (emphasis added). 
337 See Willis, supra note 107, at 219-23 (arguing that most American adults lack the 
skills necessary to make “independent, welfare-enhancing decisions in today’s personal-
finance product market”). 
338 Lubalin & Harris-Kojetin, supra note 137, at 88 (citations omitted). 
339 See Yaniv Hanoch & Thomas Rice, Can Limiting Choice Increase Social Welfare?  
The Elderly and Health Insurance, 84 MILBANK Q. 37, 41 (2006) (arguing that elders use 
BEN-SHAHAR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011  11:53 AM 
722 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 647 
items, people consider only the simplified shortcut—some bottom 
line.  Loan shoppers, for example, when given more information 
about subcomponents of the loan price, were less likely to choose the 
cheaper loan than shoppers who saw only the bottom-line price.340 
So (perhaps because of the anchoring heuristic) the rule for bor-
rowing seems to be, can I afford the monthly payment? 341  This requires 
minimal calculation, but it distorts the cost of credit.  It obscures 
comparisons between competing credit offers and between the cost of 
credit and the cost of paying for a household purchase out of savings.  
Most importantly, it renders disclosure of APR and related credit 
terms interesting but irrelevant. 
Cancer treatment provides another example.  Choices for treating 
breast cancer are relatively simple, specialists have much experience 
presenting those choices to patients, and much attention has been 
paid to how to do so.  Still, one study concluded that the leading “in-
fluence on decision-making behavior” was “perceived salience of al-
ternatives.”342  In other words, patients let a single aspect of the treat-
ment determine the decision.  These patients “did not report conflict 
about what course to take or the need for further information or deli-
beration.”343  And indeed, breast-cancer patients seem regularly to 
choose a treatment with nothing like adequate understanding.344 
The health-plan choices of employers’ specialists provide yet 
another example for disclosed information’s limited use.  Only about 
a fifth use “some kind of system for making trade-offs and identifying 
high-performing, cost-effective plans,” and the “system” could be as 
 
decisionmaking shortcuts and “heuristic-based strategies” when faced with complex 
decisions). 
340 JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EFFECT OF 
MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION:  
A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT 28-29 (2004). 
341 See Willis, supra note 102, at 780-84 (explaining how consumers simplify finan-
cial decisionmaking by focusing on one dimension of a product). 
342 Penny F. Pierce, Deciding on Breast Cancer Treatment:  A Description of Decision Be-
havior, 42 NURSING RES. 22, 23 (1993). 
343 Id.  A study of prospective dialysis patients observed “similarly truncated courses 
of decision.”  SCHNEIDER, supra note 110, at 94-95.  The patients listened until they 
heard some arresting fact and then based their decision on it:  “as soon as some pa-
tients hear that hemodialysis requires someone to insert two large needles into their 
arm three times a week, they opt for whatever the alternative is.”  Id.  For an extended 
development of these points, see id. at 92-99. 
344 See Angela Fagerlin et al., An Informed Decision?  Breast Cancer Patients and Their 
Knowledge About Treatment, 64 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 303, 309 (2006) (noting 
that “a considerable number of studies have reached similar conclusions” with regard 
to the low level of knowledge patients used in making health care decisions).  
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primitive as a four-cell matrix.345  Additionally, “[t]welve percent re-
ported that they made their choices on the basis of a single dimension 
such as cost or geographic access.”346 
b.  The Mysteries of the Mind 
Disclosure is not mandated to give disclosees a cognitive workout.  
Rather, its purpose is to help them make good decisions.  Disclosure 
will be pointless if people can understand information but informa-
tion-handling problems prevent them from making good choices.  
The literature on how people misanalyze problems because of defects 
in human reasoning is now so great that it cannot (and so familiar 
that it need not) be summarized.347 
So we are faced once again with the overload effect.  We propose 
to solve it with a brief and incomplete picture of the “cognitive and 
social psychological phenomena” that “significantly limit the effec-
tiveness of disclosures alone” (in this case to help consumers choose 
mortgages well).348  These phenomena include 
(a) inability to process user-unfriendly features of disclosure regimes; (b) 
lack of contractual schemas or knowledge structures; (c) inaccurate de-
fault assumptions of how contractual provisions are likely to be struc-
tured and whether the terms can be negotiated; (d) availability heuris-
tics; (e) reason-based decision making; (f) biases in attribute estimation 
and evaluation; (g) positive confirmation biases; (h) acceptance of 
senseless explanations; (i) argument immunization; ( j) sunk cost effects; 
(k) endowment effects; (l) temporal and uncertainty discounting; (m) a 
strong motivation to trust that is exacerbated when the consumer is of a 
lower socioeconomic status, and misplaced trust in the mortgage broker or 
lender; and (n) social norms and signals not to read disclosure forms.
349
 
 
345 Hibbard et al., supra note 138, at 177. 
346 Id.  
347 See, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006) (providing a psy-
chological explanation of the limitations of human imagination in the area of forecast-
ing the future); NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 319 (arguing that human error often aris-
es when people use simplistic inferential decisionmaking strategies, rather than 
normative and inferential tools); TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES:  
DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002) (arguing that the adaptive uncons-
cious is a powerful force, controlling many motivations, judgments, and actions). 
348 Stark & Choplin, supra note 189, at 89. 
349 Id.  
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c.  Parsing Preferences 
The mandated-disclosure formula assumes that disclosees take in-
formation and use it to determine which choice best serves their pre-
ferences.  However, lack of well-developed preferences can keep 
people from using disclosed information productively.  For example, 
people buying insurance often know little about the coverage sought.  
Even if they decipher the risks, probabilities, and deductibles, do they 
have the skill to figure out which bundle of policy limits, scope of cov-
erage, exclusions, deductibles, and premia is best?  More coverage, 
fewer exclusions, smaller deductions, and cheaper premia are better, 
but trading off these factors is perplexing. 
To take another example, a patient with a dire disease may have to 
choose between a treatment with a low chance of success but a low risk 
of death and disaster, and a treatment with a high chance of success 
but a high risk of death and disaster.  Patients have relevant prefe-
rences:  avoiding death and avoiding side effects.  But few patients 
have values that will help them beyond this.  We are not arguing that 
people generally do not know their preferences.  Our narrower argu-
ment is that few people can—or want to—develop finely calibrated 
preferences in the often technical mandated-disclosure areas.  At the 
very least, few develop such preferences quickly and accurately 
enough to use in making decisions. 
Using disclosed information requires making two kinds of predic-
tions:  how you will behave in your chosen situation and how you will 
feel about your choice once you have started living it.  A considerable 
and bemusing literature reveals that both predictions are hazardous.  
Even in some familiar situations, people mispredict their own beha-
vior.350  They go on dates determined to behave chastely, engage in  
foreplay expecting to use a condom, and initiate sex while planning to 
stop in time.351  In less familiar situations, the problem worsens.  For 
example, many credit-card users wrongly expect to maintain a zero 
credit balance,352 and consumers joining health clubs often choose to 
 
350 See Oren Bar-Gill, Informing Consumers About Themselves (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law 
Ctr. for Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 07-44, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1056381 (providing numerous examples in which consumers fail to maximize 
their preferences in product choice and product use). 
351 See generally Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting:  Some Problems 
in the Forecasting of Future Affective States (describing how people incorrectly evaluate 
their desires over time),in FEELING AND THINKING:  THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL 
COGNITION 178, 182-83 ( Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000). 
352 See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 
AM. ECON. REV. 50, 71 (1991) (discussing “indirect empirical confirmation of the pres-
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pay a flat rate because they overestimate their future usage by more 
than 100%.353 
People’s ability to use disclosures can also be compromised by, for 
example, a tendency to overestimate how unhappy a bad outcome will 
make them and to underestimate their ability to diminish that unhap-
piness.354  People react to disease and disability less despairingly than 
they expect.355  The sick generally evaluate their lives differently from 
the way the well evaluate them,356 and despite the “quality of life is 
more important than quantity” mantra, many patients would yield 
much quality even for slightly more quantity.357 
d.  Expertise 
In most situations in which disclosure is mandated, more than 
facts are needed to make good decisions.  Expertise—accumulated 
knowledge and experience—is also essential.  The experts with whom 
disclosees deal—like bankers, doctors, police, and businesses—have 
experience that allows them to make better decisions than a novice.  
As experts accumulate experience, they develop sets of mental pat-
terns and a certain degree of intuition.  This intuition relates to the 
way things usually work.  When experts encounter a new problem, 
they consult their mental file of patterns to see what is recognizable in 
the problem and what solutions are plausible.  In other words, “[a]s a 
practitioner experiences many variations of a small number of types of 
cases, he is able to ‘practice’ his practice.  He develops a repertoire of 
expectations, images, and techniques.  He learns what to look for and 
how to respond to what he finds.”358  More precisely, 
 
ence of consumers who act as though they do not intend to borrow but who conti-
nuously do so”). 
353 Stefano Della Vigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 694, 706 (2006). 
354 See GILBERT, supra note 347, 175-92. 
355 See, e.g., Joel Tsevat et al., The Will to Live Among HIV-Infected Patients, 131 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 194, 195 (1999) (reporting that half of AIDS patients interviewed 
said “their life was better currently than it was before they were aware that they had 
HIV,” while only 29% said life was worse). 
356 See Ubel et al., supra note 221, at 601-04 (highlighting the discrepancy between 
quality-of-life estimates from patients and the general public). 
357 See Tsevat et al., supra note 355, at 196 (reporting HIV patients’ “mean time-
tradeoff score was 0.95 ± 0.1” over a five-year period, “indicating that, on average, pa-
tients did not have a clear preference between living 5 years in their current state of 
health and 4.75 years . . . in excellent health”). 
358 DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 60 (1983). 
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[d]ecision makers recognize the situation as typical and familiar . . . . 
They understand what types of goals make sense (so the priorities are set), 
which cues are important (so there is not an overload of information), 
what to expect next (so they can prepare themselves and notice surprises), 
and the typical ways of responding in a given situation.  By recognizing a sit-
uation as typical, they also recognize a course of action likely to succeed.
359
  
This experience and skill in making decisions comes with practice 
and cannot be taught simply by instruction.  A good decision results 
from technical experience and savvy, gained by practice, trial and er-
ror, and educated intuition—factors that cannot be passed along by 
simple communication, reading a treatise, or signing a disclosure.  It 
is based on implicit, not articulated knowledge.360  Indeed, experts 
“usually know more than they can say.  They exhibit a kind of  
knowing-in-practice, most of which is tacit.”361 
This is not to say that novices never understand information.  But 
novices’ inexpertise gives them another burden in interpreting disclo-
sures.  In the areas in which mandated disclosure is most used, novices 
cannot easily understand the facts they are given, how to put them in 
context, how to analyze them, and how to act on them.  To be sure, 
the degree of expertise called for in the areas regulated by mandated 
disclosure varies.  But when one surveys the range of disclosers, one 
realizes that most areas require expertise to understand the informa-
tion subject to disclosure requirements.362 
This brings us back, again, to the quantity question.  Experts can 
cope with large quantities of information in ways novices cannot.  For 
example, they build up sets of patterns they can consult almost intui-
tively.  They build up standard solutions to problems.  Like seasoned 
watchmakers, they reduce complexity through modularity:  they break 
down complex problems into manageable subproblems.363  In short, 
experts simplify choices so that they require fewer data and less labor. 
Lawmakers and disclosers increasingly recognize the importance 
of expertise, and at times supplement disclosure mandates with coun-
 
359 GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER 24 (1998). 
360 See Stephen A. Marglin, Towards the Decolonization of the Mind (“The sources of 
techne range from intuition to authority; . . . it is often implicit rather than articu-
late; . . . it is practical rather than theoretical, and geared to discovery rather than veri-
fication . . . .”), in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE 1, 24 (Frédérique Apffel Marglin & Ste-
phen A. Marglin eds., 1990). 
361 SCHÖN, supra note 358, at viii. 
362 See text accompanying supra note 1. 
363 See SCHÖN, supra note 358, at 60-64 (describing a practioner’s “reflection-in-
action”). 
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seling requirements.364  For example, several states have enacted 
mortgage counseling requirements as a means to provide better guid-
ance to borrowers.365  Recently, HUD considered but eventually re-
jected a requirement that “a closing script . . . be completed and read 
by the closing agent.”366  In addition, proposals have been made for 
doctors and researchers to test patients and prospective research sub-
jects on their understanding of the consent forms.  Even without an 
official mandate, many doctors follow a “shared decisionmaking” 
model, intended to educate patients well enough for them to make 
good decisions.  This model “assumes that both the patient and the 
doctor have a legitimate investment in the treatment decision; hence, 
both declare treatment preferences and their rationale while trying to 
build a consensus on the appropriate treatment to implement.”367 
e.  Decision Aversion 
Mandated disclosure assumes that people want to make decisions 
themselves and want to do so by gathering and evaluating information 
about their choices.  In areas subject to mandates, however, both as-
sumptions are unreliable.  The empirical evidence discussed in this 
section shows that people resist making even crucial decisions and 
when they do make them, they use little information and scant reflec-
tion.  For example, people frequently resist making medical decisions, 
and the sicker and older they are—and thus the more consequential 
their decisions—the more they resist.368  When one study asked pa-
tients whether they wanted information, their mean score was 80 on a 
 
364 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11) (2006) (prohibiting a debtor from discharging 
a debt in a bankruptcy proceeding if the debtor has not completed a personal-finance 
management course). 
365 See Stark & Choplin, supra note 189, at 87 & n.12 (listing statutes in Arkansas, 
Georgia, Indiana, New Mexico, and North Carolina). 
366 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA):  Rule to Simplify and Improve 
the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 68,204, 68,205 (Nov. 17, 2008).  Ironically, in contrast with the rule’s title, HUD 
projected the closing script would take forty-five minutes to read and would cost ap-
proximately $98.48 per loan.  See Stark & Choplin, supra note 189, at 108 (citing Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act Proposed Rule to Simplify and Improve the Process 
of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,030, 
14,102 (proposed Mar. 14, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 203, 3500)). 
367 Cathy Charles et al., What Do We Mean by Partnership in Making Decisions About 
Treatment?, 319 BMJ 780, 781 (1999). 
368 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 110, at 41 (surveying direct empirical studies on pa-
tient preferences about autonomy). 
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0–100 scale; when asked if they wanted to make their own decisions, 
the mean score was 33.369 
Similarly, people avoid financial decisions, and when they do 
make a decision, they use less information than they need and could 
get.  For example, people famously postpone retirement planning.370  
One survey found that “[o]nly 42 percent of workers report they 
and/or their spouse have tried to calculate how much money they will 
need to have saved.”371  Rather than choosing investments, employees 
often leave pension money wherever their employer puts it.372  Conse-
quently, despite easily available advice about the basics of investing, 
employees hold employer stock in risky proportions.373 
Of course, many people make many decisions willingly and well.  
Many decisions cannot normally be delegated, like choosing a school or 
a spouse.  Some decisions are enjoyable, like buying shotguns or shoes.  
And acquiring information can be fun, like reading box scores or gossip 
columns.  But decisions—especially the subsets of decisions that man-
dated disclosure seeks to improve—are generally a means, not an end; a 
distraction, not a pleasure.  The drudgery of learning, the agony of in-
decision, the risks of responsibility, the inevitability of incompetence, 
and the acknowledgment of perils hold charms for only a few.374 
 
369 Jack Ende et al., Measuring Patients’ Desire for Autonomy:  Decision Making and In-
formation-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 23, 25-26 
(1989).   
370 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING, GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA:  THE 
HEALTH & RETIREMENT STUDY 57, 60 (2007) (reporting studies finding low savings 
rates for retirement, including one study finding that one third of survey respondents 
had saved nothing for retirement); see also James J. Choi et al., For Better or For Worse:  
Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior (reporting 401(k) participation rates not ex-
ceeding 70% at two large companies without automatic-enrollment plans), in PERS-
PECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 98 tbl.2.2 (David A. Wise ed., 2004); James 
J. Choi et al., Optimal Defaults, 93 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 180, 180 (2003) 
(discussing the potential effects of an optimal default-savings rule given people’s ten-
dency to procrastinate in making retirement choices). 
371 RUTH HELMAN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ENCOURAGING WORKERS 
TO SAVE:  THE 2005 RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY 6 (2005) (emphasis added). 
372 See James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions:  Plan Rules, Participant 
Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance (discussing studies on “passive decisionmaking in 
asset allocation choices”), in 16 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 67, 97-99 ( James M. 
Poterba ed., 2002). 
373 See James J. Choi et al., Are Empowerment and Education Enough?  Undiversification in 
401(k) Plans, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 2005, at 151, 156-57 (survey-
ing research finding that 401(k) plans have high percentages of employer stock). 
374 Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra note 110, at 38-39 (describing a study finding that patients 
wish to defer to doctors who presumably have more expertise). 
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Furthermore, seeking plenary control can interfere with the things 
that really matter.  Control means constant choices, time-sapping and 
soul-sucking.  As Alfred North Whitehead wonderfully said, 
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by 
eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate 
the habit of thinking of what we are doing. . . . Operations of thought 
are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are strictly limited in number, 
they require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments.
375
  
Not only may people resist making the sorts of decisions man-
dated disclosure addresses, they also resist making them in the in-
tended way.  For most people facing such decisions, the more-is-better 
mantra is wrong.  In many areas, and particularly when people are 
confused and need “protection,” knowledge is not intrinsically valued.  
People may want to know less, not more, and so they may find infor-
mation a burden, not a privilege.  They may begrudge the time and 
trouble it takes to learn and use the amount and kind of information 
disclosures provide.  They may dislike reading contracts, manuals, 
warnings, notices, forms, charts, and instructions, or burrowing 
through endless data. 
Yet everywhere people turn, information bombards them, and 
consequently, they strive to stem the waste of time and attention re-
quired to sort through that information.  Google succeeds, in part, by 
giving people less information—the useful information, the “top 
hits”—not more.  People become, in short, numb to the information 
in mandated disclosures.  They look for and latch onto cues, signals, 
something familiar—indicators that are largely inconsistent with the 
comprehensive, systematic information toward which disclosures tend.  
People hope to use less information, not more; to break information 
down into easy, modular pieces, not to assemble it into comprehen-
sive wholes; to minimize unfamiliar decisions and replace them with 
familiar ones.  The ideal underlying mandated disclosure—systematic 
information—fails to recognize these preferences. 
IV.  SOME UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 
We have examined mandated disclosure’s potential to inform 
people and improve their decisions.  But disclosures may affect trans-
actions and interactions in other ways:  by creating indirect benefits 
and imposing selective costs.  In this Part, we first look at some possi-
 
375 ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICS 41-42 (Ga-
laxy Book, 3d prtg. 1961) (1911). 
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ble indirect benefits of mandated disclosure and we then examine 
some indirect and unintended costs. 
A.  The Dubious Indirect Benefits of Mandated Disclosure 
Mandated disclosure’s core purpose is to supply information that 
people can use to make better decisions.  If disclosure mandates did 
lead to better decisions, they would be valuable and would likely justify 
at least the obvious costs of regulation.  However, we have just dis-
cussed a long series of conditions that must be satisfied for mandated 
disclosure to work, and we argued that only rarely can all be met.  If a 
mandated-disclosure regulation fails to accomplish its purpose, it can-
not be justified, even if its cost is small. 
But might there be ways to analyze mandated disclosure that show 
it capable of justifying its costs?  Might mandated disclosure serve val-
uable goals other than directly informing people? 
1.  An Agency Benefit? 
An influential law-and-economics argument maintains that a few 
sophisticated readers of disclosures can discipline disclosers and force 
them to offer better terms, eschew hidden traps, and behave efficient-
ly.376  Mandated disclosure might inform these sophisticated readers, 
thus helping all disclosees.  We doubt, however, that sophisticated dis-
closees are “reading agents” for other disclosees. 
First, this theory conflicts with the theory of mandated disclosure.  
Under the agency theory, sophisticated readers induce businesses to 
disclose information voluntarily and avoid self-serving behavior.  That 
is, recognizing the presence of sophisticated consumers and seeking 
to please them, businesses voluntarily disclose information and make 
it useful.  Failure to do so would either drive the sophisticates away or 
reduce their willingness to pay.  Mandated disclosure, by contrast, as-
sumes that there will be no disclosure without a mandate.  It thus as-
sumes that there are not enough sophisticated consumers who know 
to demand, and are able to scrutinize, the information.  This assump-
 
376 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638-39 (1979) (arguing 
that these effects arise because disclosers often cannot distinguish between sophisticated 
and unsophisticated readers); see also George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product 
Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1346-47 (1981) (arguing that manufacturers focus warranty 
content to attract marginal consumers and repeat business).  But see Clayton P. Gillette, 
Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 692-97 (questioning the con-
ditions under which readers would indeed serve as “agents” for nonreaders). 
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tion is ordinarily correct, since the factors that discourage disclosees 
from scrutinizing disclosures apply to even sophisticated disclosees.  If 
nobody reads disclosures, it does not matter that some nonreaders are 
sophisticated. 
Even if there were enough readers, they would not be good agents 
for other consumers unless they were reasonably typical.  But the per-
son with the time, knowledge, skill, and determination—not to men-
tion paranoia—to plow through disclosures is atypical, might care 
about idiosyncratic features, and might be willing to pay for higher 
quality.  For example, a credit-card user who cares about the arbitra-
tion clause in the boilerplate is not likely to reflect the social demo-
graphics, the concerns, and the price-quality tradeoff of typical users.  
Furthermore, businesses can try to identify and segregate these read-
ers so that the benefits the readers know to insist on will not leak to 
the nonreading majority.  Sophisticated readers may selectively enjoy 
the “good” terms in the contract because they are buried in the fine 
print.  And even if agent-readers were subject to the same oppressive 
terms as everybody else, they might negotiate ad hoc accommoda-
tions.377  Therefore, the agency account militates in favor of mandated 
disclosure only for a market in which disclosers cannot distinguish 
readers from nonreaders and must give all consumers the better deal 
that readers insist on.  But disclosure is often mandated in areas in 
which people use or enjoy information differently, as in medical situa-
tions, in Miranda situations, and in warnings about products, such as 
product-liability law and cigarette warnings. 
There are market entities that specialize in reading disclosures.  
Consumer watchdogs and organizations that assess complex products 
and disseminate the information to the public could serve as reading 
agents.  Thus, mandated disclosures might inform these market in-
termediaries who, in turn, might inform the population.  But it is not 
clear that mandated disclosures help such groups fulfill their mission.  
Like other sophisticated readers, they can and do get information, 
even if it is not mandated.  Moreover, it is not clear that the informa-
tion they provide is based on the content of disclosures.  Instead, it is 
often based on surveys and studies, which these organizations conduct.  
 
377 For example, the Comcast arbitration clause discussed below, infra note 413 
and accompanying text, is a “Right to Opt Out,” which requires the reader to notify 
Comcast.  Only sophisticated readers that so notify get the benefit; naïfs enjoy no spill-
over effect.  See generally David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transactions 
Costs, in BOILERPLATE:  THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 66 (Omri Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007). 
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Consumers rely on these intermediaries to report how businesses ac-
tually behave, the quality of the businesses’ products or services, and the 
overall rates of consumer satisfaction.  Consumers do not want the 
watchdogs simply to tell them what is written in the disclosure. 
There are, to be sure, areas in which disclosures are aimed directly 
at sophisticated intermediaries, and where the presence of such inter-
mediaries produces a desirable effect for the nonreading populous.  
Hospitals, for example, make quality disclosures that health plans can 
use; employers make safety disclosures that labor unions can use; and 
firms make environmental disclosures that government entities can 
use.  And, of course, most of the securities disclosures to investors are 
read and analyzed by sophisticated participants and their informa-
tional content is reflected in the prices of the securities.  But these 
contexts are few and far between.  The bulk of the consumer-oriented 
disclosures are issued directly to people in the absence of a sophisti-
cated informational intermediary. 
2.  An Educational Benefit? 
Could mandated disclosure be salvaged for its educational value if 
it used better educational techniques?  For example, informed con-
sent’s champions place “much faith . . . in . . . various educational 
tools to empower patients to comprehend and manage adequately the 
basic information needed to satisfy informed consent aspirations.”378  
These tools include “more sophisticated decision aids in the form of 
information technology; the provision of written handouts to patients; 
presentation of information in qualitative, quantitative, and graphic 
formats, simplified to reach the lower literate patient; and the showing 
of videotapes.”379  It is also said that mandated disclosure could work if 
supported by more general attempts to educate people about the area 
in which they must make decisions.  Financial literacy education is a 
prominent example.  President George W. Bush is one of many who 
argued that financial education is critical to a robust and effective fi-
nancial marketplace.380  It is commonly believed that while mandated 
disclosure may not directly improve people’s decisions in the short 
 
378 Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care:  In-
formed Consent and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 13 (2006).   
379 Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). 
380 See, e.g., Willis, supra note 107, at 199 (citing Remarks by the President in Roundta-
ble Interview with Business Reporters, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2007, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/Content/article/2007/08/09/ 
AR2007080900780.html). 
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term, it helps to educate them about problems they may face and to 
change their behavior in the longer term. 
Tocqueville thought that “one of the most remarkable features of 
America” was the “universal and sincere faith that they profess here in 
the efficaciousness of education.”381  Attempts to make mandated dis-
closure work through education have consistently disappointed that 
faith.  For example, efforts to educate workers about 401(k) retire-
ment savings regularly fail.  Only about 15% of the people who leave 
investment seminars intending to change their investments actually do 
so.382  One study even found that high school students who had taken 
a financial education course scored worse than other students.383  Simi-
larly, considerable “evidence indicates that early efforts to educate 
consumers [of health care plans] have not been very effective.”384  
While some hope that “[w]ith appropriate education, over time con-
sumers may begin to understand the role that plan structure plays rel-
ative to doctor performance in affecting their care and plan expe-
riences,”385 researchers have long strived to create appropriate 
education, with dismal results.386 
Education presents many of the same problems that bedevil man-
dated disclosure.  And when education is for general purposes, rather 
than to help someone make an immediate decision, it is even less likely 
to work.  The problems with education are not just cognitive and not 
just difficulties of time and attention, although those are serious bar-
riers.  The problems also arise because behavior is affected by so many 
things that respond poorly to a one-size-fits-all educational campaign. 
 
381 A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, A FREE AND ORDERED SPACE:  THE REAL WORLD OF THE 
UNIVERSITY 33 (1988) (quoting Tocqueville).  
382 Choi et al., supra note 372, at 102-03. 
383 See Willis, supra note 107, at 208 (highlighting that this result held true even for 
students with their own credit cards or who helped pay for car insurance).  
384 Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?, 
HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 159, 165. 
385 Lubalin & Harris-Kojetin, supra note 137, at 73. 
386 A chastening perspective on education comes from the world of continuing 
medical education (CME).  Despite many reasons to expect CME to work, its record is 
discouraging, and it delivers “messages in ways that are most often ineffective.”  Karen 
Tu & Dave Davis, Can We Alter Physician Behavior by Educational Methods?  Lessons Learned 
from Studies of the Management and Follow-up of Hypertension, 22 J. CONTINUING EDUC. 
HEALTH PROFS. 11, 20 (2002).  Despite the ineffectiveness of didactic CME, “[t]here is 
clear evidence that CME offerings today in North America consist mostly of the less 
effective change strategies such as conferences.”  Dave Davis, Does CME Work?  An Anal-
ysis of the Effect of Educational Activities on Physician Performance or Health Care Outcomes, 28 
INT’L J. PSYCHIATRY MED. 21, 31 (1998). 
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Smoking exemplifies the confounding complexity of public edu-
cation.  Smoking rates are much lower than they were fifty years ago.387  
But is it because of warnings on cigarette packaging?  Surely, change 
came principally from more fundamental policies and cultural cur-
rents that changed social attitudes and mobilized social pressures.  
These include higher taxes and bans on smoking in places like offices, 
hotels, airplanes, and restaurants, which drive smokers from the com-
pany of their fellows.388  Better medical and social recognition of the 
mortality and morbidity that smoking causes must also have been cen-
tral.  Educational efforts coincided with these changes, but it is not 
clear how much they caused them.  It is even less clear whether man-
dated labeling had any significant role. 
Finally, and perhaps most sobering, is—yet again—the accumula-
tion problem.  Even if consumers could be adequately educated in one 
area, they cannot master many.  Consumers must do more than just buy 
goods and services intelligently, plan their retirement accounts, or 
manage their loans.  Lawmakers invoke the education rationale as the 
deus ex machina for many disclosure regimes in a multitude of areas.  It 
produces, in the aggregate, a specter of public education and literacy 
regarding financial decisions, health-insurance choices, pensions, 
health care, privacy protection, Internet shopping, eating and nutrition, 
risk management, smoking, gambling, and much more. 
3.  A Greater Social Benefit? 
Often, disclosure laws represent, and are deemed to promote, a 
vision of an improved society.  What is at stake is not only the private 
utility of an informed decisionmaker, but something more fundamen-
tal about the fabric of society.  Disclosures are intended to promote 
autonomy, dignity, civility, community, citizenship, economic growth, 
and a variety of other virtues.  For example, “presenting consumers 
with an opportunity to read supports Llewellyn’s idea of individual as-
sent and autonomy, even if most consumers don’t read.”389  An impor-
 
387 See GARY A. GIOVINO ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CIGARETTE SMOK-
ING PREVALENCE AND POLICIES IN THE 50 STATES:  AN ERA OF CHANGE 11 fig.3 (2009) 
(illustrating a decrease in the percentage of smokers among those over eighteen). 
388 See id. at 21 (listing fifteen states that have enacted legislation banning smoking 
in “private workplaces, restaurants and bars” and forty-four states that “increased their 
cigarette excise tax rate at least once” since January 2002). 
389 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?  Evaluating the Recom-
mendations of the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ 
files/file/Wurgler%20paper.pdf; see also Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, 
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tant thread of the literature suggests that there is a dignitary benefit to 
receiving information even if you do not use it.  This argument ap-
pears regularly in the informed consent literature.390  In the IRB con-
text, many often note that the disclosure regime guarantees adhe-
rence to stricter ethical standards.391  Furthermore, many regard 
financial literacy as a baseline for achieving economic growth and 
community improvement.392 
Needless to say, these greater social benefits depend on the disclo-
sures reaching and affecting people.  If, as we argue, disclosures are 
consistently overlooked and disregarded, it is possible that the only 
incidental effects are negative:  indifference, numbness, alienation, 
and even oppression.  No number of “I Agree” clicks to software li-
censes or of mechanically signed consent forms would bolster 
people’s sense of autonomy, respect, or dignity; any vision that these 
empty rituals would increase national productivity or improve com-
munities is naïve. 
B.  The Costs of Mandated Disclosure 
Whatever benefits mandated disclosures may offer, mandates are 
unjustifiable if their costs outweigh their benefits.  Measuring those 
costs is as challenging as measuring the benefits, but the costs could 
be considerable.  We first discuss some direct implementation costs 
and then follow with some indirect costs that are often unrecognized 
and unintended. 
1.  Implementation Costs 
In Part III, we charted all the things lawmakers, disclosers, and 
disclosees must do for mandated disclosure to succeed.  We showed 
 
Defending Disclosure in Software Contracts, 78 U. CHI L. REV. 1, 12 (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596685 (arguing that dis-
closure can promote “economic efficiency, due process, and corrective justice”). 
390 See, e.g., Alan Meisel, A “Dignitary Tort” as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed 
Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 210 (1988) 
(“[I]nformed consent should promote not merely those [values]—autonomy, indivi-
dualism, self-determination—that are honored in the dicta of case law . . . but the value 
of mutual trust and education between doctor and patient.”). 
391 See, e.g., ROBERT AMDUR & ELIZABETH A. BANKERT, THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
BOARD MEMBER HANDBOOK 96 (3d ed. 2011) (“Disclosure via the informed consent 
process is . . . the most direct and ethically intuitive route of disclosure.”).  
392 See generally NAACP, NAACP FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT GUIDE 4-5 (2003), 
available at http://backup.naacp.org/pdfs/finance_fei.pdf (stating the importance of 
financial literacy in achieving economic success and social justice). 
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why mandated disclosure often fails, but we also catalogued the im-
plementation costs of mandated disclosure.  For example, disclosers 
spend money figuring out what disclosures are mandated, as sug-
gested by the rise of industries intended to tell disclosers their obliga-
tions under HIPAA, the Clery Act, and so on.  TILA regulations be-
came so complicated, bolstered by numerous Federal Reserve Board 
interpretations, that even sophisticated disclosers could not always 
know what they need to do. Consequently issuers of securities always 
consult specialized legal counsel. 
In addition, we canvassed disclosers’ costs of acquiring and provid-
ing information.  Those costs can be especially great when informa-
tion has not already been assembled.  Providing information can be 
expensive if it must be mailed, particularly if it must be mailed regu-
larly.  Often, disclosers must fund bureaucracies to comply with man-
dates.  For example, it cost the Johns Hopkins Hospital $114,528 to es-
tablish its advance-directive PSDA program, which “incurs on-going 
incremental costs including document copying, file folders, audits, and 
personnel.  It also has on-going total costs including continued training 
and physician education regarding advance directives.”393  This hospital 
is only one of thousands of institutions subject to the PSDA. 
A much larger and expanding bureaucracy administers the IRB 
system.  IRBs now have professional staffs,394 but the principal person-
nel cost is the time IRB members—who are primarily physicians, 
scientists, and other expensive individuals—spend reviewing, discuss-
ing, and monitoring protocols.  IRBs can be so populous that “[m]any 
social sciences and humanities departments are smaller than the IRB 
committee.”395  The IRB system also considerably taxes the time of re-
searchers, another group of high-cost employees.  For example, one 
rather modest research program spent nearly 17% of its total budget 
dealing with its IRB.396 
As a rule, disclosees bear a large share of the costs of mandated 
disclosure, if only because in commercial relationships disclosers’ 
costs are generally passed on to disclosees.  But disclosees have direct 
 
393 Jeremy Sugarman et al., The Cost of Ethics Legislation:  A Look at the Patient Self-
Determination Act, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 387, 393 (1993). 
394 See Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic Bureaucracies:  An Eco-
nomic and Experiential Analysis, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 882 (2007) (“[A]t Northwestern 
the Office for the Protection of Research subjects grew from two full-time professionals 
in the late 1990s to 25 professionals and an administrative staff of 20 [in 2006].”).   
395 John H. Mueller, Ignorance Is Neither Bliss Nor Ethical, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 809, 
822 (2007).   
396 Humphreys et al., supra note 228, at 77. 
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costs of their own.  For example, under the optimistic view that disclo-
sees actually read, interpret, and store the information, disclosees  
incur the nonmonetary cost of such acts. 
2.  Unintended Harms of Mandated Disclosure 
Mandated disclosure can impose considerable costs by damaging 
individual and social interests.  These are unintended costs that do 
not arise in every setting.  But there are substantial and increasing rea-
sons to worry about them. 
First, mandated disclosure can crowd out useful information.  This is 
another aspect of the quantity question.  Because disclosers can prof-
fer, and disclosees can receive, only so much information, mandated 
disclosures effectively keep disclosees from acquiring other informa-
tion.  If the disclosee wants and needs to learn the mandated informa-
tion, there will be little negative effect; but mandates rarely achieve 
such precision.  Thus, mandated disclosures may “reduce the atten-
tion consumers pay to other information, conceivably leading to worse 
decisions rather than better ones.”397  For example, brokerage-fee dis-
closures can cause consumers to overestimate the total cost of loans.398 
Similarly, marginally useful medical mandates drive out vitally  
necessary unmandated information.  Providers must tell patients 
about advance directives (the PSDA), privacy policies (HIPAA), 
treatment choices (informed consent), side effects (FDA law), and 
safety (tort law and malpractice insurance).  How much attention is 
left in the patient’s reservoir (or the provider’s) to learn about things 
that are life- and health-saving, like how to manage a chronic illness?  
Compliance rates with treatment regimes are often estimated to be 
around 50%.399  Doctors must teach and persistently prompt patients 
to get medicine, ingest it in the proper manner, take the right dose at 
the right time, and continue taking it as long as necessary.400  But 
mandated disclosure can crowd out such strenuous teaching. 
 
397 Craswell, supra note 29, at 584. 
398 Id. (“[A] recent FTC study found that a proposed disclosure of brokerage fees 
paid to mortgage brokers caused many consumers to overestimate the total cost of 
loans . . . .”). 
399 See Todd M. Ruppar et al., Medication Adherence Interventions for Older Adults:  Li-
terature Review, 22 RES. & THEORY NURSING PRAC. 114, 115 (2008) (“Adherence to pre-
scribed medications in older adults has been reported to range from 26% to 
59% . . . .”). 
400 See id. at 140-43 (reviewing the literature analyzing how to increase medication 
adherence among older adults). 
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In general, because mandated disclosures are blended with volun-
tarily supplied information, people have difficulty distinguishing “re-
vealers” from “concealers.”  Voluntary disclosures can signal valuable 
information to their recipients.  A patient views a doctor who is willing 
to spend time to volunteer information as trustworthy and dependa-
ble, but the opportunity to make such inferences is squandered when 
all doctors are required to recite disclosures. 
Second, mandated disclosure can have anticompetitive effects.  Disclo-
sure costs are substantially “fixed costs”; many of them do not vary 
with the scope of activity or with the frequency of disclosures.  These 
fixed costs—collecting information, drafting forms, training em-
ployees—are roughly the same for large and small disclosers.  This 
gives larger disclosers an advantage:  their burden of disclosure per 
“unit” is smaller.  This, in turn, hurts small companies trying to enter 
and compete in the market.401  Disclosures required of vocation 
schools illustrate such anticompetitive effects.  In some states, voca-
tional schools must address as many as twenty topics, including gradu-
ation rates, reenrollments, exam pass rates, graduates’ job prospects, 
and much more.402  Creating a system that collects this information 
requires investments in bureaucracy and recordkeeping, which dis-
proportionately burdens small schools.  It also requires internal moni-
toring of standardization, another fixed cost that burdens smaller 
competitors.  This may be why federal calorie-labeling law applies only 
to chains of twenty or more restaurants.403 
Third, mandated disclosure can undermine other consumer protections.  
For example, the doctrine of unconscionability and many antifraud 
statutes allow courts to strike oppressive terms from contracts.  Usual-
ly, courts direct their scrutiny against substantively intolerable terms, 
but only if there was some procedural unfairness in making the con-
 
401 This argument was made in the context of securities regulation by Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 671 (1984). 
402 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 11200(b)(1) (West Supp. 2009) (mandating disclo-
sure by schools for traffic violators); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/15.1 (West 2006) 
(mandating detailed information in vocational school enrollment agreements); 225 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 410/3B-12(a) (2007) (requiring numerous disclosures in cosmetolo-
gy, esthetics, and nail technology school enrollment agreements); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 13:23-5.16 (Supp. 2010) (mandating disclosure by driving schools). 
403 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 
Stat. 119, 573 (2010) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)); see also N.Y., N.Y., NEW 
YORK CITY HEALTH CODE tit. IV, pt. A, art. 81, § 81.50 (2008). 
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tract.404  Often the latter requirement is met by a finding that an op-
pressive term was “hidden” or that it surprised the consumer.  If, how-
ever, the discloser performed as mandated—if the discloser can point 
to a form handed to the consumer—the “surprise” element is not sa-
tisfied.405  Terms that would otherwise be regarded as “hidden” are no 
longer so, despite people’s well-known propensity to sign such disclo-
sures without reading them.  Thus, an empty but formally correct dis-
closure can keep the contract from being unconscionable, however 
problematic its terms.  It is striking that lawmakers widely recognize 
this effect.  A federal government report on predatory lending con-
cluded that “written disclosure requirements, without other protec-
tions, can have the unintended effect of insulating predatory lenders 
where fraud or deception may have occurred.”406  Mandated disclosure 
can thus backfire in the context of boilerplate contracts.407 
A disclosure mandate can similarly backfire when the discloser 
who complies with the disclosure mandate is free to engage in other 
forms of sharp dealing.  The discloser would have a strategic reason to 
counteract the chilling effect of the disclosure by giving false and bi-
ased assurances, as well as the “moral” high ground to act in harsher 
ways against the already protected consumer.  Conflict-of-interest dis-
closures have been shown to have such consequences.408  In addition, 
disclosures backfire when they remove other incentives for firms to 
employ other consumer protections.  This is a known consequence of 
product warnings (which are not directly mandated, but result from 
the duty to warn in product liability law).  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts explains that “where warning is given, the seller may reasona-
bly assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing 
 
404 See, e.g., Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 748 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that common law unconscionability requires both a lack of 
“meaningful choice” and “unreasonably favorable” contract terms). 
405 See, e.g., id. at 749-51 (finding no violation of TILA when plaintiff signed a dis-
closure statement the Act required). 
406 HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 179, at 67. 
407 See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate:  Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e-
Standard Terms Backfire? (warning that “[m]andating Web site disclosure would narrow 
consumer rights rather than expand them”), in BOILERPLATE, supra note 377, at 83, 89-
94; see also Riensche v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06-1325, 2006 WL 3827477, at *7-8 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2006) (rejecting an unconscionability claim because the con-
sumer had unlimited time to review the arbitration clause and thus a reasonable op-
portunity to understand the terms). 
408 See Cain et al., supra note 261, at 22 (concluding that conflict-of-interest disclo-
sure “can fail because it (1) gives advisors strategic reason and moral license to further 
exaggerate their advice and (2) it may not lead to sufficient discounting to counteract 
this effect”). 
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such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective 
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”409  The manufacturer—
who could otherwise be liable for designing an unsafe product, mar-
keting it irresponsibly, or failing to provide other forms of protec-
tion—escapes liability and does not have to make the product safer. 
Mandated disclosure can undermine another form of protection:  
consumers’ self-guard.  Disclosures give a transaction a “veneer of le-
gality” and cause consumers to reduce their level of caution and self-
protection.  The presence of many official-looking documents gives 
the false sense that the government is on guard, screening and regu-
lating the terms, so there is less need for suspicion and care.410 
Mandated disclosure may not only undermine other protections, 
but also inhibit their development.  To the extent that protections 
must emerge from legislative and regulatory efforts, lawmakers who 
devised disclosure mandates may think their mission accomplished 
and avoid the onerous work of devising more imaginative, more effec-
tive alternatives. 
Fourth, mandated disclosure can cause inequity.  Mandated disclosure 
helps most those who need help least and helps least those who need 
help most.  Information is most useful to well-educated and well-off 
people who have the resources and sophistication to locate, interpret, 
and use the revealed information.  In more than one study, consumer 
knowledge of credit markets was closely related to family income and 
education.411  Another study found that disclosures of a used car’s his-
tory, odometer readings, warranties, and more did not help the 
poor.412  The poor consistently receive worse terms than other buyers 
 
409 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. J (1965).  Recognizing that a 
warning “may either not be seen or will be disregarded,” the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts repudiates this language.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILI-
TY § 2 cmt. l, reporter’s note on cmt. l (2008).  The Third Restatement, however, re-
cognizes that “when an alternative design to avoid risk cannot reasonably be imple-
mented, adequate instructions and warning will normally be sufficient to render the 
product reasonably safe.”  Id. § 2 cmt. l. 
410 See Willis, supra note 102, at 794-95 (“Disclosures give the veneer of legality and 
authority to the loan process, both to the borrowers at the time they take the loan and 
to regulatory agencies and courts who may review the transaction down the line.”). 
411 Consumers’ understanding of credit and mandated disclosures is positively as-
sociated with their income and education.  See Kinsey & McAlister, supra note 104, at 
266 (finding that accurate consumer knowledge about APRs correlated with income); 
Lewis Mandell, Consumer Knowledge and Understanding of Consumer Credit, 7 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 23, 34 (1973) (“Knowledge of credit is strongly and directly related to the income 
and education of the family.”). 
412 McNeil et al., supra note 165, at 717. 
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(for many reasons), and disclosure mandates may exacerbate this dif-
ference—perhaps because the poor are comparatively less capable of 
utilizing the disclosures. 
In the context of contract boilerplate, disclosed terms give addi-
tional value to sophisticated consumers for which all consumers pay.  
For example, Comcast included this provision in the fine print sent to 
its customers: 
RIGHT TO OPT OUT:  IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE BOUND BY 
THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION, YOU MUST NOTIFY COMCAST IN 
WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE THAT YOU FIRST RE-
CEIVE THIS AGREEMENT BY VISITING WWW.COMCAST.COM/ 
ARBITRATIONOPTOUT, OR BY MAIL . . . .
413
  
People who opt out of mandatory arbitration may bring suits and 
perhaps class actions—something only sophisticated parties would 
know.  But Comcast’s cost of exposure to such litigation is rolled into 
the costs everyone pays.  Likewise, the fees and high interest rates the 
unsophisticated pay fund advantages that sophisticated credit-card users 
secure (like low APRs and airline miles).414  Disclosures help sophisti-
cated parties avoid these fees, and high rates promote the cross-subsidy. 
Perhaps nowhere is the inequity of mandated disclosure more ap-
parent or disheartening than in health care.  “A lower education level 
was found in most studies [of medical patients] to have a negative in-
fluence on comprehension and memory.  Recall of information was 
also negatively influenced by older age.  Studies on elderly patients 
have shown that both comprehension and memory performance va-
ried directly with vocabulary level.”415  It is obvious and well proved 
that there are “large health disparities between the disadvantaged in 
the United States and those who are more privileged.”416  Resources 
spent obeying disclosure mandates are resources that cannot be spent 
giving the poor what they most need:  better care.  At the same time, 
these are resources that help the privileged more, because literature 
helps the literate most.417 
 
413 COMCAST AGREEMENT FOR RESIDENTIAL SERVICES, COMCAST, ¶ 13.c (2010). 
414 See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit (describing methods card issuers use 
to exploit unsophisticated consumers, such as teaser rates and backloading less attrac-
tive terms), in BOILERPLATE, supra note 377, at 106, 110-11. 
415 Lemaire, supra note 194, at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
416 David Mechanic, Disadvantage, Inequality, and Social Policy:  Major Initiatives In-
tended to Improve Population Health May Also Increase Health Disparities, HEALTH AFF., 
Mar./Apr. 2002, at 48, 49. 
417 See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Af-
fairs, supra note 286, at 553 (reporting that patients’ health literacy correlates with 
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Mandated disclosure not only helps the rich more than the poor, 
but also perversely and unintentionally obligates the poor to subsidize 
the rich.  Good deals must be paid for.  Vendors often incorporate the 
cost of good deals for the sophisticated into the price that everybody 
pays.418  We already mentioned the redistributive effect of hospital re-
port cards, where mandated disclosure of “quality of care” measures 
disproportionately helps patients who are less sick and reduces the 
well-being of sicker ones.419 
Inequity is built into mandated disclosure.  The poor begin with 
more troubles and fewer resources.  They pay higher interest than 
people better situated to make the payments, deal with less reputable 
lenders, know less about financial affairs, are more likely to encounter 
crippling financial reverses, find it harder to locate competent profes-
sional help, and so on.  They have harder decisions to make than the 
prosperous do.  Yet the principle of mandated disclosure is to make 
people responsible for their own decisions and for protecting them-
selves by giving them information.  That is, the poor have harder 
problems that require more information and experience, but they 
have less ability to use the information.  Giving everybody access to a 
benefit that some—the “elite”—are better able to use promotes ineq-
uity.  This inequity is only aggravated if the cost of this favor is shared 
by the prosperous and poor alike. 
CONCLUSION:  BEYOND MANDATED DISCLOSURE 
This Article had four purposes.  First, to identify a regulatory me-
thod that is much used but has not been analyzed across doctrinal 
boundaries.  Second, to show how widely—even indiscriminately—that 
method is used.  Third, to show that the method is prone to failure.  
Fourth, to explain why it fails and how fallible its mechanisms are. 
We might have had a fifth purpose:  to prescribe a regulatory al-
ternative.  That is too large a question to squeeze into the compass of 
this Article.  But the logic of our argument is that that question can-
not be answered straightforwardly, if it can be answered at all.  If 
 
knowledge of their illness); Schneider & Hall, supra note 62, at 62-65 (examining the 
inequitable effects of disclosure statements, which the poor—who tend to have the 
highest prevalence of chronic disease—tend to be able to read and comprehend least). 
418 See generally Gilo & Porat, supra note 377, at 70-71 (explaining that suppliers 
hide terms favorable to some consumers in boilerplate language “to avoid frustrating 
the consumers who do not receive them”). 
419 See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of hospital 
report cards). 
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mandated disclosure has been used in a cavalcade of circumstances, if 
the decisions mandated disclosure addresses are enormously various, 
if the people disclosure is supposed to help are also various, it would 
be astonishing to find that any single substitute for it worked.  In what 
follows, we warn against some possible misunderstandings of our ar-
gument and point the way to some useful paths of inquiry. 
A.  Simple Information 
We have described problems people have in acquiring and using in-
formation.  As we have repeatedly emphasized, we do not deny that in-
formation can be useful.  Where people make a decision regularly, they 
become expert at making it.  But in these circumstances they are less 
likely to need and unlikely to feel that they need mandated disclosures. 
But what about the decisions that people do not make regularly?  
Here, people are likely to be ignorant.  Can disclosures provide in-
formation that will actually help them?  A principal lesson of our re-
view of why mandated disclosure fails is that length, complexity, and 
difficulty are the enemies of successful mandates.  This suggests that 
brief, simple, easy disclosures are at least preferable.  But how brief, 
simple, and easy must a disclosure be to be useful to more than an al-
ready-well-off few?  There is little real evidence, but we find some rea-
son to think that the answer is very brief, simple, and easy—perhaps to 
the point of using symbols instead of sentences.  For example, Los 
Angeles County requires restaurants to disclose sanitation “grade 
cards” on windows (letters “A,” “B,” or “C”), and these seem to have 
influenced consumers—and, in turn, led to cleanlier restaurants.420  
This is information that anyone can understand, and the single datum 
is enough to affect customers’ choice of restaurants.  Likewise, when 
mandated disclosures merely report a rating of consumer satisfaction, 
rather than a breakdown of quality metrics, they have an empirically 
proven impact.  For example, Medicare enrollees receiving such infor-
mation shift to health plans with better consumer satisfaction grades.421 
 
420 See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality:  
Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409, 449 (2003) (finding 
evidence that “the grade cards cause a significant decrease in the number of people 
admitted to hospitals with food-borne illness, and that this effect is not fully explained 
by consumers switching from bad to good hygiene restaurants”). 
421 See Dafny & Dranove, supra note 144, at 817 (identifying a “report-card  
effect . . . entirely due to beneficiaries’ responses to consumer satisfaction scores; other 
reported quality measures . . . did not affect enrollment”).  
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It may also be that brief, simple, and easy works best when it is part 
of a larger program of social change.  Sometimes the purpose of man-
dates is not to give people information for making the choice that they 
prefer but rather to induce them to make the choice that the lawmaker 
thinks preferable.  This inducement is the point of cigarette warnings, 
warnings about the effects of alcohol consumption on fetuses, many nu-
trition warnings, and so on.  The goal of these disclosures is more to 
persuade than to inform.  In addition, some warnings are focused on 
persuading disclosers to change their behavior rather than on commu-
nicating the information in question.  Examples include sanitation re-
port cards for restaurants and calorie disclosures on fast-food menus. 
But how often, and how well, can facts of even ordinary complexi-
ty and difficulty be reduced to simple ratings, letter grades, or sym-
bols?  The advantages of simplicity have long been evident, and thus 
simplicity has long been a cherished goal in disclosures.  Some man-
dated disclosures use simple rating scores.  An FTC study, for exam-
ple, suggests TILA mortgage forms can be simplified and better un-
derstood by borrowers.422 
On the whole, however, history is not reassuring.  Several things 
impede simplification, and the cure for the ills of mandated disclosure 
is not merely “keep it simple.”  First, sometimes even a simple 
mandate to disclose simple information could have undesirable con-
sequences.  To make a mandate simple, only very few items could be 
included, disproportionately focusing the attention of recipients to 
these items.  A possible result is the “teaching to the test” effect, whe-
reby other important aspects of the transaction are overlooked. 
Second, disclosures try to describe an element of quality:  calorie 
count, hospital-procedure fatality rate, nursing-home quality, the cost 
of credit, or a risk of the product.  For this to be useful, people must 
be able to predict the effect of the disclosed fact on their satisfaction.  
Not only are such predictions tricky, but satisfaction depends on much 
else and on a variety of tradeoffs.  Moreover, people vary in their ability 
to use information, and weaker market participants—poor, unedu-
cated, high-need individuals—will find the information less useful.  This 
 
422 See Lacko & Pappalardo, supra note 322, at 518-19 (observing that study partici-
pants who received a prototype disclosure, developed for the study, “answered on aver-
age 80 percent of the loan term questions correctly, compared to an average 61 per-
cent for participants viewing the mandated disclosure”). 
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was shown to be the case with respect to hospital report cards, and it is 
likely to be true of the new “country of origin” food-labeling laws.423 
Third, people’s preferences and concerns vary, and disclosures 
may matter to them in different degrees.  Indeed, this very hetero-
geneity is at the ideological base of mandated disclosure for free mar-
keters and autonomists.  Some borrowers care about APRs, while oth-
ers care about overdraft fees or the structure of debt.  Transactions 
subject to mandated disclosures are complicated and multi-
dimensional.  Some aspects of these transactions might matter to 
some people but not to others.  Simple quality disclosures fix people’s 
attention on a particular aspect, which might fail to capture the key to 
their satisfaction.  Between the heterogeneity of the disclosees and the 
complexity of the relevant information, it is normally hard to reduce 
an evaluation to a simple score. 
Fourth, mandated disclosure succeeds only if lawmaking works 
well.  Even if one could imagine ideal disclosure or some ideal sum-
mary of data, the lawmaker would need to identify and preserve it in 
that form.  But as we noted earlier, much drives lawmakers toward 
overusing mandated disclosure and setting standards of disclosure too 
broadly.  Additional disclosures aimed at new problems are likely to 
augment simple disclosures.  For the very feature that can make some 
disclosures effective—their simplicity—also keeps them from respond-
ing to the heterogeneity of problems and people.  But once a simple 
disclosure is bolstered and expanded, the quantity problem returns.  
Nutrition labeling is already on this path, as lawmakers add more and 
more to the package (e.g., the food’s origin, GMO information, aller-
gy warnings, and a finer breakdown of nutrients and toxins). 
While we are skeptical that mandated disclosure can be fixed, we 
do not contend that disclosure can never work.  Failure is not inhe-
rent in any information regime, nor is it the mandatory aspect that 
guarantees failure.  Rather, it is the regulatory dynamic of this institu-
tion—the desire to solve too many problems merely by informing un-
sophisticated decisionmakers and expecting them to make affirmative 
thoughtful decisions—that undermines the system. 
 
423 See 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (mandating marking of any imported articles and 
containers with the country of origin); 7 C.F.R. §§ 60.200–.300 (2010) (detailing coun-
try-of-origin labeling requirements for agricultural products). 
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B.  From Information Toward Advice 
When simple data will not do the job, when considerable informa-
tion is needed to make a good decision, and when experience is re-
quired to use information well, mandated disclosure confronts the 
many daunting problems that we have described. 
The premise of mandated disclosure is that information will help 
people toward the right decisions.  We have shown that the empirical 
history of mandated disclosure is a history of failure.  The quantity 
problem is generally unsolvable without making disclosures fatally 
simple-minded, incomplete, and misleading.  The accumulation prob-
lem would defeat mandated disclosure even if individual overload is-
sues could be managed.  The ideological thrust of mandated disclo-
sure—its origins in both market and autonomy theory—is to place 
choice, and thus risk and responsibility, onto the ill-informed and in-
expert person facing a novel and complex decision.  That can have 
especially lamentable consequences for the vulnerable, but it also 
leaves ordinary people facing decisions ill-prepared and ill-equipped. 
We cannot offer a new panacea to supplant the old one.  Indeed, 
we reject the premise that a one-size-fits-all solution can miraculously 
work in all areas of human plight.  But we can offer at least a line of 
hypothesis and inquiry:  Mandated disclosure asks what people should 
know to make a good decision.  We would ask what they want to know.  
When we abandon the unreal world of mandated disclosure and ask 
how people really make decisions, we see that they generally seek—
and that the market often supplies—not data, but advice. 
Facing choices, people sensibly ask friends for help.  Whether 
seeking a plumber, a dentist, an insurance agent, or a mortgage bro-
ker, they consult their private network for the kind of advice that they 
trust and know how to use.  Much of that advice comes in the form of 
global recommendations, based on overall satisfaction, since the best 
way to predict one person’s satisfaction is to assess other people’s satis-
faction.  The broader the network of recommendations, the sounder 
the information, but the greater the challenge of aggregating recom-
mendations into useful guidance. 
Many markets have sua sponte provided such evaluations in a par-
ticularly useful form—by aggregating recommendations from users of 
a good or service.  Many markets depend on peer ratings.  The eBay 
business model relies on buyers’ willingness to pay upfront for goods 
sold by anonymous sellers, a phenomenon that is largely possible be-
cause of the reliability of sellers’ ratings—a single score that tallies the 
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percentage of satisfied customers.  Similarly, Expedia.com rates hotels, 
Zagat rates restaurants, CNET.com rates electronic appliances and re-
tailers, Amazon rates used-book sellers (and a cornucopia of goods), 
and Netflix rates movies.  Some services try to improve scores by ask-
ing people to rate the raters, thus creating a smart weighted-ratings 
average.  In short, consumers rate innumerable market transactions 
and services, from blenders and pizzas to doctors and professors. 
Another source of help—as opposed to just information—for con-
sumers is to give them expert advice.  Expert advice comes in two 
forms.  In some of the areas in which disclosures are mandated, an 
expert gives personalized advice to a particular client.  This happens 
all the time with doctors, financial advisers, accountants, brokers, and 
so forth.  For example, after hearing an insurance agent go through 
mandated disclosures, many people have the agent make a decision.  
Next time, they just skip the disclosures.  Similarly, patients frequently 
prefer that a doctor propose a treatment, explain it, and get the pa-
tient’s (largely symbolic) confirmation. 
The problem with expert help, of course, is that it needs to be ge-
nuinely expert and genuinely in the service of the client, free of con-
flicts and influences.  These things are not easy to assure.  Unfortu-
nately, mandated disclosure has been one of the principal means of 
trying to do so.  It is, at the very least, paradoxical:  experts are needed 
in the first place because people cannot rely solely on disclosures.  But 
how can disclosures assure the clients that the experts are dedicated?  
Moreover, mandated disclosure constrains even dedicated experts.  
The rigidity of disclosure templates confines them to provide their 
clients with information.  Our Article has questioned whether this 
technique best serves clients.  We noted that this may even perversely 
tend to make the expert feel less responsible for—and be less helpful 
to—the client.424 
The second form of expert advice is advice made generally availa-
ble, by purchase or otherwise.  Significant elements of the market 
have long proffered the views of experts.  Expert evaluations can be 
bought, as Consumer Reports’ long history suggests, but many are free.  
 
424 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 110, at 188-90 (noting that bureaucratization of 
medical care and the shift of doctors’ focus from individuals towards “the organiza-
tions which employ doctors” has an effect of “weaken[ing] the doctor’s ties with, and 
sense of obligation to, the patient”).  Compare the medical principle of informed con-
sent with the very different principles that govern the relationships between lawyers 
and clients.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2009) (“Clients 
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the 
means to be used to accomplish their objectives . . . .”). 
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For example, when electing a Senator, voters can consult ratings by 
the AFL-CIO or the NRA.  When choosing a restaurant, patrons can 
count Michelin stars.  And when buying wine, oenophiles can check 
Robert Parker’s wine scores. 
Some very simple disclosures and many ratings systems can pro-
vide help in another way that does not burden the consumer with  
data.  It appears that the sanitary grade that Los Angeles restaurants 
must post leads some restaurants to try to get their grades up.425  It 
seems likely that consumer ratings can have the same effect.  Sellers 
on eBay are generally concerned with avoiding negative ratings.  Inso-
far as disclosure causes disclosers to behave better (and not merely at-
tempt to manipulate the feedback and the ratings scores), disclosees 
need not rely on the disclosed data but can instead (as they say) shop 
with confidence.426 
Sometimes advice—whether it is the aggregated experience of the 
multitude or the opinions of the expert—will not adequately help the 
naïve in their dealings with the sophisticated.  Another way to try to 
help people make good decisions is for the law to “channel” people’s 
choices, without mandating them.427  The core of channelling is not to 
make decisions for people but rather to create defaults and incentives 
that lead people toward presumptively wise decisions, while leaving 
people to reject those choices if they wish.428  For example, defaults 
may be set so that people start off and can most easily stay in the posi-
tion that most people would prefer.  This is what intestacy statutes do 
with apparent success.  Because a considerable consensus supports 
encouraging people to save for retirement, some employers put 
pension funds directly into retirement savings account, letting em-
ployees opt out if they wish.  Another channeling device is to require 
vendors to offer a basic, uniform option.429  This makes apples-to-
 
425 See supra note 420 and accompanying text.  
426 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts:  Consumer Protection Without Law, 7 
EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 221 (2010). 
427 See, e.g., Scott D. Halpern et al., Harnessing the Power of Default Options to Improve 
Health Care, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1340, 1343 (2007) (declaring that policymakers 
should set default options to “achieve legitimate and important health care goals”); 
Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 496-
97 (1992) (introducing the concept that, in family law, the law has a channeling func-
tion, which “recruits, builds, shapes, sustains, and promotes social institutions”). 
428 See RICHARD R. THALER & CASS H. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).  
429 The Obama administration recently advanced a proposal in this spirit.  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 180, at 66-67 (proposing that a “plain vanilla” type 
mortgage, or one “easy for consumers to understand” should be offered as a simple 
option alongside other mortgages). 
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apples comparisons easier and improves competition.  Vendors would 
remain free to offer more complex choices as well. 
A more aggressive way to use the law to help the naïve is to outlaw 
practices that are too likely to result in disaster.  Whether some choices 
are so likely to be so bad for so many people that they should be out-
lawed is beyond the scope of this Article.  HOEPA—a 1994 statute that 
amended the Truth in Lending Act—went a step beyond mandating 
disclosures.  To combat predatory lending practices, it prohibited subs-
tantive terms like prepayment penalties, balloon loans, acceleration 
clauses, and some default penalties.430  Or, recent reform in credit-card 
markets eliminated some choices that borrowers traditionally had, 
which often led to poor outcomes.431  Obviously such prohibitions close 
options from which some people would benefit.  Risky mortgages let 
some people buy and keep homes who otherwise could not have done 
so.  Thus, at some point, the benefits of such prohibitions exceed their 
costs.  The lawmaker’s challenge is to identify that point. 
The contribution of this Article is not in finding a suitable prohi-
bition point.  Rather, its contribution is in recognizing that such poli-
cies are sometimes inevitable and cannot be sidestepped by opting for 
seemingly easier solutions in the disclosure paradigm.  If, as we have 
argued, mandated disclosure rarely works, lawmakers must do the 
hard work of carefully analyzing social problems to find the best way 
to promote good decisions.  In any event, we need to abandon the 
idea that people’s autonomy is bolstered by supposedly empowering 
them to make choices through mandated disclosure. 
 
 
430 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31–.34 (2010). 
431 See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 
§ 105, 15 U.S.C. 1637(n) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
